# Strategic Concept DA – BFHR

### Notes

Not a finished product --- mostly because things could change significantly in the next two weeks. In case it does, we have written multiple versions of the disad. Think of the disad as an overstretch da, that also has arguments about political in-fighting and cohesion. The better version of the da is probably NOT just the straight cohesion argument because there are so many things in the alliance that the allies disagree about. Rather, the disad is an argument about the future vision for NATO. Every 10 years or so NATO puts out a document/announcement called the strategic concept. The concept both reiterates the goals for the alliance for the next decade, as well as reinforcing the strategy and direction of the alliance. NATO has a summit in Madrid this coming week where they may theoretically release the concept. There is talk that due to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine that they may push back the release of the concept and the accompanying statements for another 6-12 months. Obviously what happens at Madrid will change the disad significantly. The disad in its current form says that the allies are negotiating what will be included in the document. The general tenor is that they strayed too far away from their core tasks in the last concept, and that the re-emergence of Russia as a serious threat to global stability and NATO allies in particular justifies re-focusing the alliance on Deterrence, while including a new component about Chinese deterrence. The disad argues that the plan shifts that focus away by including a new governance/technology/civilian focus around EDT that is at odds with the current concept strategy. There are several different link arguments available including focus, a narrow mandate/agenda, as well as a separate in-fighting/cohesion argument. The concept is a very important moment for the future of the alliance with several issues facing the potential cohesion and coherence of the alliance going forward. Pushing the concept away from its traditional focus and causing in-fighting with its release has serious implications for long-term stability and cohesion.

Links overlap for different versions of the disad. If the Madrid talks formalize the concept, I will shift the uniqueness story for the disad in future updates. However, the link work the students have done in this file will work for other versions of this disad. At worst, there is a cohesion da that has all the components necessary to make it a viable da. I would just suggest continuous cohesion updates and really staying on-top of the disagreements within the alliance if you want to go for that version of the da.

Some other notes:

There are some uniqueness tricks vs. EDT now --- some decent arguments about the NATO focus on EDT currently being at more of a public-private partnership level, and that NATO is staying out of the business of EDT governance and standard-setting. This should jive well with the way that most of the aff’s are written. There is of course, lots of room for innovation, and I think there are probably domestic political arguments as well as a potential credibility da about the Secretary General. He has been trying to get a focus on more tech/EDT into the concept, but also trying to keep the mandate narrow and focused on Russia, so there may be some link/link turn arguments either way.

Forslund

Thank you to the following students for their work:

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## Top Shelf

### 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

#### A --- Strategic concept will focus on deterrence – the direct nature of the Ukraine war means NATO will refocus on conventional deterrence instead of hybrid and non-state threats.

Simon 22 [Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance.; “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO”; NATO Review; June 2, 2022; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html]//eleanor

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion.

#### B --- The plan crushes NATO’s strategic concept --- causes infighting, collapses cohesion and deterrence and overstretches the agenda

Dr. Tardy ‘20

(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

In the debate about congruence, one logical conclusion of the above-described elements about the character of the Russian threat is that NATO has to embrace a broader agenda than the one defined by the “deterrence and defence” mantra. To remain relevant, NATO needs to go beyond a too narrow defence-focused agenda, the argument goes. It needs to engage into a securitisation process, by which issues that were not previously belonging to its portfolio of tasks, would now appear on its agenda. As a matter of fact, the shift to security is not new. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has indeed broadened its agenda through activities in the fields of crisis management, implementing mandates often closer to police tasks than to genuine military undertakings. In doing this NATO demonstrated a sense of adaptability and resilience (Menon and Welsh 2011). NATO’s role in Afghanistan’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or in humanitarian relief operations, provides more specific examples of NATO operating at the frontier of military core tasks to respond to broader security needs (see Gallis 2007, Jakobsen 2010, Williams 2011). Similarly, NATO’s role in counter-terrorism, energy security (Bocse 2020), security sector reform, training, or more recently in the cyber domain, also attest to a broadening of the agenda. The entire discussion about hybrid threats and warfare epitomises this evolution. NATO has also developed expertise on these issues, both within its own staff in Brussels and through its network of Centres of Excellence. To a large extent thus, the defence agenda is subsumed into a broader security agenda and the challenge is therefore to make trade-offs between different types of activities. We believe though that not only are these activities politically and operationally less prominent than what the “deterrence and defence” agenda has implied since 2014, but a key argument of this research is also that further developing these tasks carry risks of maladaptation. Maladaptation may result from issues spanning a lack of expertise and legitimacy deficit on many of the new tasks embraced, inter-institutional duplication and competition, uneven members states’ backing, to dilution of the Alliance’s core military role. Enlarging the scope: towards security and internal threats Acquiring a mandate or a capacity to tackle a broad range of threats implies that NATO moves in two directions: towards more security-type activities as opposed to defence-focused ones; and towards more internal issues. In both directions, a more assertive role for NATO implies three levels of activity: policy development, i.e. the ability to produce policy documents that frame NATO’s role in a particular domain; capability development, i.e. the ability to acquire expertise or resources that can be used for the implementation of a particular policy; and operations, i.e. the ability to act through operational activities, be they exercises, training or actual use of NATO and member states’ capabilities placed under NATO command. These three levels allow us to distinguish between domains where NATO would only act in a coordination or information-sharing role (for which capability development and operations are not necessary), and domains where NATO would be having a more central function. Applied to the current landscape, the broadening security agenda beyond what is already done would imply a more assertive role for NATO in defensive/offensive cyber activities (with the cyberspace being an operational domain and covered by Article 5), in the fight against organised crime networks, inter alia through maritime security, as well as in the broad security sector reform (SSR) agenda of partner countries, to take just a few examples. In all these tasks coercion and military effect are not absent, yet they are less central than in traditional defence activities. The second direction of the move – inward-looking – would mean that NATO plays an increased role in the defence against internal threats, by contributing to: critical infrastructure protection and resilience building; civilian protection tasks; police-type activities such as anti-terrorist operations in European capitals; operations that aim to tackle the security consequences of (massive) migrant flows; or support to police forces facing under-the-radar hybrid-type non-conventional attacks. This would imply establishing relations with a set of national actors, from law enforcement entities to municipalities, public companies (in the energy and transport sectors among others) and the private sector (Machi 2017). The role of NATO in these various activities could vary in ambition, spanning information-sharing, awareness rising, coordination, exercises, and more operational tasks. The implied risks of task expansion Although these various tasks make sense when assessed against the broad security needs of NATO member states and societies, and may be justified for political reasons, they carry a number of risks of maladaptation. First, NATO would have to further develop or acquire an expertise on issues that can be very technical, or human resources-heavy, and for which even the member states may have a deficit (as in the cyber domain, energy security, or critical infrastructure protection). The added-value of NATO’s role would be all the more challenged as its expertise is being questioned. Second, the legitimacy of NATO’s role in some areas may be challenged due to a lack of expertise or because of the possible intrusiveness of NATO’s activities; this leads to sovereignty considerations, with states – be they NATO member states or not – having issues with any attempt from NATO to interfere with their internal sphere, in the law enforcement domain for example. Third, any task expansion would require a degree of consensus within member states on the merits of the enlarged mandate, and this will prove to be difficult, as illustrated by the sensitivities of broadening NATO’s agenda towards the South, to include counter-terrorism and migration policies for example (NATO official 2019). Even an agreement on broadening NATO’s mandate on the Eastern flank to embrace security issues would be difficult. Securitisation is inherently subjective (Buzan and Waever 2003, Sperling and Webber 2016); it is the outcome of a political choice that in turn results from an intersubjective understanding of what constitutes a threat. It follows that consensus-building on newly identified threats or policies is all the more difficult. Fourth, the broad security field is already crowded with institutions that in some areas would appear in a stronger position. NATO’s positioning on the broad field of activities would potentially duplicate existing capacities, and place it in direct competition with others, often in a weaker position. From the SSR domain in Sub-Saharan Africa to police or border tasks within European states, actors like the EU, national administrations, police forces and NGOs would not necessarily welcome a NATO role. Fifth, any broadening of NATO’s mandate would be resisted as it would carry the risk of diluting NATO’s war-fighting capability. Contemporary war-fighting is arguably politically, financially and operationally demanding; any parallel effort can, therefore, be seen as a deleterious diversion (see Stapleton 2016). Cyber security provides a good example of these risks. Cyber is arguably a key dimension of NATO’s mission. It is part of “NATO’s core task of collective defence”, and its qualification as an operational domain implies that NATO “must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as [it does] in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture” (NATO 2018, para. 20) At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies have also stated that a cyber attack could lead to the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, NATO has developed a fair amount of doctrinal and policy documents in that domain. Yet the extent to which NATO can play an important role in cyber security is uncertain for reasons that have to do with expertise, capabilities, the nature of the threat and of its possible targets, and therefore the nature of the response. In terms of expertise, while NATO may provide support to the states that suffer shortfalls, notably through its Cyber Rapid Reaction teams, the Alliance does not display obvious comparative advantages vis-à-vis most member states (NATO Official 2019). As for capabilities to conduct cyber attacks, NATO has so far relied exclusively on its member states, through the concept of “sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies”, and integrated “into Alliance operations and missions” (NATO 2018, para. 20). The fact that cyber attacks (on NATO member states) would most likely target entities that are either private actors, or in any case under the protection of domestic police forces, is also an issue. As put by a NATO official, while what can be sought is a “military outcome, it cannot be achieved solely through military means”, and “what may be a military challenge is in fact inextricably linked with both civilian government, private industry and even individuals” (Brent 2019, p. 2). These issues lead back to the question of how much NATO can deter cyber attacks, in relation to both deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Those limitations apply beyond the cyber domain, to most of the current threats, for which a military response can be necessary, but very seldom sufficient nor even central.

#### C --- Collapse of Allied Conventional Deterrence causes full-scale nuclear war with Russia

Kroenig ‘21

(Dr. Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and the director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” pg online @ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15\_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf)

If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commitments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could retaliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56

### 1NC --- Cohesion DA Shell

#### A --- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinvigorates NATO cohesion, but it’s not guaranteed if they don’t focus on Russia.

McRaven 4/20/22 [William H. McRaven, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. Peter Orszag is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008. Theodore Bunzel, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department.; “Made in the Alliance”; Foreign Affairs; April 20, 2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance]//eleanor

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the Western alliance and bolstered transatlantic solidarity. After being declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, NATO has sprung to life, deploying forces to its eastern flank and coordinating the provision of sophisticated weapons that have helped Ukraine impede Russia’s invasion. For the first time in its history, the European Union has financed the purchase and delivery of lethal aid. Western countries have vastly exceeded expectations in implementing coordinated financial sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. Even neutral Switzerland joined the fray. But no matter how remarkable this solidarity may be in the short term, there is no guarantee that it will last: if policymakers are complacent, powerful trends predating the Ukraine crisis could overwhelm and ultimately derail it. Protectionist sentiment and self-defeating trade wars have pulled at the seams of Western economic integration. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have chipped away at military trust between the United States and Europe. A Marine Le Pen victory later this month in France would pose additional challenges to the alliance, and looming concerns about the 2024 presidential election raise doubts about the United States’ commitment. If not managed intelligently, the reawakening of Europe as a diplomatic and military actor and the reexamination of global economic interdependence catalyzed by Russia’s invasion could result not in a strengthened transatlantic alliance but in a more worrying outcome: the emergence of three distinct blocs, one centered around the United States, a second around Europe, and a third around China (which would include Russia). Such a world—with the United States and Europe often collaborating, but also at odds when their interests diverge—would make the management of China and Russia more difficult, as the two would have opportunities to trigger and exploit U.S.-European tensions. It would also represent a major missed opportunity for the United States and Europe.

#### B --- The plan trades-off with NATO focus and cohesion by expanding the alliance outside of its core deterrence tasks

Larsen 22 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China”; Lawfare; May 22, 2022; https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china]//eleanor

NATO’s main task in the foreseeable security environment is to adapt to the threat posed by Russia while also trying to reach a precise understanding of the challenge posed by China. At the planned Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide the alliance’s future political and military development, which is the right starting point for a new strategy to manage renewed great power competition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to eliminate any doubts about its ability and resolve to defend its eastern territory against a Russian attack. NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values. Containing Russia, Watching China NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s revisionist foreign policy has so far focused mostly on the military threat that the country poses. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO enhanced its capacity for rapid reaction and placed multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states as a “tripwire” to remind Russia of NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO will likely aim to demonstrate its ability and resolve to repel an attack by Russia’s forces stationed near allied territory by improving its reinforcement capability to deter major Russian military buildups like the one around Ukraine. NATO already boosted its existing forward deployments, while the rise in European defense expenditure will enable the alliance to shoulder a broader deterrence effort. Conversely, NATO has not fully found its foothold when it comes to Russia’s political warfare, by which it has attempted to diminish the alliance’s ability to act cohesively. The digital age has enhanced the opportunities for Russia to engage in information and psychological warfare, including hack-and-leak operations to influence and discredit elections. The polarization of the political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade has made countries more receptive to Russian disinformation and narratives seeking to discredit the democratic process. Moreover, Russian assassination and sabotage operations on NATO territory have contributed to a public sense of vulnerability to heavy-handed authoritarian methods and doubt about the coping power of democratic institutions. China does not compare to the direct threat that Russia poses but has nevertheless appeared on NATO’s strategic radar as an economic great power with a high-tech edge that Russia is unlikely to ever match. Chinese 5G network provider Huawei remains a pertinent topic for NATO, as several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, are still undecided about relying on its potentially compromised technology or de facto allowing their national operators to use Chinese providers. Moreover, Chinese investments in continental Europe without conditionalities attached and targeting critical infrastructure (railway stations, ports and airports) raise suspicions about Beijing’s underlying political and military motives. Moreover, China is pressing ahead with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), and its space ambitions are growing. Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities. NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

#### C --- United NATO focused on Deterrence prevents war with Russia and China

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/micahw> [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole.

# Uniqueness

## General

### 1NC/2NC --- Uniqueness

#### There is an internal battle on the future of NATO now --- defense planners want to keep the mandate narrow and focused on Russia --- expanding the mandate to include emerging tech will undermine the effectiveness

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Who’s in charge? Multiple allies felt taken by surprise by the advanced nature of the thinking that went into NATO’s military strategy. When General Dunford remarked in May 2019 that NATO now had, for the first time ‘in decades’, a military strategy that ‘clearly articulates the challenges that confront NATO’ and ‘provides the framework for the various plans that will be in place if deterrence fails’, he highlighted not only the benefits of an enhanced framework for military planning but also, inadvertently, the political shortcomings of the Alliance’s strategic leadership.30 Some allies felt a need to push back. Tellingly, the United States and the United Kingdom were not among them. American and British military authorities had led the charge and considered both the new military strategy and the derivative theatre-wide DDA as having been politically approved and ready to go.31 Other allies, however, continue to have reservations with regard to the Russia-centric nature of the strategy, and attach importance to a subtle distinction whereby they have merely ‘noted’ the military strategy but explicitly ‘approved’ the DDA. In fact, these allies have sought to contain the 2019 military strategy and to control the 2020 DDA-led process. As noted, they have arrested the overarching threat assessment, pushing for an upgrade of the role of the southern flank. A revised Strategic Concept will have to find a way to balance between Russia-related collective defence and southern counter-terrorism and capacity-building. For now, the southern flank has won a stronger foothold in the DDA, which henceforth will contain a Sequenced Response Plan – which is comparable to the Russia-centric Graduated Response Plans – to address southern contingencies. This is merely a warm-up for a grander political debate, however. A wide variety of allies continue to insist that SACEUR must base theatre- wide DDA planning on compartmentalised Graduated Response Plans. Compartmentalised planning stifles military agility, but allies like to have NATO plans for their particular neighbourhoods and, moreover, the ability to leverage these plans to control SACEUR’s otherwise free rein within a 360-degree approach to NATO’s theatre of operations. Put differently, they are not about to hand SACEUR a mandate to steer the type of ‘horizontal escalation’ that is baked into the theatre-wide approach. Allies are also in control of force investment, and hence the development of the kind of ready and robust forces on which NATO plans depend. In short, SACEUR may possess a stellar military strategy, but he is limited to planning for the simultaneous activation of just two response plans at any one time, and has too few ready and capable troops on which to call. The traumatic retreat from Afghanistan in August 2021 could ultimately enhance political–military coherence and empower SACEUR’s work with the DDA, though the full implications of the withdrawal remain unclear at the time of writing. The retreat suffered from a lack of allied coordination and exposed the heralded NATO principle of ‘in together, out together’ as cover for US-driven planning. European allies found that they could regret the lack of political coordination and harbour different plans, but ultimately lacked the capabilities to resist or influence US policy. The Afghanistan retreat has thus ignited a new, probing debate on transatlantic burden- sharing that can be expected to give the Strategic Concept process a kind of unpredictable energy. What is clear is that European allies who worry about a hard-nosed turn in US policy – as exemplified by Trump’s sweeping critique of NATO allies and now the Biden administration’s actions in Afghanistan – must give thought to their own defence efforts at a level that extends far beyond the intricacies of NATO’s requirement that allies spend 2% of GDP on defence (a 2014 measure intended to increase European spending). Rebalancing NATO has become an issue that the Strategic Concept cannot ignore, but rather must define and build on. NATO has advanced military planning (MC 400/4 and the DDA) to help this process along, and no doubt SACEUR and other military authorities are hopeful that it will result in more confident political engagement with the terms of allied defence and deterrence, including the resourcing of a more robust European force contribution. To achieve this type of greater political–military coherence, NATO’s leadership must offer a corrected transatlantic vision of collective defence that explicitly delineates core lessons from Afghanistan and their implications for a rebalanced NATO. Political revival, but how? Allies have until now been catching up, having been taken by surprise firstly by forward-leaning military authorities, and then by the speed with which Stoltenberg moved to put a revised Strategic Concept on the Alliance’s agenda. In late November 2020, in the wake of the US presidential election, Stoltenberg stated that ‘the time has come to update our strategic concept’.32 A few days later, a Reflection Group appointed by the secretary-general likewise concluded that ‘NATO must update the 2010 Strategic Concept’.33 In February 2021, the secretary-general offered his condensed view of the Reflection Group’s conclusions, writing in his ‘Food for Thought Paper’: ‘At the 2021 Summit, Leaders should agree to update the Strategic Concept’ and ‘should adopt a tasking for me to lead the process’ with a view to concluding it in 2022.34 The leaders duly did so in Brussels on 14 June.35 The need for political reform had been signalled by the trauma of the divisive 2018 Brussels Summit; the decision to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary in April 2019 at the level of foreign ministers, rather than heads of state and government; the intensifying disagreement on how NATO should respond to crises in its vicinity, not least in Syria; and finally French President Emmanuel Macron’s November 2019 characterisation of NATO as ‘brain dead’.36 When NATO heads of state and government met in London in December 2019 not for a summit but for a quick Leaders Meeting – this being all they could handle – they readily agreed to ‘invite’ the secretary-general to steer a ‘reflection process’ to ‘further strengthen NATO’s political dimension’.37 Still, the speed with which Stoltenberg enlarged this reflection process into a ‘NATO 2030’ agenda, his bold leap in demanding a revised Strategic Concept, and his equally bold decision to push his February 2021 ‘Food for Thought Paper’ into the public arena were all surprisingly out of character. Stoltenberg had been decisive in helping NATO weather the storm unleashed by Trump, but as a consensus builder who worked behind the scenes while keeping up public appearances. Now, and for good reason, he was charging ahead. The distinct risk of this charge is that it will add to NATO’s political– military tensions. Stoltenberg’s London mandate, and therefore the work of the Reflection Group, was entirely political: there was no built-in requirement to seek political–military coherence. Moreover, even if Stoltenberg has so far confined the Strategic Concept debate to the headquarters of the North Atlantic Council, thereby avoiding extensive committee work and negotiations, he will not be able to imitate Rasmussen’s tightly controlled process in 2010. In fact, NATO leaders have stipulated that while the secretary-general should ‘lead’ the Strategic Concept process, the text ‘will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed by NATO Leaders at the next Summit’.38 The upside is that allied buy-in will increase compared with 2010 and thereafter. The downside is that the temptation to be expansive in terms of priorities could grow. The 2020 Reflection Group, steered by the secretary- general, notably did not call for the slimming of NATO’s core tasks.39 In a bid to build a consensus, the secretary-general may feel tempted to lengthen the list of core tasks, perhaps by adding resilience, disruptive technology, pandemics and natural disasters. This temptation will be all the stronger given that, in the meantime, NATO has decided to ‘mainstream’ the challenges posed by China into the Alliance’s many policy portfolios.40 In short, NATO is approaching a revised Strategic Concept with, on the one hand, a political temptation to go big and, on the other, a Russia-centric approach to military planning. To steer clear of further political–military tensions and even rupture, NATO allies should 1) prioritise collective defence; 2) develop a values-based narrative; and 3) intensify its internal political–military dialogue.

#### NATO is developing a new strategic concept --- maintaining a delicate balance, while pushing the core strategy is critical for unity, cohesion, and effective alliance stability

Martin and Martonffy ‘21

(Garret Martin is a senior professorial lecturer at American University’s School of International Service and the co-director of the Transatlantic Policy Center. Balazs Martonffy, who received his PhD from American University, is the director of the American Studies Research Institute at Ludovika and a nonresident fellow at the International Center for Security and Leadership, “NATO is about to launch a formal strategic review. Here’s what that means,” pg online @ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/14/nato-is-about-launch-formal-strategic-review-heres-what-that-means/> //um-ef)

After rocky relations with the Trump administration, NATO will be keen to project unity at its summit beginning Monday. Media reporting will pay close attention to how other leaders welcome Joe Biden to his first NATO summit as president — and whether he can start to deliver on a pledge to “repair our alliances.” Here’s some equally significant news: NATO is likely to formally launch the update of its Strategic Concept for the first time since 2009. The Strategic Concept, which articulates how NATO implements the principles of its 1949 founding treaty, has gone through seven iterations. During the Cold War, the alliance produced four classified versions, plus there have been three public ones since the fall of the Berlin Wall (1991, 1999 and 2010). This is a core text that spells out NATO’s “enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks” — but there’s no road map to determine when the alliance should update its Strategic Concept. Our research, though, identifies the three major conditions that need to be present before NATO initiates this key review exercise. 1. Changes in the international security landscape The Strategic Concept operationalizes the alliance’s goals and tasks. As such, one would expect that major changes in the international security environment would prompt a revision of the document. The relationship between such shifts and the review, however, is more nuanced. Biden’s in Europe to reassure nervous allies. When does reassurance work? Changes in the security environment can contribute to a “widespread feeling ... it is time to take stock” among NATO allies, but they don’t necessarily immediately result in a new Strategic Concept. The lag is not unexpected. After all, an alliance with 30 members needs time to digest these changes and their implications. Moreover, member countries often have divergent threat perceptions. A major security shock can cause conflicting interpretations — that’s what happened in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. NATO had to overcome disagreements about the nature and causes of terrorism, and it issued a new Strategic Concept nine years later. 2. Consensus on NATO’s current responsibilities Although a new Strategic Concept is “useful but not essential” when it comes to NATO’s day-to-day operations, the document does play a formal codifying role. NATO is a versatile organization, able over time to organically take on new tasks. And, once the alliance has taken on sufficient new responsibilities since the previous strategic review, it becomes easier to justify starting a new process; what one senior official called “akin to doing the vacuum cleaning.” At the same time, launching the revision process requires NATO to navigate delicate internal and external hurdles. Strategic Concepts are acts of public diplomacy and a key way to highlight NATO’s continued relevance. A high-level strategic review can exacerbate existing tensions among NATO members, running the risk of revealing a lack of unity about the future of the alliance as opposed to bolstering consensus around key security challenges. The U.S. and NATO promised to protect Ukraine. If Ukraine is the aggressor, all bets are off. For example, NATO faces perennial questions about its raison d’etre, be it at the end of the Cold War or in the late 2000s, with its struggles in Afghanistan. Debates in the mid-2000s about a “Global NATO,” and how this shift would affect the core task of defense of the transatlantic area, delayed the push toward a new Strategic Concept during the George W. Bush administration, despite the impact of 9/11. 3. Leaders who push for a strategic review Summoning the will for a major review isn’t an easy feat for an alliance with 30 members — often it takes senior decision-makers to push for consensus to move forward. Revising the Strategic Concept implies disrupting the day-to-day work of the alliance and overcoming bureaucratic inertia. It is also a complex political process that diverts precious resources away from fulfilling NATO’s existing mandates. Considering the political sensitivity of the Strategic Concept, only very senior officials can realistically take on the role of overcoming organizational reticence. Sometimes it takes a leader from a member country to push hard, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, representing a broader coalition, did in 2006 when she called for a new Strategic Concept. But NATO secretary generals have also taken on ambitious and entrepreneurial roles. Thus, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was a strong advocate for updating the Strategic Concept in the late 2000s, seeking a crowning achievement for when his term ended in 2009. Here’s the outlook in 2021 All three conditions are present, which helps explain why NATO is about to begin the process to draft its eighth version of the Strategic Concept. The security landscape has changed significantly since 2010, and the alliance has already taken steps to adapt, be it bolstering its military readiness to deter Russia or acknowledging China as a new challenge. Moreover, the new Biden administration is more pro-NATO than the Trump administration was, while French President Emmanuel Macron’s November 2019 criticism about NATO becoming “brain dead” put pressure on the alliance to demonstrate its continued relevance. And global leaders, along with NATO, have openly pushed for a new Strategic Concept. Germany rapidly proposed, soon after Macron’s comments, the establishment of an expert group to rejuvenate NATO, an idea embraced by Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general since 2014. NATO members also endorsed this plan when they met in London in December 2019. The eventual expert report, along with the wider consultations initiated by the secretary general as part of the NATO 2030 initiative, have helped to build consensus for the next Strategic Concept. What happens now? In a bid to show renewed unity, NATO members are widely expected to launch a revision process of the Strategic Concept at the summit Monday. But achieving consensus on a number of issues will be challenging. Defining NATO’s role toward China, and the alliance’s mandate on democratic resilience and climate change, are two areas in particular where alliance members will struggle to find agreement.

### AT: EDT Now

#### NATO efforts are limited and restricted to innovation within industry --- limits risk of overstretch

Warrell ‘21

(Hellen, “Nato allies need to speed up AI defence co-operation,” pg online @ <https://www.ft.com/content/61c1945c-d153-4d58-b9c5-dffd99a6919e> //um-ef)

Nato is proposing a new tech innovation centre bringing together military personnel with industry to foster digital defence start-ups. Some of these might be financed by a separate initiative, also set to be debated: a venture capital fund for innovation which member states could choose to opt in to. The efforts are belated, as Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledged. “For decades, Nato allies have been leading when it comes to technology, but that’s not obvious any more,” he told the Financial Times in an interview last week. “We see China especially investing heavily in new, disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, big data, and they implement them into new advanced weapon systems, drones, submarines, aircraft and so on.” He is not the first to sound the alarm. Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive who now chairs the US’s National Security Commission on AI, warned earlier this year that Beijing was planning to undermine conventional military forces by “leapfrogging” to new technologies. The commission’s report, published in March, raised concerns that China would use AI for “reconnaissance, electromagnetic countermeasures and co-ordinated firepower strikes”. Part of the problem is that western defence institutions have been slow to recognise the potential of innovation beyond their own industry. “For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector — the internet, nuclear, GPS, all of that was developed by the defence industry and then shared with the civilian sector,” Stoltenberg said. “Now, it goes the other way around. It’s a civilian sector which is leading in the development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and many of the new disruptive technologies.” Some Nato members are ahead of others. The US and France have published military AI strategies, while the UK announced this year that it is to establish a centre for defence AI. For the first time, Britain’s intelligence agency, MI6, is recruiting from the private sector for a new head of its “Q” branch — the technical lab made famous in the James Bond films. Establishing a new Nato hub — known as an “accelerator” — in which tech companies and members of the armed forces can experiment with new ideas has advantages, according to Professor Fiona Murray, co-director of MIT’s innovation initiative. Start-ups and investors do not always have the time to tackle defence challenges when solutions are “hard to test, markets are fragmented and procurement is slow”, Murray said. Working together would create a wider market for new products and enhance collective security, she noted. It was “not enough” for countries to be handling this individually, she said. The US has started marshalling allies on the policy implications of using new technology. The Pentagon’s “AI Partnership for Defense”, comprising 13 countries (including Nato members Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the UK, France and Norway) met virtually for the first time last year to agree joint military standards on AI. Schmidt’s commission has called on the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) to work more closely on developing AI systems. Ulrike Franke, an expert in military technology at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Nato’s tech centre will be most effective if it prioritises systems designed to facilitate joint military operations. The alliance should look at areas such as AI-enabled command and control, she said, which could give members a unified picture of the battlefield across multiple regions, using intelligent data analysis to sift information. Franke said that in the vast arena spanning drones to quantum computing, there was a temptation to cover too much. “It makes massive sense for Nato to look more at this [technology]”, she said. “The question is, what exactly are they focusing on? There’s a danger of Nato spreading itself too thin.”

#### Biden is consulting and listening to allies --- only the plan would change the tenor

Sonne 21 [Paul Sonne, 2-16-2021, Biden administration takes more cooperative approach to its first high-level NATO meeting, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/nato-meeting-biden-trump/2021/02/16/b42d00d0-709f-11eb-a4eb-44012a612cf9\_story.html] Eric thanks 4rsland

The **Biden** administration **is preparing to strike** a more cooperative tone at the first meeting of senior NATO officials since President Donald Trump departed office, as the alliance faces difficult questions about how to proceed with a frayed [U.S.-Taliban peace agreement](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghanistan-us-taliban-peace-deal-signing/2020/02/29/b952fb04-5a67-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_1) and when to withdraw the remaining forces from Afghanistan. The change in approach by Washington comes as the 72-year-old military alliance looks to find its footing after a tumultuous four years dealing with Trump. The challenges are vast — from defending against Russia, evolving to consider threats posed by China, and extricating forces from Afghanistan without prompting a collapse of the nation’s NATO-backed government and military force. Senior U.S. defense officials, in a briefing with reporters, signaled that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin wouldn’t offer any U.S. decisions on Afghanistan at the virtual two-day NATO meeting for defense ministers that begins Wednesday, as the Biden administration reviews its policy ahead of a May 1 deadline for the full withdrawal of U.S. troops set out in the [peace agreement](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-us-taliban-peace-deal/2020/02/29/e63e062c-5a67-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_4). The senior officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the thinking of Pentagon leaders ahead of the NATO meeting, underscored that violence must be reduced in Afghanistan and said the Biden administration was reviewing the peace agreement in particular. One of the senior officials said the Taliban’s compliance with the deal — which U.S. officials have criticized — would be a key part of the review. “It will play into how our government comes to a conclusion on where we should go,” one of the senior defense officials said, noting that the United States looked forward to consulting with NATO allies on the issue in the days and weeks to come. The deliberations within the U.S. government over Afghanistan come as NATO faces an array of challenges, including in Iraq, where a NATO training and advisory mission, welcomed by the Biden administration, has continued amid attacks that Iraqi and Western officials have blamed on Iran-backed militias. On Monday night, coalition forces in Irbil were struck in an [attack](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraq-irbil-rocket-attack/2021/02/15/2ab13236-6fd7-11eb-93be-c10813e358a2_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_9) that left a civilian contractor dead and a U.S. service member injured. Other challenges await: Russia is launching increasingly sophisticated cyber campaigns, including the most recent SolarWinds hack. Turkey, a NATO member, is blocking work and picking fights inside the alliance. And the United States, according to the senior U.S. defense officials, wants NATO to put China on its priority list. Most notable at this week’s meeting is likely to be the change in style by the new U.S. administration toward its fellow NATO members. **Trump often threatened** **NATO allies about** **their defense spending** and used a bullying approach that led some world leaders to [mock him](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-braces-for-contentious-summit-as-trump-other-leaders-gather-near-london/2019/12/04/5994d97c-0fc0-11ea-924c-b34d09bbc948_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_13) and his freewheeling news conferences. But at NATO, worries about Washington extended beyond Trump’s tone. European diplomats said they would sometimes wake up at 3 a.m. to check Trump’s Twitter feed to see if he had announced a sudden shift in U.S. military posture. They would spend weeks carefully laying out strategic plans with lower-level U.S. officials, only to have everything upended by a new pronouncement from the Oval Office. Sometimes, U.S. officials would come to them to try to find ways to work around Trump’s anger toward the alliance. President **Biden** has said he will take a far different approach to NATO **and has gone out of** **his way to signal support for the alliance**, including by recording a video of a friendly phone call to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg last month. After Austin became defense secretary, the Pentagon scheduled Stoltenberg as his first call, and **Biden has** **already halted a partial withdrawal** **of U.S. troops** from Germany that Trump ordered, as the Pentagon evaluates what forces should be stationed where. Some four weeks into the new administration, NATO diplomats are still sorting out the rules of the game inside the glassy alliance headquarters in Brussels. Trump’s ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, is gone, replaced for now by her former deputy, Chargé d’Affaires Douglas Jones. Biden has yet to announce his nominee for the post. One significant shift so far, **diplomats said**, is that **the** **Biden administration** **appears interested in hearing the** **views of allies on issues** **including operations** **in** **Afghanistan**, where in addition to [2,500 U.S. troops](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghanistan-us-troop-drawdown/2021/01/15/9396553c-5737-11eb-acc5-92d2819a1ccb_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_19), 8,000 forces from allied and partner nations remain. Earlier this month, officials from the White House, State Department and Pentagon joined a conference call with NATO ambassadors, who detailed their countries’ positions on deployments and the security situation. A number of diplomats said it was a departure from Trump-era practice — and that they were delighted. Stoltenberg signaled his eagerness to move on from the acrimony of the Trump era. “**It’s no secret that over** **the last four years, we had some** **difficult discussions inside NATO**, **but now we look to the future**,” he told reporters Monday ahead of the defense ministers’ meeting. “And the future is that we now have an administration in the United States, in Washington, which is strongly committed to the transatlantic bond, to NATO, to Europe and North America working together.” One of the senior U.S. defense officials underscored the point on Tuesday. “Consultation is really kind of the name of the game here,” the official said, describing the expected tone of the meeting. **The task of repairing the U.S. relationship** with members of the alliance is significant, after some policymakers said their bandwidth was consumed by catering to Trump’s whims and acting as if he hadn’t upended the military organization. “**The level of anxiety is still** **high after four years of** **trauma**,” a senior NATO diplomat said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal alliance conversations. **“It’s been four years of** **denial** **and sort of** **faking things, repeating over and over again, ‘This is a strong NATO,** we can become even stronger.’ ”

### AT: NATO AI Now

#### NATO limiting leadership and active implementation of AI mechanisms now --- has shifted development to private industries and adoption to individual countries

Burt ‘21

(Peter, “NATO's new AI strategy: lacking in substance and lacking in leadership,” pg online @ <https://natowatch.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/briefing_88_nato_ai_strategy.pdf> //um-ef)

NATO's ethical principles for the responsible use of AI, though welcome, raise several issues. Such statements of principle are now commonplace in the corporate sector and are increasingly being adopted by governments on both a unilateral and multilateral basis. NATO's principles are similar to principles adopted by the US Department of Defense for the ethical use of AI: indeed, in some places the wording is the same as that in the Department of Defense principles. As with many such statements of principle, the NATO principles have no coherent means of implementation or enforcement. Their successful adoption will in many ways depend upon leadership and political and military culture, which is different in each of NATO's 30 member states. Will Turkey, for example, which has been a keen proponent of automated warfare and by some accounts has already developed AI-based loitering munitions with an autonomous capability to identify targets, be willing to follow the same rules as the USA? And would the USA under a second Trump administration follow the same rules as a Biden administration? In the absence of any binding enforcement mechanism NATO's principles may provide useful for public relations purposes but are likely to be less useful in preventing harm to humans, particularly those in the Global South who are already in situations of conflict, and historically marginalised groups. Despite the plethora of corporate statements on ethical principles, those working in the tech sector are sceptical about the prospect that ethical AI design will be adopted as a norm over the next decade. A non-random poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in early 2021 found that 68% of experts in the field thought that ethical principles focused primarily on the public good will not be employed in most AI systems by 2030. Their concerns recognised that the main developers and deployers of AI are focused on profit-seeking and social control, and that global competition will matter more to the development of AI than any ethical issues. This latter factor will very much influence NATO's future adoption of AI. Although NATO's ethical AI principles are stated to have been developed on the basis of “Allied approaches and relevant work in applicable international fora”, it is not clear whether they draw on views from the wide range of professional disciplines necessary to develop a representative and rounded view of the ethical pitfalls and risks associated for AI, or from a diversity of perspectives. There has certainly been no open consultation on their formulation, 4 and it is possible that the principles may only represent the perceptions of a relatively narrow range of predominantly white male technocrats and military planners drawn from within NATO, member governments (notably the USA), and the arms industry. Ordinary people, particularly marginalised groups and those in the Global South, will ultimately face the consequences and impacts of NATO's decisions on AI systems, yet the public have certainly not been involved in making decisions on this strategy, which will set the framework for NATO's future AI choices. NATO's AI strategy does not discuss the development of AI-driven autonomous weapon systems – a significant omission, given the ethical issues that this application of AI would raise and the challenges to human rights that such weapons would pose. As a bare minimum, the strategy could—and should—have endorsed the 'Guiding Principles' on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons which have recently been adopted by consensus by High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Despite increasing pressure for a ban on the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, key NATO states including the USA and UK have been lukewarm about the need for a ban, arguing that current laws of war are adequate to regulate any such weapons. This seems optimistic, given the rapid development of AI technology and the push by some states over recent years to redefine the rules that govern use of armed force to suit their own purposes. To date no NATO member states have supported the call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. If NATO members were serious about ensuring that the military use of AI adheres to international humanitarian law and human rights law, they would call for and engage in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems at the CCW; which is expected to take a historic decision on this issue at its Review Conference in December 2021. Investment and innovation in artificial intelligence is being led by the private sector, and not by the world’s militaries. Recognising this, NATO's AI strategy places a premium on engaging with “start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models”. NATO wants to “make defence and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with”. Aiming to capture the civilian tech sector in this way risks increasing the influence of the military-industrialpolitical complex to an even greater extent than is already the case. Will this really help advance NATO's liberal and democratic values? Conclusion Although NATO's AI strategy contains a few worthwhile nuggets, on balance it is tame and unambitious. It is depressingly clear that NATO sees AI as basically another way of using technology to wage war more effectively, and is not willing to show any real leadership to mitigate the risks that AI poses to human rights and dignity. War is, after all, the highest area of risk when it comes to the potential for human rights abuses, yet NATO's strategy says nothing about measures to effectively govern military AI and autonomous weapon systems. AI has the potential to help humanity tackle intractable 'wicked problems' such as climate change and unsustainable development, and tackle the course of dangerous behaviour which is threatening the survival of our species. But this will only happen if it is employed under wise and decisive human leadership, otherwise it may dramatically compound the problems we face, threatening international security and human rights even more. NATO, unfortunately, seems unwilling to provide that leadership. Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank Wanda Muñoz for advice and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Author: Peter Burt is a researcher at Drone Wars UK working on issues relating to artificial intelligence and autonomy and their role in the future development of drones. Before moving to Drone Wars UK Peter was Director for the Nuclear Information Service for six years, and he is also a Trustee the Nuclear Education Trust.

#### NATO AI now is under DIANA --- left to private sector development

Dr. Sharma 5/30/22

(Sanur, Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis,” pg online @ <https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/> //um-ef)

The strategic surge in EDTs is driven by the accelerated investment towards the military adoption and innovation of EDTs and maintaining a sustainable innovation ecosystem that can be achieved through civil–military collaboration. In 2021, NATO endorsed the strategy on EDTs that included AI and machine learning among the seven identified key technologies (Data, AI, Autonomy, Quantum, Space, Biotechnology, and Hypersonic).6 The strategy plans to invest US$ 1 billion in building test centres across Europe and North America, focusing on emerging technologies like AI, Quantum and hypersonics.7

In the NATO Summit held at Brussels in 2021, as a part of the NATO 2030 Agenda, NATO’s new Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) was launched. It aims to maintain NATO’s technological edge compared to nations like China and Russia, which are challenging the West with their accelerated investments to build technological capacity and use offensive subversive measures.

DIANA has been assigned to manage the NATO Innovation Fund, receiving a funding of US$ 82.6 million a year for 15 years.8 It will explore the future roadmap of implementation of advanced technologies and competition to foster transatlantic cooperation.9 At present, there are 10 accelerator sites with more than 50 test centres in technological hubs across the states.10 The NATO advisory group on EDTs is an external body that advises NATO on the optimisation of its innovation efforts. This group provides recommendations on improving collaboration and partnerships with the private sector, industry, and academia. In addition, there are other bodies like the NATO Advisory board, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation (STO), and NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) that support the alliance’s adoption of deep technologies and EDTs.

### Uniq --- Cohesion/Focus Now

#### Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinvigorates NATO cohesion, but it’s not guaranteed if they don’t focus on Russia.

McRaven 4/20/22 [William H. McRaven, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. Peter Orszag is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008. Theodore Bunzel, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department.; “Made in the Alliance”; Foreign Affairs; April 20, 2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance]//eleanor

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the Western alliance and bolstered transatlantic solidarity. After being declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, NATO has sprung to life, deploying forces to its eastern flank and coordinating the provision of sophisticated weapons that have helped Ukraine impede Russia’s invasion. For the first time in its history, the European Union has financed the purchase and delivery of lethal aid. Western countries have vastly exceeded expectations in implementing coordinated financial sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. Even neutral Switzerland joined the fray. But no matter how remarkable this solidarity may be in the short term, there is no guarantee that it will last: if policymakers are complacent, powerful trends predating the Ukraine crisis could overwhelm and ultimately derail it. Protectionist sentiment and self-defeating trade wars have pulled at the seams of Western economic integration. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have chipped away at military trust between the United States and Europe. A Marine Le Pen victory later this month in France would pose additional challenges to the alliance, and looming concerns about the 2024 presidential election raise doubts about the United States’ commitment. If not managed intelligently, the reawakening of Europe as a diplomatic and military actor and the reexamination of global economic interdependence catalyzed by Russia’s invasion could result not in a strengthened transatlantic alliance but in a more worrying outcome: the emergence of three distinct blocs, one centered around the United States, a second around Europe, and a third around China (which would include Russia). Such a world—with the United States and Europe often collaborating, but also at odds when their interests diverge—would make the management of China and Russia more difficult, as the two would have opportunities to trigger and exploit U.S.-European tensions. It would also represent a major missed opportunity for the United States and Europe.

#### NATO will pursue a strategic concept focused on alliance cohesion now.

Thomson and Stacey 6/19/22 [Sir Adam Thomson, former United Kingdom ambassador to NATO, is now director of the European Leadership Network, a not-for-profit network of leaders working for a safer Europe. Sir Graham Stacey, former chief of staff of NATO Transformation, is senior consulting fellow at the European Leadership Network.; “NATO’s next Strategic Concept: Getting modern deterrence right”; The Hill; June 19, 2022; https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3529051-natos-next-strategic-concept-getting-modern-deterrence-right/]//eleanor

NATO leaders meet in Madrid next week on June 29 – 30. Among other things, they are pledged to agree on a new Strategic Concept, replacing the one that has broadly guided the Alliance since 2010. The Strategic Concept is not the Alliance’s only guiding document, but it does set the tone and direction for many years to come and is referred to almost daily as NATO’s 30 nations struggle to forge consensus. It is important to get it right. Maybe the confrontation with Russia will make this too difficult or premature and leaders will defer the new Concept until 2023 — but all Allies recognize that the 2010 language on Russia is wildly out of date. And so too is the language on deterrence. The Alliance is facing an unstable period of cold war-style dynamics and potential nuclear brinkmanship. Strong defense will be essential. The next Concept will rightly reflect moves already underway towards increased defense expenditure, greater national resilience, and increased consultation and Alliance cohesion. This will include forward deployment of forces and enhanced operational activity along NATO/Russia borders But while strong defense is necessary for deterrence, it does not guarantee it. For effective collective defense in unstable times, the 2022 Strategic Concept must deliver modern deterrence fit for the next decade.

#### The strategic concept will focus on deterring Russia and China.

NATO citing Geoană 6/10/22 [Mircea Geoană is NATO Deputy Secretary General; “Deputy Secretary General previews NATO’s next Strategic Concept at Copenhagen Democracy Summit”; June 10, 2022; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\_196299.htm]//eleanor

Mr Geoană explained that the new Concept will reflect an era of great power competition, and recognise that Russia has become “one of the most important challenges to our security in Europe and also beyond”. He added that China’s role as a transformative player in world affairs will also be acknowledged. The next Strategic Concept will further highlight the importance of resilience and new technologies for Euro-Atlantic security. Speaking about deterrence and defence, the Deputy Secretary General noted that NATO anticipates “a new generation of our presence in the East”. At the Madrid Summit, leaders will adapt the Alliance’s posture on the eastern flank for the longer term to reflect the new security reality. Mr Geoană said this is likely to include measures for faster and more effective reinforcement. The Copenhagen Democracy Summit is an annual conference bringing together political and business leaders, including current and former heads of government, from the world’s democracies. It is led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Founder and Chairman of The Alliance of Democracies Foundation. Mr Rasmussen served as Secretary General of NATO from 2009 to 2014.

### Uniq --- Cohesion Strong

#### NATO is structurally strong

Stavridis 18 [Admiral Stavridis (Ret.), a TIME Contributing Editor, was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Vice Chair, Global Affairs at The Carlyle Group and Chair of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. He is the co-author of [2034: A Novel of the Next World War](https://bookshop.org/a/4973/9781984881250). His new nonfiction book is [To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/669809/to-risk-it-all-by-admiral-james-stavridis-usn-ret/), 7-11-2018, Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander, Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/] Eric

For all those harbingers of trouble, though, **by** **many traditional** **measures**, NATO remains extremely healthy.

It is powerful. **The 29 nations of** **NATO** **produce** more than 50% **of the world’s gross domestic product**, **have well over 3 million troops on dut**y, **operate massive combined naval** **fleets and air** **forces** **and together** spend over $1 trillion on defense. Indeed, even with all the frustration over European defense spending not hitting the 2% of GDP goal, **the collective European** **defense budget is the second largest** **in the world** **after the U.S.’s** **and is ahead of China’s and Russia’s–combined.**

**It is smart.** **U.S. and European** **defense** **innovation** **and** **production** **provides a formidable military** **research** **and** **development capacity**. **Particularly** **in** **cybersecurity**, **unmanned** **vehicles**, **space operations**, **special-forces technologies**, **maritime** **and anti-submarine capability**, **and air and missile** **defense**, NATO is a technology and education superpower.

**It is capable**. **The alliance** boasts a large command structure of highly qualified teams of military officers from all of the 29 nations. **Throughout** **Europe** **and the East Coast of the U.S.,** **those teams prepare war** **plans**, **conduct training exercises**, **monitor readiness** **of allied units, gather** **intelligence about** **potential adversaries** **and run complex operations** **centers** that cover the entire geographic range of NATO. **These standing** **staffs**, which we rationalized by reducing them 35% while I was NATO commander, can conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in a coalition structure on short notice.

Just as important as NATO’s health is the fact that we still need it. **Geography matters**, **and the European peninsula is** **particularly** **well located** **on the western edge of the** **Eurasian** **landmass**. When I was the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, people would say to me, “Why do we need all those useless Cold War bases?” My reply was simple: They are not Cold War bases but rather the forward operating stations of the U.S. in the 21st century. When necessary, they allow us to operate in the Middle East and Africa. But they primarily serve as a bulwark: NATO is not global in its scope, scale or ambition and will remain tightly focused on the North Atlantic.

**Moreover**, **despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare**, **most** **observers** **would agree with Winston Churchill that** “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries.

Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that **no alliance nation has ever attacked another.** **NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years** after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans.

### Uniq --- Cooperation/Slow Consultation Now

#### Consultation is keeping the alliance intact – Ukraine discussions prove

Liptak 22 [Kevin Liptak is a reporter covering the White House. He previously covered President Trump's foreign and domestic policy, campaign politics and the internal dynamics of the administration, 6-25-2022, Biden heads to Europe to keep allies united against Russia as a grinding war in Ukraine takes its toll, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/politics/what-to-watch-from-biden-at-the-g7-and-nato/index.html] Eric thanks 4rsland

At the start of the war, western leaders rallied behind a sanctions regime to isolate Russian President Vladimir Putin. But months later, how to bring the war to an end — and potentially end the sanctions that are helping drive inflation — have led to strain.

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who visited Kyiv for the second time last week, has positioned himself as a top ally of Zelensky and insists Ukraine “must win.” French President Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, has warned against “humiliating” Russia. And along with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, he has maintained open channels of communication with the Kremlin.

That has sometimes put them at odds with Biden, who accused Putin of genocide and war crimes while also saying – at the end of his last visit to Europe – that he “cannot remain in power.” Biden’s Defense secretary said after his own visit to Ukraine that Russia must be “weakened.”

**Biden’s aides** **insist the** unity he’s worked hard **to cultivate** remains intact.

“I mean, **every country speaks for themselves**. Every country has concerns for what they’re willing to do or not do. **But as far as the alliance goes,** it truly has never been stronger and more viable than it than it is today,” said John Kirby, the coordinator for strategic communications at the White House National Security Council.

**Those differences could** make for intense conversations this week, **when the leaders will** **inevitably need to discuss how the conflict will end** — either through Ukrainian concessions, more concerted work toward brokering a ceasefire or just months of endless fighting.

#### Consultation efforts are strong, Ukraine proves

TWH 22 [White House, 3-24-2022, Background Press Call on President Biden's Meetings at NATO, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/03/24/background-press-call-on-president-bidens-meetings-at-nato/] Eric  
**The U**nited **S**tates **is** already taking steps both nationally, as well as **through NATO,** to enhance the readiness and capability of our defense forces to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents.  Frankly, for NATO, this is an important part of strengthening our longer-term defense and deterrence postures.  
   
**NATO has a Combined Joint CBRN** **Defence Task Force,** which is an element of the NATO Response Force, which is prepared to deploy at SACEUR’s direction.  **This** **includes specially trained** **and equipped forces** who are able to deal with these types of incidents if there are attacks against NATO populations, territory, or forces.   
   
And NATO Allies are also continuing to consult, as well as to take national decisions, to be able to provide on a bilateral basis protective equipment and medical countermeasures to help Ukraine detect, identify, and respond to these types of threats.

#### Cooperation is forefronted in NATO right now

NATO 22 [Nato, 6-17-2022,, Brussels Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021 NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\_185000.htm] Eric

**We**, **the Heads of State** **and Government** **of the** **30** **NATO Allies, have gathered in Brussels to reaffirm our unity, solidari**ty, **and cohesion**, **and to open a new** **chapter in transatlantic relations**, at a time when the security environment we face is increasingly complex.  **NATO remains the foundation of** **our** **collective defence** **and** the essential forum for security consultations **and decisions among** **Allies**.  NATO is a defensive Alliance and will continue to strive for peace, security, and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area.  **We remain firmly** **committed** **to** **NATO’s founding Washington Treaty**, **including** that **an** **attack against one Ally** **shall be considered an attack against us all, as enshrined in Article 5.**  **We will continue to pursue a 360-degree approach to protect** **and defend** **our indivisible security** **and to fulfil** NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

### Uniq --- Unity Now

#### Summit invites cohesion and determination from a united NATO

VOV 22, News site, 6/23/22, “German Chancellor expect NATO’s cohesion and determination,” *VOV World,* <https://vovworld.vn/en-US/news/german-chancellor-expect-natos-cohesion-and-determination-1111686.vov>, JH

(VOVWORLD) - German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Wednesday spoke to parliament about the upcoming European Union, G7, and NATO summits, where he expects a cohesion and determination from NATO leaders on the issue of the Ukraine conflict.

He promised that Germany and Europe will continue to support Ukraine financially, politically, and with weapons. However, he said, NATO will not become a combatant and he promised Ukraine a "Marshall plan" of long-term support for reconstruction after the war. As G7 President, the German Chancellor wants to convene an international conference to work towards an agreement on investments in Ukraine.

Scholz said his goal at the upcoming EU summit is to mobilize EU members to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. He said the EU needs to set up accession negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, and he pushed for solutions to the problem of grain exports from Ukraine and said the German government is coordinating with partners on measures to prevent energy shortages this winter.

### Uniq --- Concept = Cohesion

#### Strategic concept proves cohesion

Lusa 6/22/22, “Portugal: NATO summit will show cohesion between allies at time of conflict – military chief,” Macau News Agency, <https://www.macaubusiness.com/portugal-nato-summit-will-show-cohesion-between-allies-at-time-of-conflict-military-chief/>, JH

The chief of staff of the armed forces (CEMGFA) considered on Tuesday that the NATO summit will show “cohesion” between allies, noting that the new strategic concept will be approved at a time of conflict in Europe.

“In military terms, what I can say is that we will have, from the Madrid summit onwards, a great demonstration of the strength of the Atlantic Alliance in terms of its cohesion and what are the structuring documents to build an auspicious future for this extraordinary alliance which has been extremely relevant in terms of peace guarantees on the European continent,” he said.

Admiral Silva Ribeiro was speaking to journalists on the sidelines of the 1st seminar on Innovation in the Armed Forces, organised by the military general staff (EMGFA) at the Military University Institute in Lisbon.

The CEMGFA highlighted the importance of this summit – scheduled for 29 and 30 June, in Madrid – considering it to be “perhaps one of the most relevant since the beginning of the 21st century.

“Insofar as a new strategic concept will be approved that comes at a time when we have a conflict in Europe and, therefore, it is a strategic concept that gives not only a vision of what the future of NATO will be but it is also an extremely relevant summit to highlight a fundamental aspect to the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance, which is cohesion among allies,” he added.

When asked if defence should have a larger budget in the next state budget, given the context of conflict in Ukraine, Silva Ribeiro considered that Portugal has made “a progressive path” towards meeting NATO’s goals.

“We are in the process of revising the Military Programming Law, which provides exactly for the construction of a set of capabilities that will ensure the achievement of two fundamental objectives: sustaining the capabilities we have and filling gaps that we have in our system of forces so that the military can respond to the most likely threats while considering the most dangerous ones,” he added.

The admiral said that NATO countries are “also making an effort to respond to the Welsh Summit’s objective of 2 per cent investment in defence”.

“Portugal has been making its way according to what the prime minister presented at the Brussels summit two years ago. There is now going to be a summit in Madrid and so we have to wait for the political decisions in that regard, but I am convinced that the path Portugal is following will give peace of mind in terms of what the investments are, so that the defence and security forces can maintain their operational capabilities that have performed well abroad,” he said.

When asked by journalists whether he expected the government to invest more in defence in the next budget, Silva Ribeiro replied that “these are political decisions”, guaranteeing that “the armed forces will carry out their missions with the dignity and relevance that is customary with the resources that are placed at their disposal”.

### Uniq --- Overstretch Brinks

#### The agenda is already large, but NATO can focus on alliance cohesion – adding more issues suddenly overstretches the summit.

Goodman 6/21/22 [Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS.; “Press Briefing: Previewing the G7 and NATO Summits”; Center for Strategic and International Studies; June 21, 2022; https://www.csis.org/analysis/press-briefing-previewing-g7-and-nato-summits-0]//eleanor

There have been some ad hoc meetings, but this is the first sort of annual meeting of the year for those two summits. So it’s a pretty significant trip because, obviously, this is a chance to affirm and bolster U.S. alliances, to bolster democracy. I think those are going to be the overarching themes across both summits. But, obviously, there’s some pretty significant headwinds here. You know, you have Ukraine bogged down. You’ve got inflation raging, you know, a series of crises from food to energy to health to climate. So this is going to be a pretty challenging set of meetings and I think, you know, the good news is that President Biden has some wind at his back because he was able to mobilize this group of allies and partners to take on the Russia-Ukraine challenge initially. But the question is can he move the ball forward on these two – at these two meetings.

## Thumpers

### AT: Turkey hurts cohesion

#### Turkey wants unity

Mehmet Tosun 22, Dr. Tosun is the Barbara Smith Campbell Distinguished Professor at the University of Nevada, 6/23/22, “Unity, solidarity against common threats key for NATO, Türkiye tells US,” Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/unity-solidarity-against-common-threats-key-for-nato-turkiye-tells-us/2621180>, JH

There must be unity, harmony and solidarity among NATO allies against common security and terrorist threats, Türkiye’s Presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said in a phone call with US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on Thursday.

Along with bilateral political and economic ties, the officials held discussions on Türkiye’s role in NATO and contributions to the alliance, the upcoming NATO Madrid summit, Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids, grain shipments through the Black Sea and other regional issues, according to a statement from the Turkish presidential spokesperson.

They exchanged views on issues on the agenda for next week’s NATO summit, including its new Strategic Concept, the Ukraine war, the fight against terrorism, the global food crisis and other security issues, the statement said.

Kalin emphasized that NATO allies must have a unified stance against common security and terrorist threats, reiterating that Sweden and Finland must fulfill Türkiye’s demands and expectations in the fight against terrorism.

Since Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO last month, Türkiye, a longstanding member of the alliance, has repeatedly voiced objections over the countries’ tolerance, and even support, for terrorist groups, particularly the PKK terrorist organization.

Kalin stressed that no progress could be made on the matter until Sweden and Finland take concrete steps.

He underlined that it was unacceptable that PKK/PYD/YPG supporters are disseminating propaganda in Stockholm and through the media while Ankara remains engaged in talks with the two Nordic countries.

He also conveyed that Türkiye is continuing negotiations with Ukraine and Russia on creating a safe corridor for grain shipments through the Black Sea.

Achieving results from this negotiation process, which includes the UN, is of strategic importance for global food security, he added.

#### Summit eases Turkish tensions

The Diplomat 22, The Diplomat is an international online peer-reviewed news magazine covering politics, society, and culture in the Indo-Pacific region based in Washington, D.C, 6/23/22, “Turkey hosts panel discussion on NATO to coincide with the Summit,” *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomatinspain.com/en/2022/06/turkey-hosts-panel-discussion-on-nato-to-coincide-with-the-summit/>, JH

On Tuesday 28 June from 14:00 to 16:30, the Communications Directorate of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey will host a panel discussion on ‘NATO, from regional to global: Dialogue, enlargement and cohesion’ at the Mandarin Oriental Ritz Hotel in Madrid.

Convened at an unfortunate time when Europe is once again experiencing war after more than half a century, the NATO Alliance, of which Turkey has been a member for 70 years and Spain for 40, will hold its next summit from 28-30 June in Madrid, bringing together heads of state and government from 30 countries. This summit will also adopt the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept in the face of today’s security challenges. This juncture has already positioned the Madrid Summit as one of the most successful and special meetings in the Alliance’s history.

The purpose of the panel, which will take place on the above-mentioned date, is to discuss NATO’s capabilities and sphere of influence, to enable it to intervene effectively in crises other than military ones, and to debate the strategies to be pursued and the steps to be taken in the framework of enlargement policies. The panel programme, which will feature distinguished academics and experts from Turkey and Spain, will consist of two sessions entitled NATO Enlargement Policy on the Axis of Cooperation and Dialogue and Common Challenges for Turkey and NATO.

The panel will be held in English with simultaneous English-Spanish translation and is expected to address the following agenda items: NATO 2030: Cohesion Report for a New Era; NATO’s New Mission and Enlargement Policy; NATO’s Role and Activities in Global Security; NATO’s Central Role in Euro-Atlantic Security; Turkey’s Role in NATO; and Turkey’s Approach to NATO’s Enlargement Policy.

As a product of the Alliance’s efforts to renew and update itself in line with current priorities, on 25 November 2020, a 67-page report with 138 recommendations under the title “NATO 2030: United for a New Era” was published by the NATO Expert Group. The report is also a sign of the Alliance’s willingness to strengthen its strategic and political orientation. Vision 2030 clearly shows NATO’s preparations to become a security organisation that contributes not only to member states but also to global security.

NATO has played an important role in ensuring Turkey’s security and has contributed significantly to its goal of cooperating with Euro-Atlantic structures in a number of respects. Since its accession to the Alliance in 1952, Turkey, with its extensive military capabilities, historical background and cultural relations, has fulfilled its responsibilities to realise the Alliance’s objectives of global peace, tranquillity and security. With NATO’s second-largest military, Turkey is one of the top five contributors to Alliance missions and operations, one of four countries that can provide airborne early warning and refuelling aircraft to the Alliance, and one of eight that contribute the most to NATO’s joint budgets.

The conditions generated by the war in Ukraine have put NATO membership applications from some countries on the agenda. In the face of this development, in principle our country reiterates its “supportive” policy towards NATO enlargement; at the same time it expresses its concern about Turkey’s security sensitivities. In this regard, it is legitimate to expect countries wishing to join NATO, which is constituted as a collective security organisation, to show sensitivity to the security concerns of individual NATO members. It is a prerequisite for a candidate country to coordinate with existing members, especially on an issue such as terrorism and counter-terrorism, which has seriously threatened the international system and the national security of states in recent years.

#### Russia has reinforced cohesion, including Turkey

Barış Seçkin 22, experienced Foreign Correspondent with a demonstrated history of working in the media production industry, 4/3/22, “Cohesion of NATO reinforced by Russian president: Defense College commandant,” *Anadolu Agency,* <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426>, JH

The commandant of NATO Defense College said the cohesion of the alliance has been even reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent actions, now that the region sees the Russian threat.

Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann told Anadolu Agency in an interview that Ukraine was a partner of NATO and so there is a difference between a partner and an ally.

"Cohesion of NATO has been even reinforced by what President Vladimir Putin has been trying to achieve in Russia. Because now he proved that Russia is actually a threat for Europe and the whole area and it has really reinforced the cohesion and the solidarity between allies," Rittimann said.

Commandant of the NATO Defence College, Lieutenant General Olivier Rittimann

Commenting on the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, he said Ukraine was a partner of NATO and the college has been working quite a lot with Ukraine for the last 20 years.

"In fact, if the recent events had not happened, we would have gone to Ukraine to work together in two weeks. Of course, we had to postpone this under the current conditions. I hope we just postponed it," he added.

He also stressed the Russian aggression that started in 2008 in Georgia and which continued in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas.

"So what it proves is that ... if you are a NATO ally you are still safe because we are (in) a solidarity with 30 allies working together and defending us together," he said.

Rittimann said the common response by every NATO member, every ally was to reject "this Russian invasion of Ukraine."

"I think that enlargement is something that needs to be decided first by NATO if they are accepting somebody to become a member and then by the nation which is interested in becoming a NATO member it is definitely not Russia nor China nor any others who has to decide whether Ukraine can become a NATO member or not.

"It is something that has to be discussed between the thirty members of NATO and the applicant. It's not to be interfered by anyone else," he added.

'Turkey is one of biggest contributors to NATO alliance'

"Turkey is one of the biggest contributors to the alliance, it is the second largest arm forces in NATO, Turkey is located in a region which is at the high interest of NATO, especially these days, in what we see in Ukraine, the Black Sea, is very important and so is the Middle East. So, Turkey is a very important ally to NATO," he said.

Rittimann said Turkiye contributed to the college since the beginning, adding that over 800 Turkish course members were educated there and that college was twice commanded by Turkish generals.

Agenda of NATO Defense College

Pointing out that the college's agenda changed in 2014 as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its policies towards eastern Ukraine, Rittimann said they have been working on crisis response operations for the last 20-25 years, but after Russia's increasing importance on the international scene after 2014, these studies turned to defense and deterrence.

"We have seen the importance of this with Russia's invasion of Ukraine recently. That's the hottest and most important topic here in college," he said.

#### Turkish reservations will be resolved---it’s a political maneuver by Erdogan.

Thomas O. Falk 22, Senior Political Journalist and Commentor, “Will Turkey block Finland and Sweden from becoming NATO members?” Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/24/will-turkey-block-nato-expansion/micahw

Ultimately, all 30 members must vote unanimously in favour of the historically neutral Nordic nations if they are to join the Washington-led group, so Turkey could – in theory – block an application.

“Turkey has every right to block Sweden and Finland’s ascension to NATO,” Ahmet Erdi Ozturk, associate professor in politics and international relations at London Metropolitan University, told Al Jazeera.

However, such a position would be costly as NATO members would likely approach Turkey as a problem child moving forward.

“It is hard to see Turkey’s future position since it is mostly based on domestic political developments. We should remember that Erdogan has been doing these policy changes to win the next election,” said Ozturk.

Murat Ersavci, a former Turkish ambassador to Ireland, Oman, Australia and Belgium, told Al Jazeera that Ankara does not oppose membership for Sweden and Finland per se, but has reservations.

Erdogan has accused Sweden and Finland of having an “open attitude towards terrorist organisations”, in reference to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organisation.

Turkey also says the two Nordic countries have failed to extradite suspects it wants.

And Ankara remains angry over Sweden’s 2019 decision to freeze arms sales.

‘Nothing to do with appeasing Russia’

One of Russia’s stated reasons for invading Ukraine was to stop NATO expansion, and Moscow has threatened Finland and Sweden with a vaguely worded “response” since they made their NATO ambitions clear.

“Turkish reservations have nothing to do with any sort of appeasement towards Russia,” said Ersavci.

Turkey has historically advocated for NATO enlargement, he added.

“Turkey has always been strongly in favour of NATO enlargement, as seen with the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, as well as Slovenia, Slovakia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Albania and even Georgia. However, the situation is now different,” he said.

“There is a very strong public perception in Turkey that Sweden is assisting Turkey’s enemies, and this exerts huge pressure on the government,” said Ersavci.

However, he said Ankara perhaps should have engaged in a private diplomatic process to address its reservations before going public and sparking a global controversy.

The alliance now finds itself in a difficult position.

On one hand, Sweden, Finland and the vast majority of member states are keen to fast-track the applications. On the other, Turkey appears intent on stalling the process over national interests, at least temporarily.

“Turkey remains a fairly influential member within NATO,” Garret J Martin, lecturer and co-director of the Transatlantic Policy Center at American University, told Al Jazeera.

“Its geopolitical position makes it a very valuable player while the second largest standing military force in NATO, behind the United States, makes it a potential contributor to the collective defence of the alliance.”

What next?

Washington and NATO officials have said they expect Turkey’s issues to be resolved, even as Ankara’s rhetoric remains tough.

Despite recent developments, experts believe negotiations might proceed more quietly moving forward.

“The next step is likely to be a flurry of behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and international pressure, to convince Turkey to quickly remove the roadblock. Sweden and Finland will seek to placate Turkey, but we can also expect the US and the EU to play a leading role in this pressure campaign,” Martin said.

“After all, both have some leverage over Turkey, be it through [Washington’s] sale of military equipment or the [EU’s] provision of aid as part of the 2016 migration deal.”

Meanwhile, a sense of urgency is growing amid the Ukraine war and as the alliance prepares for its Madrid summit in late June, where a united front is essential.

“The most likely outcome remains Finland and Sweden joining the alliance very soon. Erdogan is a transactional leader, and the costs of blocking the two Nordic countries – deeply angering Western allies – would far outweigh the benefits in terms of domestic support,” said Martin.

Meanwhile, several observers have said Turkey is using this particular moment for leverage.

“Erdogan also briefly blocked in 2009 the nomination of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s secretary-general, before relenting after receiving a prize in a high-level appointment for a Turkish official in the alliance,” said Martin.

With this in mind, NATO might again be willing to make reasonable concessions to Turkey to overcome this temporary encumbrance and proceed with the application process.

“Since the rest of the alliance is welcoming Finland and Sweden with open arms, there is clear political will to overcome this temporary roadblock,” Martin said.

#### Turkey just wants concessions---they’re not completely opposed to accession.

Susan Fraser 22, Associated Press Correspondent in Turkey, “Why is Turkey wary of Nordic states’ NATO bid?” https://apnews.com/article/turkey-nato-membership-sweden-finalnd-83a191ca8b4052925059b61ddd7e0945/micahw

Turkey is expected to seek to negotiate a compromise deal under which the two countries will crack down on the PKK and other groups in return for Turkish support of their joining NATO. A key demand is expected to be that they halt any support to a Syrian Kurdish group, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG. The group is a Western ally in the fight against the Islamic State group in northern Syria but Turkey views it as an extension of the PKK.

Erdogan could also seek to use Sweden and Finland’s membership to wrest concessions from the United States and other allies. Turkey wants to return to the U.S.-led F-35 fighter jet program — a project it was kicked out of following its purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems. Alternatively, Turkey is looking to purchase a new batch of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade its existing fleet.

Other possible demands could include an end to an unofficial embargo on military sales to Turkey by allies; concessions from EU member countries concerning Turkey’s faltered bid to join the bloc; and increased funds to help the country support 3.7 million Syrian refugees.

#### Turkish opposition will get resolved quickly.

Gautam Mukherjee 22, commentator on political and economic affairs, “Sweden and Finland may be keen to join NATO, but all’s not well in US-led alliance,” https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/sweden-and-finland-may-be-keen-to-join-nato-but-alls-not-well-in-us-led-alliance-10686951.html/micahw

To admit Sweden and Finland, the existing NATO members must agree unanimously. Western media is talking of American pressure, even sanctions, to force an economically savaged Turkey, with 70 per cent inflation, to fall in line. NATO itself expects to smooth things over with Ankara so that they don’t stand in the way.

It is hoping for a fast tracking that could see both countries as NATO members within this year.

### AT: Eastern Flank Thumper

#### NATO united around eastern flank

Air command Public office, 5/10/22, “[NATO: Allies stand together to bolster NATO’s eastern flank](https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/nato-allies-stand-together-to-bolster-natos-eastern-flank/376713/?utm_source=ieu-portal),” Insight EU monitoring; Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, <https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/nato-allies-stand-together-to-bolster-natos-eastern-flank>, JH

RAMSTEIN, Germany – Since the beginning of Russia’s attack on Ukraine NATO has taken measures to shield its member States along the eastern flank from potential aggression. In the air, Allied Air Command commands and employs military aircraft from the nations and NATO to execute enhanced Vigilance Activities.

NATO has substantially increased the number of fighter jets on alert across Eastern Europe in response to Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine. NATO’s enhanced vigilance is a powerful statement of Alliance resolve and cohesion [that demonstrates] our commitment to protect every inch of NATO territory of all our Allies

“NATO air forces have bolstered their presence in the eastern part of the Alliance helping to shield NATO against any aggression. Several dozen fighter jets are on alert at any time to response to possible airspace violations and to deter aggression,” said Headquarters Allied Air Command Chief of Staff, Major General Jörg Lebert. “Allied Air Command integrates the Allied air forces’ fighters, air-to-air refuelling and transport aircraft as well as Allied and NATO airborne warning and control (AWACS) platforms into the standing arrangements to safeguard the skies above the Allies. These assets enable NATO to patrol the Allied airspace and have 24/7 situational awareness above NATO and adjacent territory,” he added.

Allied fighters take off from their home bases, forward deployment bases or carriers flying Air Patrol missions along the Alliance’s eastern flank.

A Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) was stood up at Allied Air Command to plan, task and control Allied aircraft flying enhanced Vigilance Activities. Both Combined Air Operations Centres in Uedem, Germany, and Torrejón, Spain, and the Deployable Command and Control Centre at Poggio Renatico, Italy, have sent personnel to augment the JFAC for the mission.

“NATO’s enhanced vigilance is a powerful statement of Alliance resolve and cohesion under the umbrella of Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area concept,” said Major General Lebert. “These activities are prudent and defensive measures that increase our readiness, underpin Alliance war prevention aims, and clearly demonstrate our commitment to protect every inch of NATO territory of all our Allies,” Major General Lebert concluded.

### AT: France/U.S. Fights Now

#### US and France are united

ANI 21, ANI is South Asia's leading Multimedia News Agency providing content to TV, newspapers, digital platforms, mobile apps and news consolidators as complete digital media solutions, 6/12/21, “Washington, Paris 'on same page': Biden tells Macron,” Yahoo News https://sg.news.yahoo.com/washington-paris-same-page-biden-172254604.html

The United States and France are "on the same page" and can work together to further strengthen NATO, US President Joe Biden told his French counterpart on Saturday, adding that he felt strongly about ensuring NATO's "cohesion."

"As we say back in the States, we're on the same page," Biden told Macron during a televised conversation on the margins of the ongoing G7 summit in the UK.

The US president also explained that he stood fully in support of both NATO and the EU.

"We feel very very strongly about the cohesion of NATO and I for one think that the European Union is an incredibly strong and vibrant entity that has a lot to do with the ability of Western Europe to not only handle its economic issues and provide the backbone and the support for NATO," Biden said.

French President Macron, who clashed numerous times with Biden's predecessor Donald Trump on issues such as NATO, said that he welcomed having a US president who was committed to strengthening ties between the US and Europe.

"I think it's great to have a US president part of the club and very willing to cooperate, and I think that what you demonstrate is that leadership is partnership," Macron said.

The three-day G7 summit at Carbis Bay began on Friday. Opening the first session, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that the international community should "learn the lessons" from the COVID-19 pandemic and bolster resiliency and preparedness

#### France is fully committed to NATO

France Diplomacy 22, French news site 3/15/22, “France and NATO,” *France Diplomacy,* https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/our-alliances-and-cooperations/france-and-nato/

France: a reliable, responsible and supportive ally

France is one of the 12 founding members of NATO. It also hosted the first permanent headquarters in Paris in the 1950s and 60s. In 1966, France decided to withdraw from the Alliance’s integrated military command. That decision in no way undermined France’s commitment to the Alliance’s collective defence. As General de Gaulle put it, the aim was to change the form of our Alliance without changing its substance. Following the positive vote of the National Assembly, France officially announced its full participation in NATO military command structures at the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit in April 2009. French personnel returned to the Alliance’s command structures from 2009, split between Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Currently, when all structures and agencies are taken into account, France has almost 780 troops seconded to NATO entities. Since 2015, ACT has been commanded by a French Air Force General, with the mission of leading the warfare development of military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines of the Alliance to enable NATO to meet its level of ambition and fulfil its three essential core tasks.

Since the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, France has contributed significantly to NATO operations. France thus took part in NATO crisis management operations upon their creation in 1993, in Bosnia under IFOR from 1993 to 2004 and the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999. France then contributed actively to the NATO force in Kosovo, holding KFOR command on three occasions.

France, engaged in Afghanistan from 2001, contributed significantly to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), placed under NATO command in 2003. It also contributed to Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, under UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Since 2018, France has deployed some 380 staff to support the Sea Guardian maritime operation to fight terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. It has also participated in the NATO training mission in Iraq since 2018.

Since 2016, France has contributed to reassurance measures for Baltic States and Poland, launched in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014. Every year, France provides an armoured, mechanized combined arms company team of 300 personnel including Leclerc tanks and infantry combat vehicles, integrated over eight months over alternate years in a multinational battalion in Estonia (2017, 2019, 2021, 2022) and Lithuania (2018, 2020). It also provides air policing support to Estonia and participates in the AWACS patrols over Eastern Europe. This strong, consistent commitment is unanimously appreciated and has led to exceptional partnerships with host countries.

France also contributes to NATO’s tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea with its ship deployments in the Black Sea (two or three per year) and maritime surveillance missions with maritime patrol aircraft.

France is holding the rotating command of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in the first half of 2022.

In light of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022, France decided to further increase its contribution to reassurance for the Allies most exposed to Russia’s threatening actions. A 500-strong French contingent has therefore been deployed in Romania. Almost 200 troops have also joined the enhanced Forward Presence group in Estonia and 4 Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft have been deployed for air policing missions in Poland.

France is one of the few Allies to have a defence instrument that is combat-tested and covers the entire spectrum. National capability priorities will ensure that this defence tool is maintained and updated consistent with the objectives approved within NATO and the European Union.

At the diplomatic and political levels, France also has a key role in fostering a balanced and mutually beneficial transatlantic relationship where Europeans play their full part in security and defence. The European initiatives developed in this field in 2017 (Permanent Structured Cooperation, EU European Defence Fund, European Intervention Initiative and European Peace Facility) fully complement NATO’s action and therefore help Europeans to invest more in their defence and be more effective and competent from a military perspective.

### AT: Greece/Turkey Thumper

#### Greece and Turkey are BFF’s

Tasos Kokkinidis 22, Greek Reporter who studied poly sci at University of Newcastle upone Tyre, 6/17/22, “Greece and Turkey Agree to Reduce Tension in the Aegean” *Greek Reporter,* <https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/17/greece-turkey-reduce-tension/>, JH

Greece and Turkey agreed to reduce tension and keep communication channels open during a meeting between the countries’ defense ministers on Thursday.

Greek National Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos held a brief meeting with his Turkish counterpart Hulusi Akar on the sidelines of the NATO defense ministers summit held in Brussels.

Emphasized in this meeting was the importance of maintaining open communication channels in the spirit of good neighborly relations, a [Greek ministry statement said](https://www.mod.mil.gr/en/), and focusing on a positive agenda that will contribute to building a better climate and regional cooperation.

Within this framework, the Greek minister stressed the importance of reducing tension.

The discussion in Brussels between Akar and [Panagiotopoulos](https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/07/greece-warns-turkey/) focused on the “importance of continuing the dialogue in order to reduce tensions,” according to a Turkish Ministry of Defense statement.

They discussed the need to maintain open channels of communication, a positive agenda, and bilateral and regional cooperation, according to the statement.

### AT: NATO Expansion/Nordic Thumper

#### Nordic bids don’t hold up cohesion

Richard Milne 22, Richard Milne was a capital markets editor, European business correspondent, correspondent in both Frankfurt and Paris as well as a graduate trainee, 6/13/22, “Nato chief says he had ‘no reason to believe’ Turkey would block Nordic membership,” *Financial Times,* https://www.ft.com/content/80039389-1d2b-4eca-9cf6-476a2a6ca0ac  
Nato’s secretary-general insisted he had “no reason to believe” Turkey would block Finland and Sweden’s bids to join the military alliance when he promised the Nordic countries a quick accession process in April.

Jens Stoltenberg told the Financial Times that it was still possible to overcome Ankara’s “legitimate” concerns over terrorism and arms sales “within a reasonable time”. The former Norwegian prime minister added: “Earlier in the process, we had no reasons to believe there would be any problems.

The Turkish concerns are not new. Türkiye is an important ally, and when an ally raises security concerns, we have to address them.” Nato officials promised Finland and Sweden that the first stage of their Nato bid would only take one or two weeks, before Turkey raised objections over terrorism and support for the Kurds just as the two Nordic nations applied last month after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly hit out at Sweden and Finland, calling them “guesthouses” for terrorists and demanding that their Nato applications be blocked. Finnish and Swedish ministers have spoken about toughening their anti-terrorism laws and potentially easing the criteria for Turkish arms sales once they are Nato members.

But officials from both countries have also complained that it is hard to pin the Turks down in terms of their actual demands. Asked if his own credibility was on the line after he told Finland and Sweden their ratification would be quick, Stoltenberg repeated that he had “no reason to believe at that time” there would be any problems. Finnish president Sauli Niinistö has also said that in an April conversation with Erdoğan the Turkish president assured him any Nato bid would be viewed favourably.

Stoltenberg said on Monday: “My goal is to have Finland and Sweden as members as soon as possible. It can still be quick compared with other accession processes.” He said there was no deadline to resolve the issue by Nato’s summit in Madrid at the end of June, which many had seen as a moment for the defence alliance to formally welcome its new applicants. Turkey’s concerns seem less directed at Finland than Sweden, which has a significant Kurdish population and whose government has twice survived only thanks to a deal with a Swedish-Kurdish MP that includes support for a group that Erdoğan calls terrorists.

“The Turkish concerns on terrorism are legitimate. Because no Nato ally has suffered more terrorist attacks than Türkiye . . . We will sit down with Türkiye and find a common way forward,” Stoltenberg said, using the name for the country favoured by Erdoğan. He also praised Magdalena Andersson, Sweden’s prime minister whom he will visit later on Monday, for “Swedish readiness to address Türkiye’s concerns” by amending anti-terror laws and suggesting arms sales to Ankara could be made easier. Niinistö appeared to indicate on Sunday that Finland would not abandon Sweden should its neighbour run into difficulties with its Nato bid, stressing that “Sweden’s cause is ours”.

### AT: Concept Over/Happened

#### The summit for the concept only initiates the discussion --- next 12 months are key

Hamilton ‘20

(Daniel, Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Global Europe Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC . He is also a faculty member at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies . He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NATO and Nordic-Baltic affairs, and as Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two U .S . Secretaries of State, “Transatlantic Futures: Towards #NATO2030,” Latvian Institute for International Affairs, https://www.academia.edu/47604415/Between\_War\_and\_Integration\_NATO\_and\_Russia\_towards\_2030)

How to Achieve It A NATO Summit no later than late spring/early summer 2021 can set the stage with allied heads of state and government affirming their mutual commitments to each other under the North Atlantic Treaty . At that summit, leaders should initiate a process leading to a new Strategic Concept to be unveiled at a bookend summit within 12 months . A new Strategic Concept is an opportunity to get all allies back on track in a NATO that is more cohesive politically, more capable militarily, more balanced between North American and European contributions, and more resilient in the face of disruptive dangers to our societies .

## Deterrence/Doctrine Focus

### Uniq --- Deterrence Focus Now

#### The Strategic concept’s focus is deterrence

Atlantic Council 6/16/22 [[Lisa Aronsson](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/lisa-aronsson/) is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a research fellow at National Defense University, 6-16-2022, Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/] Eric

**The** Madrid **Strategic Concept** will redefine the Alliance’s core tasks. **The focus will be on defense** **and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic**, **but cooperative** **security** **and relations** with partners are still relevant given the myriad non-traditional challenges posed by climate, technology, and authoritarianism. Cooperative security is a means of strengthening the Alliance’s relationships with these global innovation and climate leaders, and leveraging their strengths and experiences **to help shape and sustain the rules-based international order.**

Jim Garamone 22 [Jim Garamone, 6-16-2022, NATO Defense Leaders Set Stage for Alliance Decisions at Madrid Summit, U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3065892/nato-defense-leaders-set-stage-for-alliance-decisions-at-madrid-summit/] Eric

Still, **the talk of the ministerial** **concerned** **Ukraine and** **the challenge Russia presents**. **The alliance is looking to** beef up deterrence **and defense** **in the Eastern** **countries of the alliance,** Austin said.

"During this enormous crisis in European security, we're proud to stand together to strengthen the rules-based international order that protects us all," the secretary said.

"**Together**, **we have risen to the challenge of [**President Vladimir] **Putin's war of choice** **and Russia's assault** **on** **transatlantic security**," Austin said. "**Our allies have** **activated NATO's defense plans**. **They've deployed elements of the NATO Response Force**. And they've placed tens of thousands of troops in the eastern areas of the alliance, along with significant air and naval assets under direct NATO command, supported by allies' national deployments."

**The alliance is looking to the future and NATO leaders** **are making long-term plans to deter** **and defend every** **inch of NATO territory**. This is especially aimed at the East, the secretary said.

Many of the ministers' recommendations will be presented to NATO leaders in Madrid. **These will include** **basing decisions**, **the footprint of forces throughout the continent, all domain combat and more.**

The secretary said he was pleased with the work the ministers did during the ministerial but could not elaborate on the decisions. Those will be ratified later. "See you in Madrid," he told reporters.

#### Strategic concept will focus on deterrence – the direct nature of the Ukraine war means NATO will refocus on conventional deterrence instead of hybrid and non-state threats.

Simon 22 [Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance.; “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO”; NATO Review; June 2, 2022; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html]//eleanor

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways.

#### NATO members want to focus on deterring further Russian aggression now.

Kojala and Kulys 6/19/22 [Linas Kojala, Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania. Justinas Kulys, Policy Analyst / Project Manager, Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania.; “Lithuania Hopes NATO’s Strategic Concept Leads To More Heavy Metal And Boots On The Ground – Analysis”; Eurasia Review; June 19, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062022-lithuania-hopes-natos-strategic-concept-leads-to-more-heavy-metal-and-boots-on-the-ground-analysis/]//eleanor

For decades the Baltic States and Poland have been the most vocal advocates of the threat posed by Russia’s aggressive foreign policy to the peace and stability of Eastern Europe and beyond. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine there is a feeling that testing NATO’s resolve in the Baltic states and Poland may well be the next move. Thus, they are convinced that a greater NATO presence and enablers capable of deterring and, if necessary, defending the area are urgently needed. History taught Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the lessons of living in a tough neighbourhood with Russia. After gaining independence in the 1990s they focused their foreign and security policies on two main goals: joining both the EU and NATO. First, these two goals determined their geopolitical will to become an official part of the vital Western alliances, showing a willingness to follow the Western way of life and its values. Secondly, they had practical implications as they helped build a framework for economic development and offered official security guarantees from the West. To become members of NATO, the Baltic states not only reformed and strengthened their armed forces (with material and expert support from the Nordic countries) but also contributed to NATO missions in many of the period’s hotspots, such as Bosnia and Hercegovina and Iraq. The greater or lesser but constant physical menace from Russia felt by the Baltic States has led them to mainly focus on conventional threats as they are both real and existential. Yet the shifts in modern warfare witnessed in Ukraine starting from 2014 also require focusing on hybrid threats, as they can be used during peacetime or as a preparation prior to aggression. Given Russia’s regional military advantage, aggressive rhetoric against the Baltic States and possibly permanent Russian troop deployments in Belarus, it is essential for NATO to enhance its defensive capabilities in the region, moving away from an enhanced forward presence towards forward defence. This is the crucial reason why the Baltic States are focused on more practical military solutions (to be described in this article) during the upcoming NATO Strategic Concept and NATO Summit in Madrid.

#### NATO will focus on Russia in its strategic concept now.

Xu 6/25/22 [Yifan Xu is a reporter at China Daily; “Russia to dominate Western agenda”; China Daily; June 25, 2022; http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/25/WS62b624d5a310fd2b29e68796.html]//eleanor

At the upcoming G7 and NATO summits, Russia will be No 1 on the agenda, while China will also be a focus, experts said. Because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, "the focus fundamentally will remain on Russia at these summits", Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Institute for China-America Studies, told China Daily. He said the issue of China would also be brought into the spotlight, for the two groups "had already been thinking a little bit about China for a few years". "That's why this issue of China being big into the NATO Strategic Concept was something which was cooking for a couple of years," Gupta said. The G7 group will hold its 48th summit at Schloss Elmau in Germany between Saturday and Monday. The NATO summit will take place in the Spanish capital Madrid on the last two days of June. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the summit would update the NATO Strategic Concept, and will include China in this document for the first time. On Tuesday, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a news briefing call previewing the two summits. During the call, Matthew Goodman, senior vice-president for economics at the CSIS, said the two summits are "a pretty challenging set of meetings" for the United States. "The good news is that President (Joe) Biden has some wind at his back because he was able to mobilize this group of allies and partners to take on the Russia-Ukraine challenge initially. But the question is: Can he move the ball forward on these two — at these two meetings," Goodman said. "There are some pretty significant headwinds here. you have Ukraine bogged down. You've got inflation raging, you know, a series of crises from food to energy to health to climate. Obviously, Ukraine is going to loom large and the big question is around whether this group is going to be able to take forward the sanctions."

#### The strategic concept will focus on deterring Russia and China.

Shankar 6/25/22 [Priyanka Shankar is an independent journalist with a keen interest in press freedom, human rights and podcasting.; “Nato poised to harden position on China as support for Russia deepens distrust”; Yahoo! Money; June 25, 2022; https://money.yahoo.com/nato-poised-harden-position-china-093000314.html]//eleanor

As Nato leaders prepare to convene in Madrid next week for their annual summit, observers say the world's largest defence alliance is likely to harden its stance towards China over its position on Russia's war in Ukraine. China is expected to be identified for the first time in Nato's new strategic concept, a key document charting the 30-member bloc's future security trail and military development to be adopted at the summit. A recent Nato survey across all member states found China was viewed as a security threat by 52 per cent of respondents, an increase of 11 percentage points from 2021. Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team. "China is openly contesting the rules-based international order," Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg told an event organised by media firm Politico in Brussels this week, in a sharp departure from his tone a year ago. Chinese investments in new modern military equipment and desire to control critical infrastructure in Europe had made it all the more important for Nato to develop a stronger stance, the secretary general said.

#### The alliance will focus on Russia now – that assures they stay cohesive.

Coffey 6/25/22 [Luke Coffey is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.; “NATO’s chance to chart a new path for its future”; Arab News; June 25, 2022; https://www.arabnews.com/node/2110366]//eleanor

NATO leaders will meet in Madrid next week at a crucial time for the transatlantic alliance. It will be their first summit since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February and NATO’s defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan last year. The main focus of the meeting will be Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has completely altered the geopolitical landscape of the transatlantic community. The consequences of this war will not be fully felt or understood for years. The alliance will want to take steps to deal with the fallout from the conflict and to prepare for new security challenges in the future. Also, considering the fragile security situation in Europe, it will be very important for all 30 NATO members to show cohesion and unity. While some who have cozy economic relations with Russia have caused some bumps in the road for the alliance, for the most part NATO members have been unified in their response to Russia.

#### The security concept will focus on Russia.

Coffey 6/25/22 [Luke Coffey is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.; “NATO’s chance to chart a new path for its future”; Arab News; June 25, 2022; https://www.arabnews.com/node/2110366]//eleanor

The second issue to watch is the publication of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, its first since 2010. Had it not been for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this would have been the big news from the summit. The Strategic Concept is the premier policy document to guide the alliance’s role into the future. The current version is woefully out of date. In the past 12 years there have been major geopolitical crises such as the so-called Arab Spring and its aftermath, NATO’s intervention in Libya, the defeat in Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rise of Daesh, the rise of China, and COVID-19. None of these issues were addressed in the 2010 Strategic Concept in any meaningful way. Although it is 40 pages long, the words “pandemic” and “China” do not appear. Of course, Russia will be the main focus of the new document, but it will be equally interesting to see how other issues such as China and engagement with the Middle East will be addressed.

#### Biden will try to keep it focus on Ukraine and containing Russia now.

Miller and Superville 6/25/22 [Zeke Miller is an American journalist and past President of the White House Correspondents Association. Miller is a White House reporter for the Associated Press. Darlene Superville is a veteran White House reporter for The Associated Press.; “Biden’s mission in Europe: Shore up alliance against Russia”; AP News; June 25, 2022; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-inflation-biden-g-7-summit-nato-090e5cc5390acf29a069334dba0a5b47]//eleanor

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden is out to sustain the global alliance punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as he embarks on a five-day trip to Europe as the four-month-old war shows no sign of abating and its aftershocks to global food and energy supplies are deepening. Biden first joins a meeting of the Group of Seven leading economic powers in the Bavarian Alps of Germany and later travels to Madrid for a summit with leaders of the 30 NATO countries. The visit comes as the global coalition to bolster Ukraine and punish Russia for its aggression has showed signs of fraying amid skyrocketing inflation in food and energy prices caused by the conflict. Biden, who left Washington on Saturday, and the G-7 leaders intend to announce a ban on importing gold from Russia, according to a person familiar with White House planning who was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. Gold is Moscow’s second largest export after energy. The Ukraine war has entered a more attritional phase since Biden’s last trip to Europe in March, just weeks after Russia launched its assault. At that time, he met with allies in Brussels as Ukraine was under regular bombardment and he tried to reassure Eastern Europe partners in Poland that they would not be the next to face an incursion by Moscow. Russian’s subsequent retreat from western Ukraine and regrouping in the east has shifted the conflict to one of artillery battles and bloody house-to-house fighting in the country’s industrial heartland, the Donbas region. While U.S. officials see broad consensus for maintaining the pressure on Russia and sustaining support for Ukraine in the near term, they view Biden’s trip as an opportunity to align strategy for both the conflict and its global ramifications heading into the winter and beyond. Allies differ over whether their goals are merely to restore peace or to force Russia to pay a deeper price for the conflict to prevent its repetition.

### Uniq --- Conventional Strength Focus

#### It will focus on conventional strength

Kojala and Kulys 6/19/22 [Linas Kojala, Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania. Justinas Kulys, Policy Analyst / Project Manager, Eastern Europe Studies Center, Lithuania.; “Lithuania Hopes NATO’s Strategic Concept Leads To More Heavy Metal And Boots On The Ground – Analysis”; Eurasia Review; June 19, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062022-lithuania-hopes-natos-strategic-concept-leads-to-more-heavy-metal-and-boots-on-the-ground-analysis/]//eleanor

In its last strategic concept, NATO focused more on problems like terrorism rather than on conventional warfare, reforming its military structure and procuring lighter military equipment. After the Russian aggression in Ukraine there is much speculation in the media about the lack of specific military equipment in NATO countries. Their lack could also be detrimental to strengthening NATO’s eastern flank on a more long-term basis. To strengthen the security of the Baltic States more heavy equipment, such as tanks and heavy artillery, must be deployed in the region. This could be a helpful deterrence measure against Russia and increase the capabilities of NATO forces in the area as all three Baltic States have either mechanised or motorised brigades. All of these combat-ready military capabilities must be formed in NATO countries at a national level and only then can they be sent to the Baltics. It is to be hoped that the current trend in rising military spending will soon cover all the most urgent gaps. Air defence is a crucial gap for the security of the Baltic States. They lack fighter jets and long-range air-defence systems, so they are heavily dependent on NATO air policing missions (despite efforts to strengthen their mid-range air defence capabilities). While the air policing concept might have been efficient when it was created, it should now focus more on integrated air defence. First, NATO fighter jets in the Baltics should be consistently armed and ready to engage if needed. Secondly, NATO should think about deploying extra surface-based air defence (especially long-range) capabilities that can be integrated with local air defence infrastructures and capabilities and strengthen air defence capabilities by expanding eFP forces to the brigade level. Furthermore, NATO’s presence in the air could be reinforced by having high-readiness airpower capabilities assigned to be deployed in the Baltic States in a crisis or conflict.

## EDT/Innovation Uniq

### Uniq --- NATO = Privat EDT Now

#### NATO invest in private industry

Kyle Wiggers 21, Kyle Wiggers is a senior reporter at TechCrunch with a special interest in artificial intelligence, 10/21/21, [NATO launches AI strategy and $1B fund as defense race heats up](https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document/collection/news/id/63X0-DXD1-JCMN-Y04X-00000-00?cite=NATO%20launches%20AI%20strategy%20and%20%241B%20fund%20as%20defense%20race%20heats%20up&context=1516831), The Machine, <https://venturebeat.com/2021/10/21/nato-launches-ai-strategy-and-1b-fund-as-defense-race-heats-up/>, JH

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of 30 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean, this week announced that it would adopt its first AI strategy and launch a 'future-proofing' fund with the goal of investing around $1 billion. Military.com reports[1] that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will join other NATO members in Brussels, Belgium, the alliance's headquarters, to formally approve the plans over two days of talks.  
Speaking at a news conference, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort was in response to 'authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies.' NATO's AI strategy will cover areas including data analysis, imagery, cyberdefense, he added.  
NATO said in a July press release that it was 'currently finalizing' its strategy on AI' and that principles of responsible use of AI in defence will be 'at the core' of the strategy. Speaking to Politico in March, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges David van Weel said[2] that the strategy would identify ways to operate AI systems ethically, pinpoint military applications for the technology, and provide a 'platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards.' van Weel said.  
'Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs but also with bytes and big data,' Stoltenberg said. 'We must keep our technological edge.'  
NATO's overtures come after a senior cybersecurity official at the Pentagon resigned in protest because the slow pace of technological development at the department. Speaking to the press last week, Nicolas Chaillan, former chief software officer at the Air Force, said that the U.S. has 'no competing fighting chance against China' in 15 to 20 years, characterizing the AI and cyber defenses in some government agencies as being at 'kindergarten level.'  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in 2020 launched the AI Partnership for Defense[3], which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context. More recently, the department announced that it plans to invest $874 million next year in AI-related technologies as a part of the army's $2.3 billion science and technology research budget.  
Much of the DoD's spending originates from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in Washington, D.C., a government organization exploring the use and applications of AI in combat. According to an analysis by Deltek, the DoD set aside $550 million of AI obligations awarded to the top ten contractors and defense accounted for 37% of total AI spending by the U.S. government, with contractors receiving the windfall.

### Uniq --- NATO Unity on DIANA Now

#### NATO members are together on private innovation with DIANA

Chris Ruff 22, Director for Political Outreach & Communications, 3/24/22, “Increase security spending to 3% of GDP, with 1% dedicated to emerging technologies,” *Digital Europe,* <https://www.digitaleurope.org/news/increase-security-spending-to-3-of-gdp-with-1-dedicated-to-emerging-technologies/>, JH

Ahead of the NATO and European summits today, DIGITALEUROPE urges leaders to bolster their cooperation with the private sector, and invest in a strong and resilient security policy with digital technologies at its heart.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shocked the world. Our support goes out to the Ukrainian people who are suffering unimaginable horrors.

There are no positives in this war, but we note that Europe and its NATO allies are standing shoulder to shoulder. The response has been swift, united and resolute. Furthermore, we see historic commitments by leaders to finally match the 2% defence spending target.

We need to take note of the digital aspects of this war. Before the first troops entered Ukraine, Russia had been subjecting Ukraine to years of cyber warfare. This has disrupted critical infrastructure and weakened the state, in preparation for military invasion.

Artificial intelligence and drones are already revolutionising warfare, and new technologies like quantum computing are set to change the way we look at cybersecurity. It is vital that the EU and its NATO allies stay at the forefront of technological advances and strengthen their cooperation with the private sector for an effective crisis response.

We must build efficient governance structures between the EU and its member states, NATO and the private sector, so that we are ready to work together and respond in times of crisis. This is especially the case in critical sector areas, such as banking, energy or healthcare. A good example for inspiration is the European Central Bank's Euro Cyber Resilience Board.

Impressive tech innovations are no longer coming from governments, but from technology companies, and often smaller players. It is therefore vital for our resilience to build an innovative tech ecosystem in the EU and in NATO allied countries.

This requires investment. NATO showed impressive leadership in its collaboration with the private sector last year, setting up the Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies and implementing the NATO Investment Fund and the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA).

In addition, 20% of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility was dedicated to digital spending for the first time ever. In the US, digital infrastructure has been central to the Biden's Build Back Better plan.

In the context of a devastating pandemic followed by a devastating war, we call on NATO leaders to increase their spending target to 3% of GDP, with 1% dedicated to funding for emerging and disruptive technologies.

We are finally taking our collective security seriously, and now we need to make sure that digital technology is at the heart of our security and defence policy.

### Uniq --- Concept = Privat Now

#### The strategic concept will use the private sector now

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović 22, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović is a Croatian politician and diplomat who served as President of Croatia from 2015 to 2020, 6/16/22, “NATO Must Ensure Defense and Civilian Industries Work Together,” *Defense One,* <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/nato-must-ensure> defense-and-civilian-industries-work-together/368250/, JH  
The internet, microwaves, and synthetic rubber came into our lives as products invented for military purposes. Even everyday things, such as undershirts and concentrated fruit juice were created to improve the combat readiness of armed forces. Though many people typically associate the military with war and suffering, this industry has been a source of incredible progress, producing inventions that made our lives longer, healthier, and easier. These days, innovation is likely to run the other way, with the military benefiting from inventions developed with private funding.

A symbiotic relationship between military needs and human progress is not necessarily the default. Instead, it requires a well-oiled innovation ecosystem in which military and civilian industries share their expertise and knowledge with one another. NATO has recently announced several initiatives to build on past success, but more are needed—particularly as members increase their military funding.

Virtually all alliance members are investing more in defense or are soon planning to do so. Germany, for example, declared that it would create a 100-billion-Euro fund and reach its 2% goal in 2022. Poland, which shares the longest EU border with Ukraine, has taken in more than 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees and promised to dedicate 3% of its GDP to defense. Croatia ramped up its defense investment to 2.3% of GDP.

To ensure that this new investment spurs innovation and co-operation between military and civilian industries as well as academia, NATO announced in April the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. DIANA will concentrate on deep technologies, including artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, novel materials, and outer space. In addition, 17 NATO nations have agreed to set up the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund. It will invest 1 billion Euros in early-stage startups and other deep tech funds aligned with its strategic objectives.

As NATO prepares to adopt its next Strategic Concept at the summit in Madrid, it is essential that it focus on mechanisms that maintain its technological advantage. As part of [GLOBSEC’s work](https://www.globsec.org/projects/globsec-future-security-defence-council-fsdc/) at the Future Security and Defense Council, we have proposed several ideas to help promote innovation in the Alliance. We are convinced that NATO’s innovation ecosystem must integrate public and private sectors to ensure this edge.

### Uniq --- DIANA = Privatize Now

#### DIANA will move to private to rapidly increase its innovation

Simona R. Soare 21, Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest where she lectured on international security, 6/11/21, “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies,” GMF, This policy brief is published as part of the GMF Transatlantic Security Task Force project, with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies>, JH

In the context of the rapid pace of progress in several technologies driven by the private sector and market forces, NATO’s approach to innovation and EDTs stands out in comparison to previous adaptation efforts in the 1990s and 2000s. The ongoing reflection in the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap and the NATO 2030 process is perhaps one of the most systematic efforts to develop a strategic and coordinated approach to several technology priority areas, backed simultaneously by institutional change and procedural innovation. Today’s iteration of defense innovation seems an order of magnitude and speed above what the alliance has experienced before. It builds on substantial changes in NATO processes, structures, authorities, and skills to reward risk taking and experimentation. NATO’s innovation efforts also go beyond the traditional focus on technical and operational standardization, and they include a prominent ethical and normative dimension. As the NATO secretary-general recently underlined, allies “should also look into how NATO can be the platform to address ethical aspects of these technologies,” including by developing “guideline standards.”22

NATO has a real opportunity to broaden its vision and practice in this area by using innovation in EDTs as a linchpin for a new allied framework in which innovation drives the adaptation process. If the flexibility, creativity, and diversity of democratic societies, governments, advanced economies, and research communities are a strategic asset, as the NATO 2030 process suggests, then NATO can create an innovation environment that competes with more centralized alternatives, such China’s process of civil-military fusion. For example, the new NATO accelerator could prioritize disruptive innovation in strategic digital systems of systems and technology convergence (notably, combinations of emerging technologies) while maintaining the trend of sustained innovation in other emerging technologies such as hypersonics. The aim would be to start on a disruptive pathway, with a view to challenging the operational models of adversaries, rather than merely improving allied military capabilities. Thus, the accelerator could become NATO’s permanent offset capacity.

Specifically, building on ongoing efforts, NATO should consider addressing the following five areas as key to its innovation-as-adaptation framework.

Establishing a NATO Civil-Military Technology Assessment Capability

During the Cold War, the allies had dedicated instruments—for example, the Cooperation Committee—to monitor and control technological diffusion. Now, to facilitate innovation and improve its adaptability through innovation, NATO needs a strategic-level, civil-military capacity for horizon scanning, technology assessment, and monitoring. Such a capability would build on work currently undertaken by NATO ACT and the Science and Technology Organization, and it would be complementary to the Innovation Board and Defense Innovation Accelerator. However, it would broaden the scope to include a variety of military and civilian, state, and private-sector actors active in the EDTs innovation ecosystem. It would deliver constant understanding (including taxonomies) and intelligence on technological developments in academia, the private sector, and the military across the alliance, as well as the authority to link such developments to NATO innovation priorities. It would contribute to the resilience of allies by monitoring the transfer of jointly agreed critical EDTs (software and hardware) to non-NATO and non-partner countries. And it would provide intelligence and understanding among the allies on adversarial developments in defense innovation and EDTs uptake. Established as a distinct entity or within an existing NATO structure, this capability should regularly consult with competent EU bodies to exchange information, improve understanding, and facilitate coordination on output and commonality of purpose.

# Links

## General Links

### Links --- Overstretch

#### Taking on too many tasks overstretches NATO

Larsen 5/22/22

(Henrik, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich., “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //um-ef)

NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.

#### Governance tasks trade-off

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

The challenge for NATO is to tap into these values without falling into the familiar trap of committing itself to global governance, a commitment which the disorderly and hasty Afghan retreat has robbed of much of its credibility. Today, NATO needs to be clear on the need to defend democratic values at home and on the lengths to which it is willing to go in the defence of such values abroad. Partnering with established democracies in Asia may fit the bill, but building democracy in contested countries likely will not. In short, NATO needs to subordinate cooperative security to its key priority of collective defence.

#### Taking on too many tasks dilutes NATO’s warfighting capabilities and deterrence focus

Dr. Tardy ‘20

(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Conclusion – overcoming maladaptation This article has offered an analysis of the risks of maladaptation that NATO has been exposed to while seeking congruence with its environment. As any security organisation, NATO has since the end of the Cold War sought to align with the needs and policies of its member states; yet such adaptation has generated side effects that can undermine the Alliance’s own relevance. We have looked at the context of the new Cold War to explore this maladaptation. As of 2014, the resurgence of Russia as a peer competitor has given NATO a new role as a collective defence organisation; Russia constitutes a threat and NATO offers a response to it; through the shift to collective defence NATO seemed to align with its environment. What we have seen in this article though is that the pure defence-focused response is insufficient to NATO’s alignment with its threat environment. Because the threats are diverse and embrace a large range of possible actions, the policy response needs to be equally broad-ranging and multi-domain. This leads to the dilemma by which NATO must play with two imperfect policy options: either it focuses on the narrow segment of defence but then risks being ill-equipped for the multifaceted threats; or it enlarges its mandate to a broad range of tasks but then it runs the risks of diluting its core military function. The dilemma is here to stay. Member states are unlikely to agree on a strategy that would clearly identify one path at the expense of the other. And security institutions inherently struggle to demonstrate relevance and adjust their own mandate to the evolving environment. In this context, the challenge comes from the exposed dilemma as much as it is about a trade-off between the narrow and the broad paths; in lieu of a binary choice the way forward is probably to calibrate the scope of the broadening (see Shea 2019). Here is the relevance challenge: for NATO to keep the military edge and being able to prevail in future military operations, while sufficiently enlarging the scope of its mandate so that it can respond to the most acute contemporary threats. Such trade-off builds a slightly different notion of congruence that is in the end more equivocal than initially asserted. Further research is needed on this calibrating exercise as a potential response to maladaptation. When doing this, three sets of considerations will have to be taken into account, and one possible path is recommended. First, the NATO of the Cold War is no longer a useful point of comparison; the threat environment is simply too different today and adaptation has, as a consequence, become a very different process. Second, maintaining a comparative advantage in the military domain will most likely remain a priority and therefore the starting point of any adaptation policy. Failing that, NATO’s added value would be at stake. Third, the nature of the threats means that NATO must to a degree embrace a wider security agenda: hybridity calls for it, and resisting task expansion will be difficult. In this context, one possible way out comes from burden-sharing through institutional partnerships (Flockhart 2014). Back in the 2000s, the idea of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) emerged from the acknowledgement that “NATO cannot do it all”, and must, therefore, rely on partners which, because of their own expertise and comparative advantages, would maximise the broad international efforts, be it in Kosovo or in Afghanistan (see Williams 2011, Tardy 2012, Jakobsen 2018). This is no less valid today. Partnerships carry benefits that alliances bring, be it in terms of capability aggregation, strategy coordination, or burden-sharing (Wallander and Keohane 2002). Partnering with others is imperative as there are issues that are simply not for NATO to tackle and that are nonetheless essential to NATO’s mission. How to organise this new type of comprehensive approach goes beyond the remit of this article. The thinking relates to other institutions such as the EU or the UN, but also to sub-state actors such as municipalities, law enforcement entities or regions, as well as the private sector. At least two principles should guide the reflection so as to minimise the risk of maladaptation: first is the fact that any task expansion be based on NATO’s added value as a defence institution. It is this defence added value that must determine the nature of NATO’s role in any broader partnership. Any task expansion that would not make the military nature of the Alliance the starting point of the discussion would potentially lead back to the unintended consequences of adaptation and create incongruence. Second, any burden-sharing implies that NATO may not be in the lead, but rather in support of other actors, and even, theoretically, coordinated by others. This implies a sense of modesty in some areas of multi-domain threat response, where NATO’s added value is not central. Making these points takes us far from the alleged pertinence of the post-Ukraine collective defence agenda. Yet, this is what NATO’s relevance and congruence with the twenty-first-century security environment are about.

O’Neil ‘22

(Paul, “The Risk of Attempting Too Much,” pg online @ <https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-report-2022-03-EN_0.pdf> //um-ef)

### Links --- Focus

#### Prioritization and focus key to NATO unity and effectiveness --- shifting focus trades-off

Larsen 5/22/22

(Henrik, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich., “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //um-ef)

Implications for NATO’s Strategic Concept

In the coming years, NATO needs to balance the impetus toward being a “liberal bulwark” with its traditional role as a defense alliance. To do so will require a thorough understanding of the strategic environment, particularly the threat posed by Russia and the challenges posed by China. NATO must adapt by better delineating what aspects of security planning it is best suited to and what would be better delegated to other institutions, while prioritizing partnerships that share NATO values. As the drafting of the Strategic Concept is being finalized and moving toward formal adoption by the NATO allies in Madrid in June, it is crucial to avoid the temptation to define “resilience” as a core task. The Strategic Concept from 2010 outlined the core tasks of “collective defense,” “crisis management” and “cooperative security,” but adding a fourth core task this time around would further confuse what is core to the alliance. NATO needs to prioritize and refocus on collective defense, its original and continued raison d’être. The digital age and the significance of political warfare is bringing about new challenges, but the transatlantic alliance is better off tying resilience to collective defense as an integral part of it rather than risking the inflation of core tasks.

#### Narrow focus is key.

Moller and Rynning 21 [Sara Bjerg Moller is Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond”; The Washington Quarterly; March 23, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133?journalCode=rwaq20#:~:text=If%20the%20allies%20are%20not,before%20it%20has%20even%20begun.]//eleanor

NATO’s continued transformation in the coming years seems all but certain; less certain is what it will transform into. The alliance has survived this long by adapting. But unlike during previous rounds of adaptation that involved the alliance taking on more responsibilities and tasks, the coming decades—whose defining feature will be the continued rise of China—will require a much more narrowly focused alliance. For nigh on three decades, NATO had the luxury of pondering what kind of alliance it wanted to be as it searched for a new raison d’etre in the reduced threat environment following the end of the Cold War. But the contrast between the 1990s and today’s deluge of challenges and threats is stark, and NATO no longer has the luxury of time. To ensure the alliance’s future operational utility, the alliance must embrace its original collective defense identity and look for ways to streamline, and where possible reduce, its existing collective security and crisis management activities. In addition to offloading existing responsibilities to the EU and UN, NATO should think twice before taking on new mandates and avoid elevating new tasks like resiliency or counterterrorism missions and assigning them equal importance to Article 5. The alternative to the vision outlined here is an alliance increasingly weighed down by a myriad of tasks, unable to prioritize among them, and lacking both the political will and financial resources to perform its main function. An overburdened NATO risks being unable to fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense, thereby increasing the risk of further fracturing within the alliance. The proposed course of action will by no means be an easy one. But it provides the best chance to guarantee that the transatlantic alliance will have the capabilities and assets needed to meet the challenges posed by China’s rise.

#### Concept key to reinforce deterrence --- adding new issues to the NATO menu trades-off with focus

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

Balancing Russia and China First and foremost, the US will want the Strategic Concept, last updated in 2010, to more accurately reflect today’s threat environment. This requires acknowledging that NATO is up against not one, but two strategic challengers—Russia and China—and getting the balance right between the two. Step one is to recast Russia, which is no longer the possible partner envisioned in the last concept but now an adversarial force. The aim should be to provide a clear mandate and a unified threat assessment to better enable the alliance to address the Kremlin’s persistent probing and aggression in Europe. While some allies have accused the Biden administration of trying to “park” the Russia issue in favour of other priorities (China), Washington has kept a focus on Moscow in respect to arms control, cyber threats, authoritarianism, disinformation and foreign malign influence. US Defense Secretary Austin’s recent visit to the Black Sea reinforced US commitment to countering Russia’s conventional military threat in Europe and NATO’s fundamental role in deterring and defending against it. Step two is to add China, which is not even mentioned in the last concept. Reflecting its own geostrategic shift to the Indo-Pacific, which elevates China as the “pacing” challenge over a Russia in relative decline, the US has spent the last few years pushing NATO to do more about China. Washington has met resistance from some allies who view China primarily as a US problem with a military threat too far from NATO’s borders; or prefer to maintain cautious cooperation with China in favour of lucrative economic opportunities; or argue Russia remains the most pressing threat, more squarely in NATO’s wheelhouse. In the 2021 Brussels Summit Communique, allies carefully cited both the challenges and opportunities posed by China’s rise for the first time in a NATO document. From here, the US wants the new concept to clarify NATO’s role and approach. But a robust debate is ongoing, even in Washington, on whether NATO should focus on countering China in the European theatre (primarily through building resilience to cyber threats, technological penetration, and political and economic subversion) or branch out to more conventional military activities with key allies in the Indo-Pacific (though not necessarily under a NATO flag). Hoping to leverage its closest allies against both its major challengers, the US will want the alliance to help address the “strategic simultaneity” problem. Given that the US and its allies could face two crises at once—one in Europe’s East with Russia and another in the Indo-Pacific with China—who will go where, what will they bring and what role will NATO itself have? Answering these questions will require frank conversations among the US and its allies about division of labour, expectations and assumptions that will be baked into the Strategic Concept. Boosting Defence, Deterrence and Burden Sharing Another top priority for the US in the concept will be bolstering the basics—i.e., ensuring NATO can fulfil its core function of defence and deterrence—whether against Russia, China or any other actor. Some in Washington worry NATO’s recent efforts to take on new issues like climate security could distract from the alliance’s baseline tasks. The US will push to keep a focus on filling key capability gaps; improving mobility, readiness and exercises; designating forces to implement NATO’s new defence plans; enhancing interoperability; and speeding up decision-making.

### Links --- General Tech/U.S. Push

#### Plan disrupts cohesion and interoperability --- U.S. moves too fast

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45177.pdf> //um-ef)

Congress may consider what role the United States can play to support NATO’s adaptation, and what channels Congress could pursue to exert influence over NATO’s direction. There are both risks and opportunities associated with sharing technology or developing it jointly with NATO allies, and there are questions about what the United States and its allies expect from one another in terms of technology and innovation. Technology has the potential to enhance NATO’s effectiveness, but it also has the potential to undermine interoperability or political cohesion if the United States develops a technology-driven strategy and its NATO allies either do not keep pace, or do not adapt to strategic, political, and technological change.

#### U.S. security cooperation undermines cohesion and interoperability --- ensures U.S.-driven tech lead and European backlash over tech control

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45177.pdf> //um-ef)

NATO’s Innovation Challenges Even as some NATO allies develop defense innovation strategies, NATO faces a series of obstacles to coordinating these initiatives, aligning national perspectives, and forging a unified approach. Without legal or financial mechanisms to steer the allies in a particular direction, or the ability to effect a step change across the alliance, NATO relies on its efforts to build and share knowledge among the allies, set agendas, establish priorities, and promote multinational cooperation. Generally speaking, NATO’s innovation challenges relate to  securing resources for innovation and engaging commercial industry;  balancing short-term priorities with preparations for the future;  preserving interoperability and transatlantic burden-sharing;  harmonizing defense planning processes, including with the EU; and  using allies’ diversity to foster more effective innovation. Resources for Innovation During the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies maintained defense spending and investment levels sufficient to ensure their military technological superiority. Large U.S. public investment programs in technology and innovation supported U.S. economic success and spurred innovation. 128 The U.S. government was a driver for innovation through the internet, biotech, and shale gas, for example, in part because of its willingness to invest in early stages of the innovation cycle.129 Analysts have concluded that long-term government funding for defense and civilian R&D are key ingredients for the development of dual-use technology. 130 Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States shifted attention away from government-led innovation and toward “consumption markets.”131 As a result it faces new challenges that relate to cost pressures, limited budgets, the shift from “defense spin-offs to consumer-market spin-ons” in technology, and rising international competition. 132 Since 2014, NATO allies have been increasing their defense spending and investment budgets, with Canada and the European allies spending more on defense in 2017 for the third consecutive year.133 In addition to more funding, NATO has other strengths to leverage, including hosting high-performing universities and research labs as well as dynamic and open economies that attract talent. These strengths could potentially give NATO access to a wide network of innovative entrepreneurs and ideas. At the same time, however, European governments continue to be constrained by relatively limited budget environments and resources for defense R&D. The budgetary context that allowed for the Third Offset Strategy in the United States, for example, does not exist anywhere in Europe. For some European governments, relatively small increases in defense spending require a convincing political narrative. Even then, the resources devoted to defense are often allocated toward more pressing short-term priorities such as readiness and current operations. Relatively limited budgets combined with NATO’s bureaucratic processes and a risk-averse culture are likely to continue to present challenges for NATO in its efforts to build relationships with large technology companies or other sources of innovation. NATO’s capacity has also been reduced over time through reductions to the command structure.134 Defense Ministers recently agreed to reverse the downsizing trend by introducing two new military command centers, but the new staff is expected to focus on maritime security, troop movements, and contingency planning for Eastern and Southern Europe. Transatlantic burden-sharing continues to be a priority for the Trump Administration. While European allies are increasing their defense budgets, they are unlikely to close the capabilities gap with the United States any time soon because that gap reflects decades of spending patterns as well as historical experience and strategic culture. 140 The risk is that the gap could deepen if the United States continues to pursue a technology-driven strategy and Europeans do not, or if the United States moves faster than its NATO allies on fielding new technologies. 141 In particular, a technology gap could present challenges to the interoperability of NATO forces, especially if the future battlefield demands faster decisionmaking, more rapid troop movements, or an immediate response to a crisis situation in close proximity to or even inside NATO territory. NATO officials are working on processes to integrate national technologies and assets into NATO networks and structures, and they are evaluating how those networks could be tested in a crisis situation.142 As technology advances and international competition grows, this challenge could become both more difficult and more important for NATO. It could also increase the pressure on NATO to ensure that technology transfer moves in both directions across the Atlantic, as there is a conviction in Europe that not only should European militaries “buy American,” but NATO should help European companies gain access to the U.S. defense market, too. 143

### Links --- Standardization/Regulation

#### Plan causes fights between allies to safeguard and prioritize their domestic industries --- undermines and slows the plan

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-t12-putting-allied-technology-cooperation-practice> //um-ef)

Moreover, while the United States and its allies share many values and interests, they are also economic competitors. U.S., European, and Asian companies compete globally for profits and market shares. Their willingness to collaborate only goes as far as will benefit them commercially, or as far as government incentives can sway them to collaborate through subsidies or other incentives. And for political, national security, and other reasons, governments naturally prioritize the interests of their own companies over those in other countries. In addition to impeding collaboration, national efforts to promote onshore production in critical technologies could lead to redundancy and global overcapacity.

#### Technology regulation causes NATO to pursue a “broad and shallow” approach that overextends and dilutes the alliance.

Moller and Rynning 21 [Sara Bjerg Moller is Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond”; The Washington Quarterly; March 23, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133?journalCode=rwaq20#:~:text=If%20the%20allies%20are%20not,before%20it%20has%20even%20begun.]//eleanor

If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its first in a decade. NATO’s current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010 and reflects NATO’s thinking on how to cope with the divisive nature of the War on Terror, and it is inadequate for a changed world of great power rivalry. A new Strategic Concept has long been on the agenda in the corridors of NATO diplomacy, but no one dared open this Pandora’s Box during the Trump presidency. Following the November 2020 US presidential elections, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stepped forward to sketch a calendar for strategic change: a mandate for a Strategic Concept review from the NATO heads of state and government in mid-2021, leading to their agreement on a new Strategic Concept in mid-2022.2 The virtue of this calendar is that it runs with the positive momentum of change inherent in the Biden presidency and concludes after German (October 2021) and French (April–May 2022) elections, with the timing ending before Stoltenberg’s mandate as Secretary General expires in September 2022. Stoltenberg has in fact been building up this momentum for change through 2020, having gained a mandate from a NATO Leaders Meeting in December 2019 to frame a “forward-looking reflection process” to strengthen NATO’s political dimension and consultation mechanisms.3 The reflection process—run by 10 experts under Stoltenberg’s guidance—was rebranded as the NATO 2030 initiative last March, complete with a slick new promotional campaign to spur public debate and interest in the alliance’s work. The experts’ report was made public in early December 2020: it too called for a review of the Strategic Concept, including a significant upgrade to NATO’s “political dimension.” 4 NATO is thus confronted with the choice of whether to merely update its old Strategic Concept from 2010 or do a 360 degree top-to-bottom review of it. A simple update would entail a broad focus on a growing range of “core tasks” running on parallel tracks. Stoltenberg has indicated a preference for this option, which is reflective of a complex and unwieldy security environment.5 But more of the same carries a risk of diluting NATO both politically and militarily: it would fragment NATO’s political focus, leave the deterrence of Russia incomplete, and fail to define collective defense interests in regard to China. In other words, there is a real risk that NATO will seek the wrong kind of renewal: going “broad and shallow” by taking on more tasks and/or elevating existing missions, like counterterrorism, to sit alongside collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security as “core tasks” of equal importance, as it did when it elevated the latter two mandates in 2010.6 NATO should instead go “narrow and deep” on collective defense, recommitting itself to its original purpose of deterring and defending against systemic rivals.

### Links --- Standardization/Regs

#### U.S. and Europe divided over emerging tech standard-setting --- will fight over the plan to protect their domestic industries

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-t12-putting-allied-technology-cooperation-practice> //um-ef)

WHERE TO FOCUS COOPERATION? After agreeing on the technologies to prioritize, allies will need to decide how to direct their efforts along the technology development chain and what substantive issues to focus on. There are opportunities to expand cooperation across a range of activities, from research collaboration to joint financing. In roundtables and conversations with experts conducted by the CSIS Economics Program as part of this project, two cross-cutting issues repeatedly came up: data and standards. Focusing allied efforts on aligning approaches in these two areas would make a significant contribution to joint promotion of critical technologies. After agreeing on the technologies to prioritize, allies will need to decide how to direct their efforts along the technology development chain and what substantive issues to focus on. Data In 2020, the world generated some 44 zettabytes of data—“40 times more bytes than there are stars in the observable universe.” Data are everywhere, fueling technology and informing our decisions and innovation choices. In biotechnology, for example, data analytics help biopharmaceutical researchers identify drug candidates for early-stage testing and drug development. Progress in AI development is largely a function of data and the computing power to process it. These and similar innovations are dependent on data quantity, quality, and diversity—how much data one has, how accurate and usable those data are, and how many different types of data are available. As the Global Data Alliance, an industry coalition, notes, greater data quantity allows researchers and firms to “identify meaningful insights, patterns, and connections that can aid R&D teams in discovering and developing novel solutions to scientific and technical challenges.” Access to high-quality data enables faster, more reliable discoveries. Data diversity helps researchers and firms broaden these discoveries, applying them to new products, patients, and processes. Data are essential to allied technology efforts for the seemingly simple reason that sharing data is beneficial. Sharing increases the quantity of data and therefore the potential for new discoveries. But it also improves the quality of data, by allowing entities to verify their data against data held by others and to inform, supplement, and complement their data. Sharing data can also increase the diversity of data sets, allowing researchers and producers to apply their results to a wider range of products and demographics. This is especially important in the development of AI, where access to different types of data allows machines to make better decisions. For all the benefits of data sharing, a number of frictions impede allied cooperation in this area. These include national laws and policies to protect the privacy and security of sensitive data. Every government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that sensitive personal, business, and government information does not get into the wrong hands, and law and policy in this area nearly always restrict the use and sharing of this data in some ways. The problem is when these restrictions inhibit reasonable, responsible, and ethical data sharing with organizations in like-minded countries involved in joint research projects. There are emerging differences in national philosophies and regulatory approaches to data privacy and security that complicate, or may preclude, allied data sharing in support of joint promotion of critical technologies. As mentioned earlier, the European Union considers personal data privacy a human right and has put into law what is arguably the global standard for data protection in its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Several other countries have enacted data laws based on GDPR, including South Korea and India. For its part, the United States has a patchwork of privacy rules at the state and sectoral level but no comprehensive federal legislation in this area. By contrast, data security has taken on new salience in Washington, as highlighted by President Biden’s signing of an executive order in this area in June. How this will affect Washington’s historic position that data should generally flow freely across borders remains to be seen. Meanwhile, several allied and partner countries have also enacted data localization policies, which require data to be stored domestically. This can silo data within states, impede data flows, and undermine innovation. According to a report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), as of 2020, 62 countries had enacted 144 data localization policies. Many governments such as the European Union and South Korea claim that data localization is necessary to protect “important” or “sensitive” data from being shared; U.S. financial regulators take a similar view with respect to financial data. However, localization policies are often broadly applied and seem to be less about legitimate protection than about protectionism. Efforts to bridge the differences among allies on data flows, privacy, and security have so far had mixed success. Japan has usefully put forward the concept of “data free flow with trust (DFFT)” and won both G7 and G20 endorsement of the idea, but it has yet to be turned into an agreed set of rules and practices. To facilitate data flows across the Atlantic, the United States and the European Union negotiated a “privacy shield” in 2016, providing a mechanism for companies to comply with GDPR regulations when transferring data from Europe to the United States. However, in 2020, the European Court of Justice found that the framework failed to meet GDPR standards and subsequently invalidated the policy. Without a replacement framework, transatlantic technology cooperation will be constrained. More positively, as detailed in a CSIS report in April 2021, there has been useful work on developing agreed approaches to data governance in a number of recent trade agreements, particularly among U.S. partners in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) incorporates and builds on commitments to substantially free cross-border data flows and other rules the United States won agreement to in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before it pulled out in early 2017. Similar provisions were included in the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement concluded in 2019. And Singapore has been a leader in aligning data governance policies through its bilateral trade agreements, in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and through its innovative DEPA arrangement. Moving forward, to capitalize on the innovation gains that come from sharing data and promote meaningful allied technology cooperation, the Biden administration should focus on several lines of effort to reconcile the divergent approaches to data governance among its key allies. First, it should work with Congress to enact comprehensive federal privacy legislation. Second, it should use the new TTC forum with the European Union to align transatlantic positions on data privacy, security, and flows. Third, it should embrace the work on data governance in the Asia-Pacific region, starting by docking onto DEPA. And fourth, it should work to identify areas where U.S. agencies can pool data with like-minded countries in the interest of conducting joint research on issues of mutual concern. (For example, NIST could combine data with UK or EU counterparts to improve the accuracy of facial recognition tests.) These efforts will help improve the quantity, quality, and diversity of allied data sets, enabling greater innovation opportunities for allied researchers and firms in critical sectors such as AI, biotech, semiconductors, and telecommunications. Standards The term “standards” is used to describe a broad array of rules, metrics, and norms, ranging from ubiquitous technical specifications like Bluetooth to safety requirements such as the warning labels found on lawn mowers to expected approaches that establish a certain baseline such as in accounting standards. In all these variations, standards convey a sense of expectation of performance. There are broadly two types of standards: consensus standards and technical regulations. Consensus standards are the outcomes of processes where general agreement rather than unanimity is sought and the development of such outcomes is voluntary. Technical regulations refer to the use of standards by the government to meet a specific policy objective and where conformance with the standard is mandatory. Standards are critical to innovation for two reasons: first, they provide a foundation for technology development upon which product differentiation can be made, which makes it easier to deploy competitive products, including by leveraging first-mover advantages; and second, they boost product interoperability and consumer confidence in technologies, expanding existing technology markets and helping to create new ones. The focus here is mainly on voluntary standards because, as with data governance, there is arguably more work to be done to align allied approaches. Global standards are typically set in a broad range of bodies that are open to participation by all interested stakeholders and where decisionmaking is done by consensus. Examples of such as bodies include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Participants in these bodies include a mix of government and private-sector researchers and other experts from the member countries. The process for reaching agreement on standards varies by organization, with different thresholds in balloting that help establish consensus. As is the case with data governance, the United States and its allies have different approaches to standard setting. While government agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation participate in many standard-setting bodies, Washington does not lead in setting technical standards. It is the long-standing policy of the United States to allow the private sector to take the lead, leveraging the extensive technical expertise and experience available in industry and its knowledge of market need and demands. This private-sector–led approach—in which the U.S. government participates as a contributor, user, and enforcer—has helped establish and maintain U.S. industrial and technological leadership since World War II. By contrast, governments in Europe and Asia tend to have a top-down approach to standard setting, establishing standardization priorities and attempting to develop and protect domestic champions. In order to achieve these objectives, these governments often send a large number of officials to push for preferred national outcomes. While there is a strong case for the U.S. government to step up its long-term game in international standard setting—for example, by investing in and adequately resourcing government experts to participate in global standards work—the likelihood that the United States and its allies will align their approaches in standard-setting bodies is low. In addition to the philosophical differences, these countries are also competitors and want their own companies and technologies to “win” in the marketplace. There are numerous examples of such competition in emerging technologies such as cloud computing, cybersecurity, and advanced manufacturing. Moreover, the industry-led U.S. approach, with its competitive dynamics among actors who have a better sense of the market potential of new technologies than governments, arguably has real advantages over the top-down approach used by Europe and other allies.

### Links --- Limited Mandate

#### Limited security guarantees are KEY, overstretching NATO directly hurts deterrence efforts.

Petersson 22 [Eivind Vad Petersson is the State Secretary to Anniken Huitfeldt, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5-23-2022, Transatlantic Unity in Times of War, Government.no, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/transatlantic\_unity/id2913989/] Eric

Sixth take-away: **The war in Ukraine** has **laid bare** **the risk that** **Russian** **expansionism poses** **to Nato partners**, **and** **especially** **those** **who aspire for membership**. **Our Open Door policy is not** **credible** **if Russia** **is** ready to close the door at any time. Now, **the Alliance cannot** extendsecurityguarantees to non-members. **But we can tailor our partnerships to this new** reality, **by putting** more emphasis on defenceandinteroperability**.** Enabling partners to better protect themselves. And I see no reason why we shouldn’t resort to more common funding to achieve this end. **We need to be** **more agile**, **and we must be able to muster the necessary resources on short notice.**

### Links --- Small Affs/Small Changes

#### Smaller decisions like the plan get codified in NATO’s strategic concept.

Ringsmose and Rynning 09 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark; “Come Home NATO? The Atlantic Alliance’s New Strategic Concept; Danish Institute for International Studies; 2009; https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97584/DIIS\_report\_200904\_RingmoseRynning\_NATO\_web.pdf]//eleanor

NATO's first Strategic Concept Of 1949 always served more than just one purpose. Today, we argue, the document has at least three major functions: two internal and one external. One Of its internal functions is to codify past decisions and practices and thus solidify the Alliance's foundation. Codification is akin to vacuum-clean- ing, as one senior NATO official put it: a new Strategic Concept summarizes and formalizes the string Of ministerial communiqués and lesser decisions that have emerged since the last Strategic Concept. 5 Every ministerial communiqué is in fact a miniature Strategic Concepts the official argued, and from time to time real world events will have driven NATO so far down new paths that it is necessary to gather all the miniatures and combine them in one overarching document. The exercise is meant to provide coherence to a record of decisions and engagements that may not always be coherent at first sight. "This points us to another internal function, namely that of providing new strategic direction — Of laying down the foundation for future coherence. Strategic direction was a crucial purpose of the Cold War Concepts, of course, and it remains essential, albeit in a new context of public diplomacy (see below) and codifica- tion. It is in fact difficult to disentangle these functions. Strategic direction concerns most fundamentally the basic values Of the Washington Treaty and their defense in global and regional contexts, which is also where this section began. "The allies must basically provide strategic direction by defining the balance between regional and global engagements, the type of threats the alliance is likely to encounter, and what it can do about them. In providing answers to these questions, and thus providing strategic direction, the Alliance inevitably conducts public diplomacy. Moreover, to move the world, the Alliance needs a place to stand, and so strategic direction begins where codification ends.

#### Smaller policies like the plan get codified in NATO’s strategic concept – failure to prioritize overstretches the alliance and makes it ineffective.

Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor

Historically, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have served multiple purposes. Firstly and most importantly, they have provided the Alliance with strategic direction: they have prioritised threats, fundamental tasks and geographical points of concern, and established guidelines for the force posture of tomorrow. Secondly, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have codified lesser, piecemeal decisions and appraisals of the strategic environment most often articulated in ministerial communiqués and summit declarations. As such, the concepts have been backward-looking, justifying past decisions and choices. Thirdly, the unclassified post-Cold War concepts have been vehicles of public diplomacy, conveying the purpose of the Alliance. NATO has adopted three concepts since 1989, and all have consciously been crafted to sell the Alliance to the public. Finally, NATO’s Strategic Concepts have served an important processual purpose. By compelling allies to confront and discuss vexing strategic issues, the process leading to the approval of a new concept – at its best – facilitates compromise and a unity of thought and purpose.3 In February 2021, Stoltenberg outlined seven broad areas he sees as key to the process of renovating the Strategic Concept.4 His ‘Food for Thought Paper’ may be seen as an opening shot, but our assessment is that an Atlantic Alliance committed to a new Strategic Concept must make bold decisions both to confront a new world order and to correct past weaknesses. Given that Russia and China have become the chief threats to NATO, the Strategic Concept should focus on these two countries and lay out the implications of their policies and activities for NATO priorities across tasks and regions. Put differently, a future concept without a hierarchy of threats and tasks will be unfit for purpose. Yet NATO comes to this project with a distinct degree of in-house political–military tension. Since 2017, the Alliance’s military authorities have crafted significant new strategic documents without clear political or grand-strategic guidance. To be sure, ministerial and summit communiqués have guided the military,5 but the political–military dialogue stopped short in 2016 and now needs to be revitalised. The new concept should not only address these issues but do so in a form that offers a compelling strategic narrative of why the citizens of NATO countries are well served by an alliance whose members collectively spend more than $1,000 billion on defence.

### Links --- Unexpected Changes

#### U.S. acting unpredictably undermines the Concept and guts cohesion

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

Although America is ‘back’ at NATO, Europe remains unsettled about the credibility and longevity of US commitments to the alliance. A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the alliance’s next Strategic Concept and how the two sides will craft a common agenda to endure the coming decade. The Biden administration, despite a few recent transatlantic missteps, recognises the gravity of this moment and has come prepared with a focused set of priorities for NATO’s future. Following his successful first trip to Europe, a string of recent US decisions has undermined President Biden’s early pledges to strengthen cooperation with NATO allies. Whether the tacit approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the controversial announcement of the AUKUS security pact, these disjointed moves have begun to sow doubt in Europe about America’s willingness and ability to work jointly with Europe, even under an Atlanticist president. While the Biden administration has acknowledged and sought to address these slipups, such unpredictability in the transatlantic relationship has weakened the political cohesion required for building NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

#### Concept key opportunity to integrate cyber and tech capabilities

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

Nevertheless, the Biden administration remains committed to NATO. President Joe Biden and his team believe America and its allies are at a historical inflection point. In the strategic competition with China and Russia, they view NATO as a great advantage. They see the strategic concept drafting process as a critical opportunity to make NATO work better in this environment—to serve not only US interests, but the shared interests of its allies and partners. For the US, adapting NATO for strategic competition will mean closing a decades-long chapter of out-of-area operations in favour of investing more in cyber and technological capabilities. It will require empowering Europe to be a more equal partner in defence, as well as creating more global partnership platforms to support allied objectives beyond the Euro-Atlantic sphere. It will also involve reinforcing the shared democratic values that unite NATO allies against their authoritarian challengers. To these ends, the US has a robust list of priorities for NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

### Links --- Unpredictability

#### Unpredictable, bolt from the blue actions anger allies – that matters more than the substance of any policy.

Lesser 20 [Ian Lesser is vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and a member of GMF’s executive team, managing programs across the organization. He serves as executive director of the Brussels office of GMF, and leads GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the wider Atlantic. He also served as interim president of GMF from September-December 2021.; “Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden”; The German Marshall Fund of the United States; November 12, 2020; https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden]//eleanor

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration. The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration’s approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization. Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others. On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe’s periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean. In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump’s approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

### Links --- Democratic/Civilian Tasks

#### NATO must not expand its mandate beyond defense --- taking on too many tasks and ‘enhancing resilience’ trades-off with war-fighting and strategic cohesion

Larson 5/22/22

(Henrik, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich., “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //pg online @ <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china> //

NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.

## Cohesion/Backlash Links

### Links --- Divided priorities

#### Plan is a long-term priority --- allies won’t sign-on --- they have short-term higher priorities

Aronsson ‘18

(Lisa, Analyst in International Affairs April 24, 2018, “Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress,” pg online @ <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45177.pdf> //um-ef)

Political Challenges NATO’s member states are unique in their historical experiences and security priorities, and they will likely only invest in capabilities that they see as addressing their security needs. For the United States, the primary drivers for defense innovation are Chinese and Russian military modernization and a sense of strategic competition for technology and innovation. While many European allies broadly accept U.S. assessments of the global security environment, including the rise of China, their assessments of China’s rise differ from those of the United States. France and Germany, for example, are more focused on managing Chinese investments in Europe, and Europeans are generally much more concerned by challenges from Russia and the Middle East. NATO allies are also divided over whether they see Russia as more of a conventional or a hybrid challenge, and over balancing NATO focus on the east with efforts to address challenges in the south. NATO has tried to communicate the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security through the “360 Degree Approach” outlined at the Warsaw Summit, but its efforts face continuing challenges.152 Others point to a transatlantic rift or a “wearing down” of a sense of collective identity in NATO with U.S. public opinion appearing uncommitted and European public perceptions of a “wider Atlantic” than in the past.153 While studies show diversity can be a driver for innovation in the workplace,154 it could restrict a NATO agenda if the allies cannot achieve a common understanding of the threat environment and a shared vision for how technology and innovation can address security challenges. European leaders are under pressure to address the immediate security challenges that concern their constituencies, which for some European allies include Russia and Ukraine and for others include refugees, migration, and the spread of terrorism. Generally speaking, short-term priorities take precedent in Europe. Discussions about technology and future warfare are beginning to take place in some national governments and in NATO institutions. According to a senior NATO official, however, these discussions need to take place at the strategic level in the North Atlantic Council, and political leadership from one or more of the major allies is likely to be required to foster cohesion and drive change at the NATO level.155

### Links --- Backlash/Consensus

#### The plan must go through the consensus process --- that slows the adoption and ensures a fight over the specifics

Cook and Dowd ‘22

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These are valuable steps, but they do not address the fundamental challenge of rapidly acquiring common capabilities. There are still many residual processes where consensus-based control is inherently prioritized over speed, flexibility, innovation, and the deployment of prototypes at the end of their development phases. NATO leaders recognize the ongoing challenge. In a recent speech to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. Philippe Lavigne, stressed that one of his key priorities is to ensure the timely delivery of new and critical capabilities, adding that “we need to change the rules and make them work for us, not against us.” But NATO leaders cannot fix this alone — the alliance’s 30 member nations are the ones that will have to agree on the solution. Exploring alternatives and getting the allies to agree on a solution will be difficult. It can happen on a NATO-wide basis, or some subset of member nations can take on the challenge and lead the effort, which may then be adopted by others.

### Links --- New Tasks = In-fighting

#### The plan causes in-fighting and disrupts cohesion --- some members don’t want changes to the status quo priorities

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

Analyses of transatlantic relations, and security relations in particular, often focus on differences between the United States and its European allies. This clearly is an important factor. Given Europe’s dependence on US security guarantees, the United States’ continued willingness to engage in the continent’s security is the condition sine qua non for NATO’s survival. US dissatisfaction with European engagement and defense spending has consequently been a key item on intra-Alliance agendas since 1949. US concerns about NATO and its European allies’ engagement were indeed voiced openly long before Donald Trump.1 Debates about burden sharing also trickle down to domestic politics in member states and thus contribute to shaping the general climate within the Alliance, as for instance the 2 percent objective that has featured in several German electoral campaigns. It is, however, equally important not to overlook structural differences among European Allies. When the Reflection Group appointed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published its report on “NATO 2030” in late 2020, it was no coincidence that Alliance cohesion was among the key points.2 Indeed, disagreements among Allies have increased in recent years—to the point of famously prompting French president Emmanuel Macron to declare NATO “brain dead” because it is no longer able to adopt common views on key strategic matters.3 This notably pertains to the role Turkey has been playing in recent years and intra-Alliance rivalries. Other examples include Allies’ difficulties to develop a common stance on Libya and different views on NATO’s potential role in the Arctic. The latter example is linked to what is certainly the single most important aspect for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century: the Alliance and its members’ relationship 157158 nato 2030: towards a new strategic concept and beyond with Russia. Yet, regarding Russia in particular, ideas on the way ahead vary widely across NATO capitals. What is ultimately at stake are diverging approaches to European and Euro-Atlantic security at large, based on different interpretations of the future direction of the global security environment. The three most relevant issues most likely to trouble NATO in the coming decade may thus be summarized as, first, disagreements among member states on concrete policy issues, most prominently illustrated by Turkey’s current foreign policies and its consequences for Alliance cohesion. Second, Allies continue and will continue to hold divergent threat perceptions and consequently place different emphases on security challenges and defense priorities. Third, there is no consensus among European Allies on whether US security guarantees can be considered a viable option in the years and decades to come. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at showing that ‘Europe’ is by no means a monolithic bloc or actor in its own right, but rather a group of states sometimes pursuing different and even incompatible perspectives. In particular, on the Western side of the Atlantic, references to ‘Europe’ as an actor in transatlantic security relations are a frequent phenomenon. Any analysis or future policy based on the assumption that Europeans are unified in security will, however, be erroneous and impracticable. As the ongoing debate on European strategic autonomy has notably revealed, the primary reason is that Europeans lack a joint vision on how to ensure their continent’s security in the future. As this chapter argues, insights gained from this debate pertain to the very fundamentals of European security, beyond petty debates on semantics. Allies’ increased difficulties to come to shared views in fact stem from very different takes on the foundational features of European security and divergent readings of structural evolutions in the international system. However, the problem is not only that diverging visions confront each other. Rather, some European governments simply do not have such a vision, cling to the status quo, and sometimes even refuse to think about the possibility that things may have to evolve. These differences come on top of other divergences on issues such as democracy and the rule of law, including within the European Union, involving Hungary and Poland.

## Links --- Cyber

### Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

#### Cybersecurity cooperation is difficult and time-consuming for the alliance.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

The abovementioned incidents have led cyber-conflict scholars to point to several technical and practical difficulties in the operational integration of cyber effects.29 In the interviews and background conversations that contributed to this study, three of these difficulties were continuously reiterated when discussing successful integration of cyber effects into NATO operational planning: the temporal dimension of developing exploits; the assessment of battle damage; and the problem of confliction. Developing exploits—a matter of time One of the characteristics of cyber attacks that receives most attention is the fact that they hit suddenly and without warning.30 While this is often the case, the central question for operational integration is not the speed at which they hit their target, but the speed with which the tools and techniques that exploit IT vulnerabilities in order to deliver cyber effects can be developed. Like conventional weapons, the cyber tools—the exploits or cyber weapons—take time to develop. However, an exploit is often harder to reuse than a conventional weapon, as it is more dependent on a meticulous analysis and target preparation—in this case, specifically, the target’s IT infrastructure. Without knowing the adversary’s IT systems and its vulnerabilities better than the adversary itself, meaningful cyber weapons are impossible to develop. The fact that knowledge about the target is linked not only to the deployment of a weapon but also to its development influences the extent to which it can be used and reused. Stuxnet, for example, required years of development, testing and perfecting before it could deliver the intended effect on the Iranian centrifuges. Despite the techniques used in the Stuxnet malware having been found in other malware,31 Stuxnet lost its ability to destroy the centrifuges when it was discovered and the IT vulnerabilities that enabled it were patched. Importantly, part of the complexity of Stuxnet relates to the US–Israeli intention to keep the effect secret. In a hot conflict, secrecy in terms of the effect is often less important, and thus the development and deployment of cyber effects do not necessarily have to be as complex and time-consuming. This observation does not necessarily change the fact that the development of exploits often has to precede the military confrontation in which they are intended to be used. NATO states that want to deliver cyber effects in NATO operations must try to gain access to Russia’s or other potential adversaries’ critical military networks to identify and exploit IT vulnerabilities. As several informants emphasized, if states wait for a conflict to escalate before they begin the development of exploits, it is most likely to be already too late.32 The alternative to penetrating adversary networks in peacetime is for states to rely on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in as many commercial off-the-shelf products as possible. This can be done, for example, by purchasing exploits from private companies offering this service, in the hope that it will then be possible to quickly create an overview of the enemy’s IT infrastructure and adapt the exploits to this environment when a conflict escalates. The latter approach is more likely to succeed against adversaries with low network security, which does not apply in the case of Russia, or in contexts where less sophisticated and less closely targeted cyber effects are required. Whether member states develop sophisticated exploits for future targeted effects or stockpile well-known exploits to cause more minor effects, they cannot—as several informants indicated—be certain that they will be able to deliver the cyber effect at the specific time it is requested by CYOC. This is because the IT vulnerabilities upon which exploits depend might not exist for ever. Cyberspace is a dynamic environment: vulnerabilities are patched, systems are updated or replaced and bad IT security practices are identified and improved. This means that exploits are temporary in nature and cannot be stored for later use.33 States must constantly ensure that the exploits still work, which requires minor adjustments when updates take place. As a consequence, the larger the military ‘cyber arsenal’, the more technically skilled human resources are needed for its maintenance. In the current labour market, where recruitment and retention of a cyber workforce is difficult, extensive investment is required for states to be able to stand ready with cyber effects available when requested. In short, if a state is to offer a cyber effect in a NATO operation, then the state is likely to have to be able, first, to predict what Russian IT systems it is going to target months or years in advance, and second, to marshal the necessary resources to develop and maintain a large array of exploits that can be used against these systems. Even if this is successfully done, the state still faces difficulty in ensuring that an effect is delivered as promised.

#### Cyber policy changes are slow and cause divisive reactions within NATO

Lonergan and Moller ’22 -- (Erica D. Lonergan and Sara B. Moller, 4-27-2022, "Opinion: NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable. One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.” But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance. Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.” This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time. This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage. These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.” NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now. We live in an age in which more people have access to highly sophisticated technologies and almost every social, economic or military asset has become ‘securitized’ or vulnerable to disruption – whether temporary or more lasting – from an outside attacker or even an inside source.

### Links --- Cyber undermines Cred

#### The nature of cyber operations undermines NATO credibility – impossible to ensure proportionality and discrimination.

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How likely is it that the requested cyber effect will be delivered? The answer to this question is not clear, in respect of either its preparation or its execution. This is not only because IT vulnerabilities are constantly discovered and patched; it is also because of the difficulty of assessing the effects and possible side-effects of an exploit when navigating and analysing complex IT infrastructures. In other words, reconnaissance is difficult in cyberspace, and so is the containment of effects. The Russian attempt to use ransomware aimed at disrupting critical Ukrainian infrastructure in 2017, for example, succeeded—but simultaneously encrypted computers globally, causing substantial economic damage to multinational businesses such as Maersk and FedEx.34 Collateral damage and unintended consequences are serious issues for NATO. The alliance takes pride in its adherence to the principles laid out in international law, such as proportionality and discrimination, as former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Jamie Shea has emphasized.35 Thus, disruptions of servers with huge negative implications for civilians, or the use of generic cyber tools that risk spreading their effects far and wide, are most likely not going to be considered for use in NATO operations. Indeed, one of the main challenges to US efforts to disrupt servers in working against ISIS was finding ways to ensure that civilians were not hit by their cyber effects.36 Another aspect of the difficulty of assessing the cyber effect relates to adversaries’ cyber defence efforts. For the more sophisticated players in cyberspace, cyber defence has developed into more than simply patching, clearing and updating systems. Cyber defence is also increasingly about following an intruder’s activity in one’s own network and creating ‘honeypots’ or ‘honeynets’; or about following data traffic back to the intruder’s network. In short, cyber defence is also about deception and active defence.37 This approach to cyber defence offers valuable insights into the intruder’s techniques and strategies; but the mere knowledge that deception is becoming a predominant defensive strategy also introduces doubts into the intruder’s assessment of possible effects. Consequently, as Russia is considered a peer competitor with considerable cyber-defensive capacities, one informant expressed scepticism about the extent to which smaller member states are confident in their ability to deliver a cyber effect when it is requested by NATO.38 This is especially the case if operational success depends on a specific effect. Even if a state has developed the appropriate exploit, it must also be able to verify that the effect is achieved and ensure that the effect is contained to minimize collateral damage. And even if a state is confident about its current ability to contain and verify an effect, it must also be confident that it can deliver, verify and contain the effect at the specific time in the future when CYOC requests it. The process of integration is further complicated by the fact that NATO must be willing to hand over to contributing states the responsibility for making battle damage assessments and collateral damage estimations. As the following subsection shows, states are generally unwilling to share classified information about exploits. Hence, the delegated NATO commander is unlikely to receive much useful information about how cyber effects are delivered before a decision about their deployment must be taken. As commanders would prefer to have control over the capabilities used, member-state cyber effects are likely choices of method only if alternative, conventional effects are unavailable.

### Links --- Cyber = Distrust

#### NATO cyberoperations exacerbate distrust between members – cyber exploits require secrecy which results in allied deconfliction.

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The third challenge to the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations relates to a well-known military concept, deconfliction. The coordination by allies and military units of their efforts to avoid confliction, between for example an air operation and a special forces operation in the same area, is a central element in every military campaign. Deconfliction is all about openness and communication between allied partners. But in cyberspace, deconfliction comes with several difficulties. At the core of these difficulties is the fact that the tools and techniques that produce cyber effects—which are often also used and heavily depended on for intelligence collection—are developed in secret and must stay secret until the effect is achieved. If the IT vulnerabilities and exploits are known, vendors or adversaries can fix or replace the software and thereby render the effect impossible to achieve.39 In an alliance not known for sufficient mutual trust among members to share intelligence,40 there is little indication that allies will become more open about the cyber tools and techniques they currently have at their disposal. The request-based model is the result of that lack of trust. And the unwillingness to share cyber intelligence seriously challenges NATO’s ambition to use CYOC to facilitate information-sharing to increase situational awareness and thereby achieve the ‘cyber readiness’ and ‘cyber resiliency’ that NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană hopes to attain.41 Furthermore, lack of coordination and discussion about the use of military cyber capabilities, both internally in each state and among allies, can have negative implications for intelligence activities and general network security. A conventional military decision to deliver cyber effects is rarely concerned with maintaining access and staying secret after an effect is achieved. Even though it is customary to try to obscure the vulnerabilities that are being exploited, it is difficult to ensure that those operating the targeted system or third-party network analysts do not identify and fix the vulnerabilities in, for example, commercial products used all over the world. Thus, military plans to engage other state entities need to weigh the benefit of delivering cyber effects against the risk of losing intelligence capacity, as well as the risk that other actors (allies, corporations, adversaries, criminals, etc.) will use the same exploits against oneself. In other words, there is a conflict of interest between attack, intelligence collection and internal defence in each NATO member state.42 The desire of the US Cyber Command to become more independent from the National Security Agency (NSA) is precisely an attempt to gain a stronger voice when the US government assesses whether a vulnerability should be disclosed to vendors, retained for intelligence purposes or used to deliver ‘loud’ cyber effects.43 The risk of confliction among allies arises from the fact that a similar assessment procedure does not exist across NATO. As conversations with several national representatives at the CDC reveal, such a procedure is unlikely to be agreed upon owing to the different perspectives on offence, defence and espionage in cyberspace currently prevailing among member states.44 If the Netherlands, for example, offers to deliver a ‘loud’ cyber effect in a NATO operation, British or American intelligence operations could end up being disturbed because they rely on the same vulnerabilities which—when used in military operations—risk being exposed and subsequently fixed.45 When deploying ‘loud’ cyber effects, malicious actors such as criminals are also given the opportunity to identify and exploit the same vulnerabilities in unpatched systems in allied countries. The ransomware incidents known as WannaCry and NotPetya are examples of the damage that can emerge from government exploits becoming publicly available—even though the specific vulnerabilities were already patched by Microsoft and updates released to supported systems.46 In short, there is a dilemma both internally, between intelligence agencies and the military, and externally, between allies. While it is difficult to do much about the latter, the internal power dynamics in most states, with the intelligence agencies as the primary cyber actors, are likely to limit the willingness of most states to deliver military cyber effects—whether offensive or defensive—when CYOC makes requests. They also limit the willingness to share cyber threat information across the alliance through CYOC. This section has pointed to three characteristics about cyberspace that limit the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations. In a complex and constantly changing cyberspace, it continues to be difficult to develop and maintain sophisticated exploits for targeted cyber effects. This is especially the case if the cyber effects are requested for a specific time and place in order to guarantee operational success, and if they simultaneously have to be verifiable and conform to international legal principles. Neither the member states, which face an internal dilemma between attack, intelligence collection and defence in cyberspace, nor the NATO commander, who will prefer to control the capabilities used, are likely to feel sufficiently confident about the targeted or highly integrated cyber effects to choose that option if other capabilities are available.

### Links --- Cyber/OCOs Aff

#### The plan sparks disagreement and expansion; even if it’s a meaningful conversation, it destroys the Strategic concept

Smeets ’19 [Max; October 14; Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, co-founder and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI.eu), an organization promoting the interdisciplinary study of cyber conflict and statecraft in Europe and beyond, also an Affiliate at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation; Lawfareblog, “NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations,” <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations>]

Neg in Green

U.S. Army Cyber Command, Fort Belvoir, Va. (Source: U.S. Army Cyber Command/Bill Roche)

In May 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense and the German Ministry of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding concerning “Cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense.” Computer network defense (CND) refers to actions taken on computer networks to monitor and protect those networks. It is not the only memorandum the U.S. Department of Defense has signed with allies on cyber defense.

In late 2016, U.S. Cyber Command operators wiped Islamic State propaganda material off a server located in Germany. The German government was notified in some fashion but not asked for advance consent, causing much frustration. While U.S. Cyber Command’s reported action may have violated Germany’s sovereignty, it didn’t explicitly violate the memorandum. It wasn’t an act of CND; it was a computer network attack (CNA), seeking to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy.

This reveals an uneasy situation within cyber cooperation: Allies do not agree on the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. More specifically, there is no agreement on when military cyber organizations can gain access to systems and networks in allied territory to disrupt adversarial activity. As I have argued previously, this issue may end up causing significant loss in allies’ trust and confidence. My proposed solution: NATO allies should establish memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.

#### 1AC evidence concedes the issue of OCOs is rife with allied disagreements and causes loss of trust in NATO – memorandum can’t solve if consensus is virtually impossible

1AC Smeets ’19 -- (Max Smeets, 10-14-2019, "NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

In May 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense and the German Ministry of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding concerning “Cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense.” Computer network defense (CND) refers to actions taken on computer networks to monitor and protect those networks. It is not the only memorandum the U.S. Department of Defense has signed with allies on cyber defense. In late 2016, U.S. Cyber Command operators wiped Islamic State propaganda material off a server located in Germany. The German government was notified in some fashion but not asked for advance consent, causing much frustration. While U.S. Cyber Command’s reported action may have violated Germany’s sovereignty, it didn’t explicitly violate the memorandum. It wasn’t an act of CND; it was a computer network attack (CNA), seeking to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy. This reveals an uneasy situation within cyber cooperation: Allies do not agree on the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. More specifically, there is no agreement on when military cyber organizations can gain access to systems and networks in allied territory to disrupt adversarial activity. As I have argued previously, this issue may end up causing significant loss in allies’ trust and confidence. My proposed solution: NATO allies should establish memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory. Objectives of Out-of-Network Operations in Allied Networks Allied states may operate in each other’s systems or networks in at least three ways: as an observer, gathering intelligence on adversarial activity in others’ networks; as a passerby, transiting through allied systems and networks to access a certain adversarial target; or as a disrupter, seeking to cause friction for an adversary’s operation within an ally’s network or system. The German case discussed above is the only publicly known case of a state acting as a disrupter in an allied network. But we can expect that more of these cases will be publicly disclosed in the future. It has now been widely discussed that the U.S. Cyber Command has undergone a significant shift in strategic thinking away from deterrence toward persistent engagement and defend forward. Following these recent changes in strategic thinking, U.S. Cyber Command seeks to cause friction “wherever the adversary maneuvers,” operating “globally, continuously and seamlessly.” In a similar vein, NSA director and Cyber Command head Gen. Paul Nakasone writes in an article for Joint Force Quarterly: “We must … maneuver seamlessly across the interconnected battlespace, globally, as close as possible to adversaries and their operations, and continuously shape the battlespace to create operational advantage for us while denying the same to our adversaries.” While one may expect adversaries to maneuver in allied networks, the U.S. is currently the only NATO state that makes causing friction in allied networks a necessary and explicit component of its strategy. Other military cyber organizations could follow in the near future. And we already see countries moving in this direction. On Aug. 1, the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE) came into force in Canada. According to the Canadian government, “CSE could be authorized to proactively stop or impede foreign cyber threats before they damage Canadian systems or information holdings, and conduct online operations to advance national objectives.” The Canadian government does not explicitly talk in its latest strategy about the need to operate “globally, continuously and seamlessly” or to cause friction “wherever the adversary maneuvers.” In that regard, it needs to do more strategic thinking—as other countries do—on the exact role of cyber operations on allied networks in the military context. But the proposed memorandum of understanding on cyber offense addresses exactly this possibility.

### Links --- General Cyber Ops

#### Cybersecurity is a divisive issue – divergent European and American approaches result in intra-alliance tensions.

Burton ’15 -- (Joe Burton, 2015, “NATO’s cyber defence: strategic challenges and institutional adaptation,” Defence Studies, 15:4, 297-319, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2015.1108108, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

NATO has frequently been beset by intra-alliance tensions and in the cyber security arena there appears to be at least some evidence of a divergence in European and US policy approaches. Recent revelations by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, for example, have exposed transatlantic tensions around surveillance, and the alleged NSA hacking of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone, which led to an angry phone call between Obama and Merkel and the summoning of the US Ambassador to Germany, was a major embarrassment for the US government (Wilder 2013). The US has arguably taken a harder security stance on cyber issues since 9/11 because of its desire to protect the US homeland, and because it faces increased strategic rivalry from rival global power centres. A more aggressive cyber posture can certainly be seen in the establishment of the US Cyber Command, a unified and expanding military command structure tasked with coordinating defensive and offensive cyber operations for all branches of the US military, the deployment of the Stuxnet software against Iranian nuclear centrifuges, the Patriot Act, and the mass surveillance programmes run by the NSA, including the Prism programme. The use of offensive and even pre-emptive operations by the US government has also grown in recent years, with a high number of ICT specialists employed to penetrate foreign networks (Gellman and Nakashima 2013). In 2012, Obama signed Presidential Decision Directive 20, a classified document that gave the US military the authority to conduct more aggressive cyber operations to thwart cyber attacks against US systems (Nakashima 2012). The wealth of cyber resources and capabilities that exist within the US military and associated agencies may be a reason in and of itself why the US approach to managing cyber conflict has been dominated by that branch of the US government. Mary O Connell takes up this line of argument, suggesting that the US government has become “trapped in an ideology of militarism” (O’Connell 2012, p. 191) and claiming that “the US military today has the largest concentration of expertise and legal authority with respect to cyberspace” (O’Connell 2012, p. 187). She further notes that in 2009, following the Estonia attacks, the Russia Georgia war and the release of the Stuxnet virus, the US government “began releasing a number of policies on cyber security that were predominantly military in orientation” (O’Connell 2012, p. 188). This would seem to support the line of argument advanced by this article, that threats from state rather than non-state actors explain the elevation of cyber security as an issue within the transatlantic security community. This hard power approach to cyber security in the US could also be explained by the rhetoric being used to describe cyber attacks in the American context. Former Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s claim that the US could face a “cyber Pearl Harbour” is a prime example of the securitisation and militarisation of cyber discourse. When there is a propensity at the highest levels of government to adopt Second World War and cold war analogies to characterise cyber conflict, this can shape US policy and doctrine in a certain direction. Shachtman and Singer (2011) argue that clear links can be found between cold war strategic thinking and the formulation of current US policy, especially the idea that cyber attacks might be met with conventional attacks; an idea “lifted” from the 1960s strategy of flexible response. Commercial and political motives might also have led to the US taking a more military-based approach to cyber security issues. They further argue that “there is a massive amount of threat inflation going on in Washington’s discussion of online dangers, most frequently by those with political or profit motives in hyping the threats” Shachtman and Singer (2011). While we should be careful in suggesting that a new “cyber industrial complex” is forming in America, the huge US government spending on cyber protection for the federal government, such as a $1 billion contract awarded to Raytheon by the Department for Homeland Security in 2015, may create incentives for responses to cyber security threats to be militarised. Equally, threat inflation may displace attention from the arguably more pervasive problem of cyber crime. In Europe, at least on the surface, a softer cyber security approach is evident. EU responses to cyber security have typically emphasised criminal and civil procedures for dealing with cyber attacks, reflecting a European preference for soft power over hard power, and there has been a broader reluctance in Europe to militarise cyberspace. The new European Union Cyber Security Strategy, for example, is based on promoting norms in cyberspace, encouraging dialogue between nations, enhancing technical capacity and resilience, and fighting cybercrime (Ashton 2013). The most controversial aspect has been the requirement for businesses in Europe, and particularly critical infrastructure providers, to report cyber attacks to a central authority. Overall though, the strategy is defensively orientated and non-militaristic.

### Links --- Cyber = Russia War

#### The aff expands NATO beyond its military purpose to cyber which is hybrid – that increases the risk of escalation and overstretches the agenda.

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One way to explain this is through the existence and dominance of a largely unspoken but widely accepted norm. For decades, the predominant actors in cyberspace have been intelligence agencies; and the norms that characterize interactions between intelligence agencies are not primarily concerned with military concepts such as conflict escalation and deterrence.67 In the world of intelligence agencies, success is not about keeping a distance between oneself and the adversary by signalling one’s intentions and capabilities. It is about being able to outmanoeuvre adversaries in a space of constant contact.68 There are always risks, and the work usually takes place in legal grey zones where a clear distinction between war and peace is not the guiding principle. This is an arena where the opportunity to annoy, cheat and delay opponents is taken when it arises. In short, espionage and counter-espionage do not fit well with the thorough military operational planning that characterizes NATO operations. Intelligence operations, on the other hand, fit perfectly with a dynamic cyberspace where anonymity is easy to achieve and uncertainty a constant condition.69 The states that embrace cyberspace as a domain where the intelligence norm dominates are able to use a broader array of tools to pursue or respond to various foreign political objectives than only those that relate to military operations. In its 2018 ‘vision’, the US Cyber Command built implicitly on the dominant intelligence norm. Here, the objective is to become more agile and act as close to the adversary as possible (‘defend forward’).70 The United States considers ‘constant contact’ and ‘persistent engagement’ as the necessary guiding principles to achieve superiority in cyberspace and to take full advantage of the broader potential for pursuing its political objectives through cyberspace. During the 2018 US midterm elections, for example, the US Cyber Command worked closely with the NSA to disrupt servers operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency aiming to spread fake news and stir up tension in the United States.71 More recently, the US Cyber Command responded with various cyber effects against Iran after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards apparently placed mines on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.72 These practices illustrate that, for the United States, cyber effects provide political options when one does not want to escalate existing tensions into military confrontation. Defensive coordination between allies through CYOC supports such defensive use of cyber effects, increasing the possibility that US Cyber Command will be allowed to ‘defend forward’ and work persistently through allied networks.73 A more cyber-active NATO, however, risks being counterproductive to the ambition to ‘defend forward’ through allied networks. Unintended conflict escalation from ongoing cyber activity is mainly a risk if military analysts—in a strategic environment with heightened attention to military confrontation—ignore the dominant intelligence norm. If that happens, it becomes more likely that ‘persistent engagement’ and active cyber defence will be misinterpreted as military preparation, armament or the initial phase of an attack. If NATO, an organization that has publicly returned to its original raison d’être of deterrence and collective defence, becomes the entity that coordinates cyber effects below the threshold of armed conflict, then the likelihood increases that Russia misinterprets these effects as escalatory and acts accordingly. In other words, a more active NATO in the current strategic environment increases the risk that the existing intelligence norm will be undermined and replaced by a more militarized norm.

## Links --- AI

### Links --- Best 2NC AI Link

#### NATO’s strategy on AI is uncoordinated and under-developed --- the plan’s coordination efforts cause time and effort and result in backlash and disagreement

Dr. Sharma 5/30/22

(Sanur, Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis,” pg online @ <https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/> //um-ef)

The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29

### Links --- AI Standardization

#### Political fights over AI undermine allied coordination

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ‘22

(Zoe Stanley-Lockman was previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and contributed to this chapter in a personal capacity. Lena Trabucco is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Both authors contributed equally to this chapter, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” pg online @ <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69> //um-ef)

More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research. On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

#### AI governance causes massive infighting within the alliance – divergent priorities between allies makes cohesion impossible and hampers NATO efficacy.

Heikkila ’21 -- (Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

### Links --- LAWS

#### NATO allies don’t agree on LAWS regulations or implementation --- plan ignites a firestorm

Konaev and Chahal ‘21

(Margarita Konaev Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst, Husanjot Chahal, “The Path of Least Resistance,” pg online @ <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf> //um-ef)

That said, there is no international consensus on how to regulate the process of integrating AI into military systems or the development and potential use of AI-enabled weapons. In international forums, the United States alongside allies like Australia, France, Israel, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, have opposed negotiating a new international treaty preemptively banning autonomous weapons. 10 Yet France as well as Germany have also expressed interest in a nonbinding declaration on the regulation of LAWS, while others like Canada are open to transparency and confidence-building measures on the development and potential use of such weapons systems. 11 In January 2021, the European Parliament released a report on military uses of AI that called for an European Union (EU)-wide strategy against LAWS, which the report defined as “weapons 4 Center for Security and Emerging Technology | systems without meaningful human control over the critical functions of targeting and attacking individual targets.” 12 As a whole, U.S. allies differ in their positions. Meanwhile, the main outlet for international deliberations on this issue—the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, established by the contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons—has made little progress beyond agreeing on the principles to guide the discussions themselves.

### Links --- Biotech

#### Cognitive Biotech requires agreement and governance strategies to develop

Bernal et al ‘21

(Johns Hopkins University: Alonso Bernal, Cameron Carter, Mohamad Elgendi, Melanie Kemp, Richard Kim, Gabriel Ramirez, Ishpreet Singh, Ujwal Arunkumar Taranath, Klinsman Vaz, Alysia Mirilia Martins and FNU Mallika Imperial College London: Sophia Mexi-Jones and Bridget Shidok, “Cognitive Biotechnology: opportunities and considerations for the NATO Alliance,” pg online @ <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/02/26/cognitive-biotechnology-opportunities-and-considerations-for-the-nato-alliance/index.html> //um-ef)

Ethical issues and responsible use There are several ethical considerations for CBT that may transcend even AI in their complexity. First is the issue of personal agency. If CBT is able to motivate, enable, and even control human decision making and action, where does individual responsibility end? Are soldiers responsible for their actions when under the influence of advanced CBT, and under what conditions? Relatedly, how does the Alliance ensure that there is sufficient consent for the use of CBT for individuals tasked to use the technology? These technologies can be invasive, both physiologically and mentally, and have the potential to cause harm, particularly as we do not fully understand their unintended cognitive and biological consequences. In addition, significant privacy concerns will be raised once these technologies can enter our minds and see our most private thoughts and memories. What are the limits of such searches? And what are the protections for physiological and cognitive data, and who may store and control their dissemination or cause their deletion? More generally, what protections will we have against the potential of mind control, cognitive erasure, and reprogramming? The Alliance’s success with CBT will depend upon well-designed principles and practices relating to these ethical considerations, since the adoption and integration of these technologies will be based on the consent and acceptance of Allied governments and their societies at large. As in the case of AI, the Alliance and member governments will need to develop principles of responsible use, addressing such issues as privacy, consent, lawfulness, responsibility and governability.

## Internals

### Internals --- Defense Priorities

#### Diverging threat perceptions impact decisions --- discussions over how to allocate scarce resources impact stability and cohesion

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

It would, however, be erroneous to solely limit the analysis of disagreements among NATO members to the actions of Turkey as the current ‘problematic ally.’ Even Western European Allies sometimes hold positions that are incompatible with each other. Key disagreements pertain to threat perception and hence defense priorities as well as to the likelihood of continued US security guarantees. These disagreements run deep—sometimes so deep that they are not always visible at the surface level of every-day policy issues. Yet, they clearly shape positions, as a closer look at the ongoing European defense debate reveals. In past years, many important aspects of this debate revolved around the notion of European strategic autonomy. Long known and used in a French national context,14 the 2016 European Union Global Strategy lifted “strategic autonomy” to the European level. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not provide a concise definition of the notion’s content or implication.15 The ensuing and There is No “Europe” 161 at times heated debate among Europeans was not particularly enlightening at the conceptual level and is today considered in need of being “detoxified.”16 Yet, the debate has offered many meta-level insights into the various national approaches to European security and defense. Two variables are key in this context: threat perception and assessments of the likely future of US security guarantees for Europe. Threat perception is an absolute classic in European defense debates: the question of against what or whom Europe needs to be defended. Diverging threat perceptions translate into different and even incompatible views on what policies the Alliance should adopt regarding certain key issues, notably in its relationship with Russia as the single most important issue for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century. Moreover, given that threat perception requires translation into defense planning, this is also a debate about allocating capabilities and defining priorities in light of scarce resources. Most important in the context of threat perception is how Europeans should deal with Russia, notably in a wider vision of Euro-Atlantic security. The second variable pertains to the United States and its engagement in European security. Here, the key question is that of the mid- and long-term reliability of US security guarantees and the conclusions Europeans need to draw for their own security cooperation, which, in turn, has ramifications for NATO.

### Internals --- Competing Priorities

#### Concept must balance competing priorities --- Russia deterrence focus with global issues like EDT

Simon 6/2/22

(Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance, “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO,” pg online @ <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html#:~:text=At%20the%20Brussels%20Summit%20in,world%20was%20a%20different%20place> //um-ef)

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasize societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. Even though the Strategic Concept is meant to inform long-term strategy, the salience of the war in Ukraine and the fact that it is likely to reverberate for years to come, makes the crisis important when developing the Concept. That said, uncertainty as to the fate of Russia’s operations in Ukraine or how they may impinge on Russia’s power and strategic posture along the Eastern border of the Alliance, mean that any reflection on NATO’s strategy in the East will need to go beyond the Strategic Concept. More broadly, the Strategic Concept must look beyond immediate challenges in Europe and take stock of the broader shift in global power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion. However, preparing the Alliance for a context increasingly defined by great power competition requires looking beyond the current crisis in Eastern Europe, and taking stock of broader geo-strategic developments. This is particularly important in light of the decreasing centrality of the Euro-Atlantic region in global strategic competition, and the fact that security dynamics in and around Europe will be progressively affected by extra-European developments. Critically, the Alliance will need to develop a more global approach to security, and more specifically a better understanding of geo-strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific region, and their likely implications for Euro-Atlantic security.

### Internals --- Prioritize k Deterrence

#### Broad strategic concept that doesn’t prioritize certain threats waters down NATO and causes disunity – the 2010 strategic concept proves.

Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor

The 2010 Strategic Concept displays all the signs of an Alliance faced with a range of security challenges but no major threats. It was drafted and approved at a time when NATO forces were heavily engaged in a war of choice in Afghanistan, and when the vast majority of allies did not perceive Russia – let alone China – as an adversary, but rather saw it as a potential strategic partner. Certainly, some allies wanted NATO to ‘come home’ and focus its energies on Europe, Russia and collective defence, but most allies, including the United States, preferred NATO to be global in orientation and better prepared for crisis management. Thus, there was little consensus as to what NATO’s key strategic focus should be in an indeterminate security environment.7 Unsurprisingly, the Strategic Concept does not set any clear strategic priorities. It merely identifies three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defence is catalogued first, but there are no indications that the order in which the tasks are listed is meant to signify a hierarchy of priorities. Several new initiatives and forward-looking schemes are introduced, yet the concept stops short of giving precedence to any core task. Likewise, the potential threats, risks and challenges identified by the concept, most of which are unconventional and transnational in nature, appear to be listed in no particular order. Tellingly, the concept describes the security environment as being characterised by ‘a broad and evolving set of challenges’ that include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology-related trends and environmental constraints.8 The 2010 concept’s ambiguity concerning threats and strategic priorities predictably spills over into its (lack of) military guidance. Unlike the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 2010 version does not include a detailed section on ‘Guidelines for Defence’ that lays out comprehensive directions for military planners. It speaks in generic terms of new defence initiatives and lists aspirations to develop future capabilities, yet it is silent on concrete measures, desired military effects and objectives. Compared with its forerunners, and particularly the Cold War concepts, the 2010 document is thus extraordinarily political in character and oriented towards public diplomacy, and by implication rather disconnected from the military side of NATO. Any bridge linking the Alliance’s political masters to its military authorities, as previously established by the ‘Guidelines for Defence’ in 1991 and 1999, is awkwardly missing.

#### The strategic concept sets NATO’s purpose for the next decade.

Heard et al. 6/15/22 [Kaleigh Heard is a senior analysist for RAND and has a Ph.D. in political science; Pauline Paillé is an analysist for RAND; Kristin Thue is a research assistant at RAND; “Human Security and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept”; RAND Corporation; June 15, 2022; https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\_proceedings/CFA2067-1.html]//eleanor

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is set to adopt its new Strategic Concept on 29-30 June 2022 at the Summit in Madrid. The Alliance's second most important document after its founding Treaty, the Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's values and purpose, and provides a collective assessment of the security environment. The Strategic Concept is foundational in driving NATO's strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has undertaken a consultation phase to explore and inform key issue areas within the new Strategic Concept. While human security has long been a priority for NATO, ongoing events in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Western forces and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have provoked further consideration of the role human security plays in NATOs activities.

### Internals --- Trade-offs

#### Concept has competing priorities --- they trade-off

Got ‘21

(Antoine Got is a Young Leader in Foreign and Security Policy within the Global Fellowship Initiative at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), “Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?,” pg online @ <https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/global-nato-what-future-alliances-out-area-efforts> //um-ef)

NATO has embarked on the process of producing a revised Strategic Concept, which will be presented at the forthcoming 2022 summit in Madrid. As part of this process a vigorous debate is taking place over its role as a security provider. As China grows in prominence on the organisation’s strategic agenda, an underlying question is that of the type of presence or power projection the alliance is willing to commit to in the Indo-Pacific area. A shift towards greater involvement in this area would likely meet with US approval. On NATO’s southern border, many remain preoccupied with risks stemming from the Middle East and North Africa region – terrorism, instability and migration – while new conventional and hybrid challenges are arising from geopolitical rivals that include Russia, Iran and, increasingly, China. Russia, with its enduring assertiveness in terms of both rhetoric and action, remains a considerable threat to Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and others, as the latest troop manoeuvres on its border with Ukraine and growing hold over Belarus illustrate. The problem, of course, is that such challenges are hard to reconcile, given competing risk perceptions, and even more so to synthesise into a single strategic narrative. Historically, this is perhaps unsurprising. For most of its existence NATO’s essential raison d’être was firmly anchored in its core Article 5 task of ensuring collective defence.5 It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 that the organisation began a historic process of strategic reorientation away from the territorial defence of European states toward a broader range of security concerns and responsibilities. In the latter end of the 1990s this paved the way for a series of decisive NATO-led military interventions in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia which, together with the advent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), produced a great deal of optimism regarding the ability and perceived duty of foreign powers to defend populations against state-perpetrated atrocities in other parts of the world. But as the early optimism of the 1990s turned into the excesses of the so-called “War on Terror” and 2003 invasion of Iraq, this enthusiasm began to falter. With the alliance’s difficult experiences in Libya and Afghanistan came an enduring perception of mission fatigue and a sense of NATO’s own limitations as a military organisation supporting crisis management. While Afghanistan helped to erode allied willingness to engage in future comparably ambitious stabilisation efforts abroad, events in Libya accelerated underlying trends by elevating questions over whether NATO was suited to act as a primary enforcer of R2P. This produced enduring scepticism regarding the general desirability and efficacy of NATO’s engagements abroad, which culminated in 2014 with the end of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the transition to a “train-and-advise” mission that withdrew in September 2021.

### Internals --- SC key to Cohesion/Deterrence

#### Cohesion measured through strategic plans and capabilities outweighs their thumpers --- the Concept is CRITICAL

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

NATO achieves its objectives by upscaling its readiness, response and military capabilities to deter an adversary. It aims at maintaining military forces in the right place and time capable of deterring or, if necessary, repelling an adversary. In this context, NATO leaders, who are aware of the fact that unity is essential for success, comply with the principles of “cohesion” and “coherence”. Hence, “cohesion” and “coherence” have become distinctive indicators of NATO’s current strategic concept. According to the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “the Alliance that cannot ensure collective defence loses cohesion in achieving collective security”. In order to clarify the principles that are crucial for the implementation of the new strategy, it is necessary to understand what “NATO’s cohesion” and “NATO’s coherence” mean.Footnote1 NATO’s cohesion means a level of political and ideological unity as well as solidarity between the members of the Pact. It mainly refers to the principles on which the Alliance is based. This is particularly true of the Member States’ commitment to collective defence, threats and challenges facing the Alliance. NATO’s coherence refers to consensus among the Member States in order to guarantee the Alliance’s capabilities and capacities necessary to ensure the effective implementation of NATO’s missions. It involves strategic plans, resource requirements, material capabilities, operational procedures, command structures, the number of soldiers and logistical infrastructure (Hodges et al. 2019). The dynamics of events after 2014 as well as the emergence of new international threats (e.g. ISIS, refugees, epidemics) has led to increasing expenditures on security and collective defence (Grygiel and Wess Mitchell 2014). This issue seems to be extremely important and therefore still remains within the realm of discussions among the politicians and bodies responsible for the state security. With time and transformations in geopolitical and military situations in the world, the requirements for the North Atlantic Pact have also changed, which has inspired the authors to write this article.

### Internals --- Political Cohesion k

#### NATO is a political alliance, that determines NATO unity

Billon-Galland 22 [Alice Billon-Galland is a research fellow at Chatham House, and one of the 14 NATO Young Leaders selected by secretary general Jens Stoltenberg to advise the NATO 2030 process, 05-27-2022, Reshaping NATO for an uncertain future, Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2022-06/reshaping-nato-uncertain-future] Eric

NATO is open to all countries in the transatlantic area, and it is even possible that Russia could join in the future should they wish to apply. **But it is important** **to remember that** **NATO is a** political-military alliance, **and** its politics are fundamental **to** its cohesion, **far more than that of any weapon system** **or a specific enemy**. It **will continue to address a wider range of** **threats** as it has in, **for example, Afghanistan and many of** **those will be directly related to the impacts of climate change**.

## Impacts --- Core DA/Deterrence

### Impacts --- Divisions = War

#### Russia will exploit divisions between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises---extinction.

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>]

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?

Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.

Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.

Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.

Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.

The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.

With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.

Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

Conflict termination

Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

### Impacts --- Prioritize k Deter Russia

#### Failure to prioritise deterrence in NATO’s stragic concept emboldens Russia

Kochis 22 [Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom; Thomas Spoehr, Director, Center for National Defense; Luke Coffey, Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy; Patty-Jane Geller, Senior Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense, Center for National Defense; “The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time”; The Heritage Foundation; March 14, 2022; https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time]//eleanor

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept. The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia. Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5. These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China. The Importance of NATO Deterrence Has Only Increased From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine will hopefully be the push that some allies need to finally live up to their commitments to the NATO defense spending benchmark. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Weak defense spending on the continent has led to a significant loss of capabilities and embarrassing gaps in readiness for NATO allies. As a result, American Presidents of both political parties have long called for increases in defense spending by NATO allies. Although most are familiar with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—an attack on one is an attack on all—Article 3 is the most important when it comes to the overall health of the Alliance. Article 3 states that member states, at a minimum, will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Only a handful of NATO members can legitimately say that they are living up to their Article 3 commitment. In 2006, in an effort to encourage defense investment, NATO set a target for its 30 member states to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. At the 2014 Wales Summit, member states recommitted to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and committed to spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on “major equipment” purchases by 2024. NATO allies have made real and sustained increases in defense spending in recent years, but it is far from enough. In 2021, 10 members of the Alliance spent 2 percent of GDP on defense, and 24 members met the 20 percent benchmark.1

### Impacts --- Russia Deterrence

#### Strong NATO deters Russia --- makes Russia hesitant to risk any conflict.

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Russian military capabilities are impressive at the local level, but they lose their luster once we adopt a global perspective. Simply put, Russia has local escalation dominance vis-à-vis neighbors to its immediate west, but it does not have global escalation dominance vis-à-vis NATO. Russia shares borders not only with NATO members to its west but also China and Japan to its east. It needs a large security apparatus to address multiple threats both within and outside its borders. Russia also faces unfavorable demographic trends, limiting the recruitment pool and reducing prospects for future economic growth.61 Russia thus faces a disadvantageous global balance of power that will become even more unfavorable as time goes by. Russia is outmatched by the United States and will be outmatched, if it is not already, by China. Because of U.S. military capabilities, NATO is in a more advantageous situation. Total NATO defense expenditures exceed those of Russia by a factor of 10. Even if we exclude U.S. defense expenditures, European NATO members still spend more than twice as much on their militaries than Russia. Of course, European allies vary in their operational readiness and willingness to fight Russia. However, because the United States has a significant nuclear weapons arsenal, any overt attack against a NATO member could trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, creating escalatory dynamics that might go beyond what Russia might find acceptable.62

#### Credible NATO deterrence key to stopping Russian aggression and WWIII

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Unfortunately, the world seems to have forgotten the importance of standing up to a bully with nuclear weapons. Remember that MAD was about the balance of terror: lose the balance and all that remains is terror. Today, NATO must balance Russian threats to use nukes with a commitment to retaliate in kind, and meet Putin’s escalation with escalation of its own. In a MAD world, caving in to nuclear intimidation is a sign of weakness that makes a war more likely.

Furthermore, in case of any aggression, the response must be total war. The paradox of Narva helps in understanding the calculus. Suppose that the Russian army captured Narva, a small Estonian city bordering Russia. If NATO did not respond to this attack on a member state, the Alliance would be dead, and all countries without nuclear weapons, lacking a credible deterrent against a nuclear strike, would be obvious targets of future aggression.

A limited NATO response would mean that the aggressor could keep pushing boundaries and raising its demands, just as Hitler raised his demands in the name of peace. One must therefore conclude that the answer is to go “all in,” no matter how small Russia’s aggression is. This also means that NATO must avoid describing what it will not do in response to aggression. Instead, the Alliance must credibly signal that all options are on the table.

The prospect of a nuclear war is terrifying. But it is equally if not more terrifying to think that a madman in the Kremlin with nuclear weapons can beat into submission whole countries or continents by threatening to launch his arsenal against anybody who meddles with his ambitions.

Today, when Ukraine is the target of Putin’s delusional ambitions, some US policymakers may ask why NATO should risk a nuclear confrontation over a country that is not a member. Putin may then threaten European Union members Finland or Sweden. But, again, the argument goes, they are not in NATO, so why risk Armageddon? The day after tomorrow, the target may be Poland or Germany – but at least they are not America.

World War II is a grim reminder that “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people about whom we know nothing,” as Neville Chamberlain infamously described the Sudeten crisis, can quickly escalate into a global conflagration. But such dangerous progressions are not inevitable.

If Ukraine has the courage to battle Russian aggression under the most difficult conditions, the West must find the nerve to stand up to Putin’s nuclear blackmail in order to preserve the wider peace. Russia has shown that it is ready to murder innocent Ukrainians, but it is not ready to commit suicide. And that holds the key to preventing more unspeakable tragedies.

### Impacts --- Strong NATO k Russia Deter

#### NATO strength is key to deterring Russian aggression – uncertain commitments greenlight attacks

Wemer 19 (David, associate director of editorial content, former program coordinator at the Eiseinhower Institute, M.S. in European Politics from the London School of Economics, “Don’t be fooled: Russia is still NATO’s greatest challenge,” Atlantic Council, December 3, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-be-fooled-russia-is-still-natos-greatest-challenge/) PCS

Seventy years after NATO’s birth, the Alliance is still confronting an existential threat to its east, several defense and foreign affairs ministers said on December 3. Although French President Emmanuel Macron has made waves by suggesting that terrorism, not Russia, was the biggest threat facing NATO today, the defense ministers from Estonia and Lithuania were clear that they still see Moscow as their biggest challenge. “Russia has shown with its actions that it is a serious security threat,” Estonian defense minister Jüri Luik said during a panel discussion on Baltic and Black sea security during the NATO engages event in London on December 3. “For Lithuania, [Russia] is the only external existential threat we have,” added Lithuanian defense minister Raimundas Karoblis. While Macron has a legitimate concern in preventing terrorism in Europe, Luik argued that unlike terrorism, “Russia is the existential threat” because “it is a nation state.” NATO, he added, is “the only organization that can viably” deter Russian aggression against its neighbors. Both ministers praised NATO’s efforts to protect the Baltic states from Russian attack and show Moscow that the Alliance would not leave them undefended. “Lithuania has never had such a great number of guarantees and allies as we have now,” Karoblis said. Luik warned, however, that persistence is key to staving off Russian aggression. “If we are serious in our actions, if we are clear and concise in our messaging, then the threat is quite low,” he explained. “But if we are weak, if we are wobbly, then the threat can go up.” Both Karoblis and Luik suggested that NATO needs to do more to shore up its Baltic defense, including larger exercises to show “how we bring in additional troops if they are necessary,” as Luik suggested. Karoblis highlighted the need for “more precise defense planning,” a wish that has become controversial after a reported Turkish attempt to block new military plans for the Baltics and Poland until NATO recognizes Syrian Kurdish groups as terrorist organizations. Despite the supposed Turkish opposition, neither Luik nor Karoblis were concerned that the proposed plans would be blocked more than temporarily. “The discussions are going on all the time,” Luik explained, adding that “if we don’t find a compromise here, we hopefully will find it a bit later. But I am absolutely sure we will find a compromise.” Karoblis promised “we will find a solution to this.” Black Sea instability But while the Baltics may remain firmly in NATO’s sights, Romania’s defense minister Nicolae Ciuca warned that the Black Sea region, the other vital part of the Alliance’s eastern flank, needs to be accounted for as well. “NATO and the EU need to have a very coherent approach to the whole flank,” rather than just tailoring solutions to either the Baltics or the Black Sea, he argued. In the latter especially, he continued, “we need to focus on strengthening the NATO and EU presence and NATO and EU cooperation in order to support the partnership countries,” such as Georgia and Ukraine, who have both faced invasion by Moscow in the last decade. “Whether you like it or not, we defend your eastern flank,” Ukrainian foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko told the crowd in London, warning that the growing number of priorities for NATO in the Baltics and the Southern flank are causing the region to “believe that we are being left alone” despite being under daily pressure from Moscow. Georgian foreign minister David Zalkaliani agreed that the region must be one of importance for NATO because “without a secure Black Sea, there will be no security in the Euro Atlantic security space.” Zalkaliani particularly lamented the failure of NATO leaders to approve the accession of either Ukraine or Georgia to NATO despite pledging to do so at the 2008 NATO Summit. Despite the prolonged wait, “Georgia is already acting like an ally,” Zalkaliani explained, as his country has met the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal and has contributed troops to NATO missions in Afghanistan and Europe. “When a country like Georgia delivers it has to be reciprocated,” he argued. Prystaiko agreed, noting that the “indecisiveness” of NATO since the 2008 promise has given Moscow the greenlight to attack both countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prystaiko argued, can only be deterred through the strength of NATO. “He still appreciates and respects the mightiness of the Alliance. That is actually the only language which Putin understands.”

#### Breaking NATO causes Russian aggression that escalates to nuclear war

Beauchamp 18 [Zack, senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, “How Trump is killing America’s alliances,” 6/12/18, <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7>]

How **the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war.**There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable: [[TABLE OMITTED]] This data should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. **There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in warfare,”** says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “**It’s a really, really strong correlation.”**A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict, on average, than countries that weren’t. **This holds true even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war**, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that **NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace** — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. According to many Russia experts, Vladimir **Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO.** The member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. **The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state** or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences **are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously.** The crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President François Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But **if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up.**America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. **The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries** or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. **When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up. Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important allies — has ever happened before**. What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but surely, he’s removing the blocks that undergird global security. It’s possible the global order survives Trump — but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. **Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d rather not play.**

### Impacts --- Weak Deterrence = Extinct

#### Weak NATO Russian deterrence leads to extinction.

Nicholas Burns 18. Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Director, American Secretaries of State Project. “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance.” Harvard’s Belfer Center. 9/5/2018. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez, you have asked for an assessment of NATO’s value to the United States. In my judgment, NATO continues to be of vital importance to American security interests in five principal ways. First, NATO is at the core of one of the most significant foreign policy accomplishments in American history—the creation of a long-term peace in Europe following the close of the Second World War. Because of NATO and the emergence of the European Union, Europe is united after centuries of division and war. NATO’s military strength has been a major reason for the absence of war with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1949. A recent Atlantic Council study reminds that America spent 14.1 percent of its GDP on defense during the First World War, 37.5 percent during the Second World War and 13.2 percent during the Korean Conflict. We spend nothing close to those levels now in large part due to the great power peace we have enjoyed for over seventy years. NATO has been a major factor in that peace. And due to the expansion of NATO and the European Union eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union, millions of East Europeans now live in free, democratic societies—a significant success for U.S. diplomacy. Second, NATO delivers additional benefits to U.S. military objectives and operations beyond our shores. NATO is at the heart of our defense of North America and Europe from nuclear and conventional threats. British and French nuclear weapons join ours in deterring aggression in the North Atlantic area. Since the late 1940s, every Administration has believed that the best way to defend our country is through American forces forward deployed in Europe with the NATO allies. This strategy remains right for today given Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its current pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO remains our primary vehicle for deterring Putin in Eastern Europe. The NATO allies host a great number of critical bases for U.S. forces—Ramstein in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Rota in Spain, Souda Bay in Greece and Incirlik in Turkey—that serve as a platform for our presence in Europe, as well as for U.S. force projection against terrorist groups in North Africa and the Middle East and for our continued military operations in Afghanistan. Europe is a critical link in the development of our Ballistic Missile Defense network focused on the Middle East with Turkey, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and other allies all hosting elements of this system. NATO allies continue to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in the Middle East. Many of the allies play lead roles in other counter terror operations such as French forces in Mali supported by the U.S. In Afghanistan, the NATO allies remain with us in combat operations and in training the Afghan military. Over 1000 soldiers from European and other partner nations have died there during the last seventeen years. NATO continues to maintain the hard-earned peace in Kosovo with European troops bearing the large share of the burden. An EU-led force has taken on all of the peacekeeping responsibility in Bosnia, freeing up the U.S. for other activities. Third, the NATO allies are among our closest and most supportive global partners as we confront the great transnational challenges that define this century—the fight against terrorism, the entire complex of cyber threats, climate change, the risk of pandemics, mass migration and others. The NATO allies and our partners in the European Union act together with us on these and other issues. This is of incalculable benefit to the U.S. Neither Russia nor China have treaty allies. NATO is a significant advantage for the United States when it acts as a force multiplier for American interests.

### Impacts --- Deterrence k N/W

#### Refocusing on deterring Russia in NATO’s strategic concept prevents nuclear escalation.

Barranco et al. 22 [John B. Barranco, Senior US Marine Corps Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council. Hans Binnendijk, Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Former Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, US National Security Council: Former Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy, US Department of Defense.; Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe”; Atlantic Council; March 9, 2022; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/]//eleanor

We are now in a new era of sustained confrontation with Russia. It is not a broad-based competition for influence across numerous domains (e.g. economic), as is the case with China; rather, it is a dynamic confrontation throughout the transatlantic theater, most heatedly along NATO’s eastern flank from the Arctic in the north to the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south. Russia wishes to push its influence or direct control of territory as far west, north, and south as possible, especially in the former Soviet states. Russia has now demonstrated both the intent and capability to mass forces to underwrite a sustained coercive-diplomacy campaign and invade the sovereign territory of another nation. Moreover, now that Russian forces have undertaken operations in Ukraine, Putin may decide to further threaten the territory and freedom of action of additional non-NATO members, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Finland—as well as NATO members themselves. Russia today has a preponderance of conventional combat forces in Eastern Europe. No matter what happens next regarding Russian military operations in Ukraine and Belarus, the security environment in Europe and adjoining regions has been structurally changed for the worse for the short to medium term. Thus, NATO’s approach of deterrence by punishment—conducted by rapid reinforcement to its frontline allies—can no longer be NATO’s sole model for deterrence. Deterrence by denial must now gain greater weight in NATO’s strategic concept. Based on Russian actions, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act—and its restrictions on NATO’s eastern posture—is no longer relevant. We are in new, dangerous territory—a period of sustained tensions, military moves and countermoves, and major intermittent military crises in the Euro-Atlantic area that will ebb and flow for at least the remainder of the 2020s, if not longer. In this environment, military tensions will likely be exacerbated by increased, aggressive Russian unconventional activities in the homelands of NATO and European Union (EU) members. We should expect Russia, feeling the impact of coordinated Western sanctions and other diplomatic measures, will ramp up the level and intensity of cyberattacks, election meddling, online disinformation, covert activities, and support for extremists in homelands across the democratic world. On top of a local conventional-combat power imbalance between Russian and allied forces in Eastern Europe, and increasingly aggressive sub-threshold operations, the Alliance also faces a highly dynamic strategic-forces balance. Russia has undertaken a long-term, sustained nuclear-modernization program that has produced several new types of offensive nuclear weapons. These novel systems present new threats to NATO, its outmoded conceptual approach to nuclear deterrence, and its aging nuclear force inventories. In turn, the Alliance will need to assure its nuclear deterrent capabilities. Modernized and adapted NATO nuclear capabilities must be prioritized in order for the Alliance to effectively deter numerically superior Russian forces from attacking NATO’s eastern-flank members, from Norway in the north through Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey in the south. While this conclusion may run counter to the Biden administration’s initial proposition to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, it would represent a clear-eyed reappraisal of the new security environment. That Biden administration commitment was made well before the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. If President Biden were to wisely decide to reassess this policy position, he would likely gain bipartisan and Alliance-wide backing.

### Impacts --- Focus/Deter k Escalation

#### Failure to refocus on deterrence emboldens Russian invasion of NATO countries – nuclear escalation.

O’Hanlon 6/21/22 [Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Co-Director - Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Africa Security Initiative, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair; “Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”; Brookings; June 21, 2022; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/]//eleanor

American strategists anxious to prioritize China as the “pacing challenge” for U.S. defense strategy may object to any increase in the resources devoted to European security. That would be a mistake. Ensuring that Russia does not further destabilize Europe will have to be just as high a priority in the years to come as the China threat. That is because any scenarios that could involve hostile threats to NATO territory could raise terrifying questions about possible escalation, even eventually to the use of nuclear weapons, and could have existential implications. Moreover, despite the ongoing emphasis on Asia as the most dynamic region on Earth, Europe remains the region where America’s preponderance of democratic, advanced, prosperous allies is found — and also the region where the world wars originated in earlier eras. Its strategic significance should never be doubted. What is more, Europe’s role in addressing the rise of China will be central to any successful effort. Finally, to the extent China is seen as a major challenge, it is all the more reason that European security must be stabilized as an anchor of the future global order. The United States and allies do not have the military, economic, or diplomatic bandwidth to address escalating crises and conflict in both Europe and Asia at the same time. New crises and conflicts in Europe must be prevented before they begin, to the maximum extent possible. I argue here that NATO should shift from what has been, in effect, a tripwire defense of the Baltic states and Poland since 2017 to a modest forward defense posture. Russian President Vladimir Putin must know of NATO’s unambiguous commitment to defend alliance territory and feel no doubt that the United States and its allies would do whatever it took to prevail in a war that he might initiate against one or more of the alliance’s members. The United States and allies should build facilities and position forces with the intent of making this forward defense enduring. The United States and allies should build facilities and position forces with the intent of making this forward defense enduring. The concept of rotational deployments is no longer appropriate given the scale of what is now needed, together with the severity and hostility of the Russian actions that have made such changes necessary. NATO should not adhere to its previous policy, dating to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, that ruled out permanent stationing of allied combat forces on the territories of new members. Those days are gone. Russia, with its attack on Ukraine, has now violated the foundational principle of that Act — the peaceful resolution of disputes. Nor is rotational presence less expensive than permanent basing. Indeed, by placing upward pressure on the size of the U.S. force posture, it risks being much more expensive, given the large number of units it inevitably entails. Thus, what has been termed NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) will need to beef up. Rather than have small and disparate combat formations from many countries, NATO should establish enough combat punch in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that it could credibly fight to protect these countries’ territories in a future war against Russia, while awaiting reinforcement from points further west. As the alliance’s military and strategic backbone, U.S. military formations must be an integral part of that NATO mix, to make the alliance’s commitment to successful defense and military victory absolutely unambiguous. That is the most promising way to make deterrence robust, given what we now know about Putin and his romanticized, twisted, dangerous vision of a greater Russia. The force packages need not be particularly large, but they should be combat capable, positioned in forward locations, and set up for the long term, given the likelihood that Putin or a similar successor will remain on the scene for many years.

### AT: China thumps Russia deterrence

#### China doesn’t thump Russia deterrence – the strategic concept will just mention it but focus on Russia.

Xu 6/25/22 [Yifan Xu is a reporter at China Daily; “Russia to dominate Western agenda”; China Daily; June 25, 2022; http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/25/WS62b624d5a310fd2b29e68796.html]//eleanor

However, Gupta said the summits would not greatly impact Europe-China relations. "There are very serious situations in Europe. And I think this is a serious situation in Europe that is going to force NATO to be less ambitious in thinking about China and more focused on how to safeguard security on the continent, the European continent," Gupta said. "Even China's inclusion in the strategic concept is just an initial marker, not really much more than that."

### Impacts --- Focus Deters China/China War

#### NATO is perfectly positioned to deter China

Brzezinski ’20 -- (Ian Brzezinski, 6-1-2020, "NATO's role in a transatlantic strategy on China," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/natos-role-in-a-transatlantic-strategy-on-china/, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

On the eve of the NATO Summit in London last December, the Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the need for a collective response to China’s emergence as a global power. “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” he stated, “but it’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.” At the summit, NATO heads of state diplomatically declared that China has become a concern: “we recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.” Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, for NATO to avoid China. Beijing presents a full spectrum challenge to the transatlantic community—a challenge whose potential mirrors, if not surpasses, that once posed by the former Soviet Union. China’s $14 trillion economy is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, and Beijing exercises that might in a predatory fashion around the globe, including in the United States and Europe. China threatens to boycott companies and countries that criticize its policies, leverages its debt instruments against poor nations, and is buying up critical infrastructure around the world. Its acquisition of European ports has raised concerns of top NATO commanders who warn that such ownership could adversely affect the Alliance’s ability to use those facilities in times of crisis. China is a technological challenge to the West. It is a leader in 5G communications, artificial intelligence, hyper-sonic weapons, and quantum computing. It has demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to exercise that prowess against Western interests and security. Chinese cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns have become part of daily life for all NATO allies, including both their governments and private enterprises. Beijing’s military is a major driver behind China’s technological edge and is developing and exercising global reach. China’s $260 billion defense budget has a purchasing power estimated to equal or exceed 70 percent of that of the US defense budget. China’s military cooperation with Russia continues to expand and the two exercise not only in the plains of Central Asia but in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Chinese military forces are the pointy of end of the spear Beijing uses to undermine the rules based international order. Its maritime claims and aggressive activities in South and East China Seas stand among its more prominent actions. And, China’s leadership relishes its role as an ideological challenge to the West and the latter’s practice of liberal democracy. China usesits economic, technological, and military power to promote globally its form of national authoritarianism. Beijing even asserts that its political model has provided the most adept and agile response to today’s coronavirus epidemic. So how should NATO should respond to China’s growing global assertiveness? What should be NATO’s China strategy? When considering this issue, it is important to recognize that the foundation for a relevant NATO role in a transatlantic China strategy has long been established. For decades, the Alliance has been operating around the world. NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2003. Its naval forces have patrolled against pirates off the shores of Africa, commencing with operation OCEAN SHIELD in 2008. As a member of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO provides training to military establishments across the Middle East. And, on a daily basis the Alliance addresses terrorism, cyber-threats, disinformation, and other global issues. Most relevant to addressing China are the Alliance’s long-standing relationships with key democracies of the Indo-Pacific region. NATO established Global Partnerships with Korea, New Zealand, and Mongolia in 2012, Australia in 2013, and Japan in 2014. These relationships are predominantly consultative, but most of these partners have contributed to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan. As the transatlantic community’s lead instrument for security collaboration, NATO can contribute to the former’s relationship with China in three important ways. As a multinational security forum, it can foster among NATO allies and partners a shared awareness of China’s capacities and activities that generate risk to and opportunity for the North Atlantic community. NATO has long served as an important forum through which its Allies and partners share intelligence data and assessments needed to foster and facilitate collaborative action. Second, NATO can help develop and promulgate a transatlantic security strategy and posture regarding China. That strategy’s objectives should include the development of a cooperative relationship with China as well the dissuasion of China from undermining the interests of the transatlantic community. The latter would define the appropriate role and means for the Alliance to contribute to deterrence and when necessary defense against Chinese aggression that imperil those interests. Third, NATO’s civilian and military capacities should be used to facilitate the defense and security component of a Western strategy addressing China—including in the tasks of engagement, deterrence, and defense. The following are five actions NATO could undertake as part of its approach to China, none of which would require it to undertake a significant reprioritization of its current mission sets and all of which would support the aforementioned: The Alliance should offer to establish a NATO-China Council. This would mirror the NATO-Russia Council whose roots date back to 1997. Its establishment would recognize and respond to the realty of China’s growing influence and reach. This forum would spur Alliance members to more seriously and comprehensively address in a coordinated manner the challenges posed by China. Its establishment would underscore that this dimension of great power competition is not between China and the United States but between China and the transatlantic community, one bound by shared values, interests, and history. And this forum could be used to identify and foster opportunities for constructive collaboration with China, such as counter-piracy operations. Second, NATO should deepen its engagement with its Pacific partners, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Mongolia. The consultative dimension of these relationships should be complemented with more regular and more robust military exercises (especially air, maritime, and special forces exercises) and operations, including those designed to ensure freedom of navigation. Such events under the NATO flag would be a useful complement to US maritime and air exercisers in the Pacific that have long featured the participation of European allies. Past US RIMPAC exercise series, for example, have included military aircraft, ships, and staffs from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. In less tense times, China even participated in RIMPAC events. Third, the Alliance should establish in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps in one of the region’s partner countries, a Center of Excellence (COE) and integrate officers and NCOs from selected partners into the Alliance’s Command Structure. Both initiatives would help increase the Alliance’s understanding of the Indo-Pacific region, institutionalize its presence in the region, and deepen these partners’ familiarization with NATO missions, structures, and protocols. The Alliance should also establish a small military headquarters element in the Indo-Pacific region, perhaps embedded in the COE or in United States Pacific Command to help facilitate and coordinate NATO exercises and operations. It, too, could contribute to Alliance’s awareness of developments in the region and, if the opportunity emerges, Alliance collaboration with China. These initiatives will take effort to launch and execute. Some allies will balk at adding additional missions to NATO and their own military forces when resources are already strained. But the aforementioned will not generate onerous costs and can build upon European, US, and Canadian military operations in the Pacific that are already the norm. Moreover, European attitudes toward China have significantly hardened. Eighteen months ago, many Europeans were content to regard China as an economic partner, notwithstanding its authoritarian political system and aggressive conduct in the Pacific. That has since changed as Europe has experienced with increasing frequency Beijing’s diplomatic and economic belligerence toward those that criticize its actions and policies. In March 2019 the European Union formally described China as a “strategic competitor,” “an economic competitor,” and “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” Beijing pugnacious conduct during the coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this new European perspective. Beijing will likely balk at the offer of a NATO-China council as it will oppose an increased NATO presence in the Indo-China, especially one that fosters deeper political-military collaboration among the region’s democracies. Even NATO Partners in Asia may balk at elevating their relations with NATO out of a desire to avoid further complicating relations with China. NATO may have to initiate its China strategy on its own, leveraging the territories Allies control in the Indo-Pacific and conducting its own operations and exercises in the region. That will demonstrate the commitment and determination necessary to earn the confidence and support of its partners for a more active Alliance presence in the region. China will then also be likely to demur, realizing that having regular communication with the world’s most powerful military alliance can be important means to avoid conflict, promote peace, and facilitate mutually useful cooperation. A NATO strategy for China alone will be not a sufficient solution to the West’s increasingly tense relationship with Beijing. A coherent and effective transatlantic strategy for China will have to be comprehensive, one that leverages the full complement of diplomatic, economic, technological, social, and military capabilities and dynamics that define geopolitical power. For it to have maximum success it will have to combine the capacities of both Europe and North America and be reinforced through collaboration with community’s democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific. As the institution that effectively marshals the military capabilities of the transatlantic community and one that has established relationships with the leading states of the Indo-Pacific, NATO is well positioned to foster that collaboration. Such NATO engagement would help underscore that Beijing’s belligerence risks provoking a geopolitically costly reaction from a vibrant and unified global coalition of democracies. NATO’s potential role in a transatlantic strategy regarding China should not be underestimated.

#### Reorganizing NATO priorities around deterring China/Russia is necessary and good – commitment and first steps happening now.

Moller ’21 -- (Sara Bjerg Moller, 3-12-2021, "China’s rise is exactly the kind of threat NATO exists to stop," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/chinas-rise-is-exactly-the-kind-of-threat-nato-exists-to-stop/2021/03/11/c3adfad6-8211-11eb-81db-b02f0398f49a\_story.html, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

As promised, President Biden and his administration are moving swiftly to repair America’s damaged relationship with its NATO allies — following four years in which President Donald Trump bitterly complained that they weren’t pulling their weight. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s first official call after his confirmation was to the long-suffering head of the NATO alliance, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; Biden followed up by releasing a video of his own call with Stoltenberg, purposefully going beyond the traditional print “readout.” “We’ve got a mountain of work to do ahead of us, from covid to climate to tackling security challenges,” Biden told the NATO head. But once the “America is back” calls and speeches are finished, the Biden team must face the hard task of preparing NATO for its next chapter. Thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the mission of this organization founded after World War II to safeguard the freedom of Western Europe and North America is no longer clear. Restoring European allies’ trust in U.S. competence won’t be enough to rehabilitate the transatlantic partnership if the allies don’t solve this identity crisis. With Trump gone, the alliance can’t simply go back to business as usual — because for some time now business as usual in NATO has meant taking on more and more roles and activities in a frantic quest for relevance. And while Trump absolutely damaged the alliance, it would be foolhardy to blame all of its problems on him: Mission drift, for instance, long predated his administration. A longer-term corrective may involve reorienting the security organization’s focus toward its traditional role of deterring and defending against strategic competitors: Russia, yes, but even more so China. That nation is the obvious successor to the mid-20th-century Soviet Union in harboring global ideological aspirations at odds with those of the major Western democracies The end of the Cold War understandably precipitated NATO’s identity crisis. With U.S. guidance, the organization pivoted away from its longtime focus on collective defense against Moscow — an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all — toward a global peace-enforcement role. The security of nations outside the alliance became a concern on the theory that instability and violence beyond NATO’s borders could spill over onto alliance territory, and because intervention to stop humanitarian catastrophes was seen as inherently right. (In the 1990s, then-Sen. Richard Lugar famously declared that the alliance must go “out of area” lest it risk going “out of business.”) This shift was accompanied by expansion: Since the late ’90s, NATO has nearly doubled its membership, from 16 to 30, incorporating states that were once part of the Soviet Union, like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, or members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, like Poland. Early examples of NATO’s new role included the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 to halt violence against Kosovar civilians perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic’s regime, followed by peacekeeping duties there. In 2003, NATO took on the task of enforcing peace in Afghanistan after the invasion by a U.S.-led coalition. In 2011, it intervened in Libya to impose a U.N. Security Council cease-fire resolution on the Moammar Gaddafi regime. Obama embraced ‘endless wars.’ Biden probably will, too. Civil strife and violence in these and other hotspots are unlikely to recede anytime soon, but NATO is ill equipped to fix such problems. Worldwide crisis stabilization is too open-ended a goal to serve as the organizing principle for a military alliance — and such ambitions stretch valuable NATO resources at a time when threats to the North Atlantic region are growing. Refocusing NATO to check the dangers posed by China’s rise would restore it to something closer to its original mission of safeguarding allies from strategic competitors. What about Russia? It remains meddlesome, but it is largely under control — and a shadow of its former self. Yes, Moscow retains the ability to wreak havoc in any manner of ways, but in conventional military terms it doesn’t pose the same threat to the alliance it once did, and NATO has moved swiftly to counter what threat there is. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, NATO established new commands and headquarters in Poland, Latvia and Romania — its biggest investment in force structure since the Cold War. There remain areas of internal disagreement: On matters like the spreading of misinformation in elections, some European members — France, for instance — seem inclined to shrug off President Vladimir Putin’s provocations. And Germany in particular is eager to embrace financial and energy collaborations with Russia (though it faces pressure to back off as Putin clamps down on dissidents). Putin will use these splits to try to divide the allies against themselves, but on the big question — checking and containing Russian military adventurism — NATO is united, and effective. It is China that represents the bigger menace over the long term to Western values and interests. At present, China is primarily an economic and political threat, not a military one, but NATO should prepare for the latter possibility, given Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. After all, it has cracked down on Hong Kong, clashed with India in the Himalayas, levied tariffs on Australia after officials criticized its handling of the coronavirus, and said Britain would “bear the consequences” for excluding telecom firm Huawei from its 5G network. China has been steadily investing in European infrastructure: State-run shipping companies own significant stakes in 13 European ports, for instance, and the telecom equipment company ZTE has a large presence in southeastern Europe. When countries cede control of their infrastructure, their “resilience,” or ability to recover from the shock of a natural disaster or armed attack, suffers. (Maintaining resilience is a core part of NATO’s mission statement.) Such developments also make it easier for Beijing to impose its will on NATO members — by threatening to end access to a port, say. China has already proved itself adept at using other tools in its arsenal — such as economic influence — to intimidate and coerce states, as when Beijing imposed an eight-year ban on Norwegian salmon in retaliation for the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. To safeguard against a future when China decides to use its growing military power in similar fashion, NATO should invest more in military assets and planning today. Narrowing the alliance’s focus and prioritizing China hardly mean that NATO-flagged vessels would appear tomorrow in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been expanding its naval bases. The shift would, at least at first, represent more of a change in strategic mind-set. But China has already begun to encroach on the North Atlantic region. In the Arctic, for example, Beijing is working on liquid-natural-gas drilling projects with Russia; it is also sending icebreakers to the Norwegian Sea. To address these developments, NATO could start by formally including the “High North” in its strategic documents for the first time and by increasing its presence in the region. Biden certainly seems focused on China at the national level — promising to maintain Trump’s tougher stance, without the counterproductive measures (like tariffs) — but it is not clear that his administration has grasped the role NATO can play. When the president spoke with Stoltenberg, he proposed adding global issues ranging from democratic backsliding to climate change and the pandemic to the alliance’s agenda. Defense Secretary Austin similarly identified a laundry list of tasks, including tackling corruption and international criminal organizations, during the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in February. Still, at a Munich Security Conference event last month, Biden said that America and its allies “must prepare together for long-term strategic competition with China.” And there’s a growing movement in D.C. think tanks — from which Biden is drawing many of his advisers — arguing for such an orientation. Stoltenberg, an early and frequent advocate of having NATO address the implications of China’s rise, would be a key figure in the refocusing: In his own comments at the Munich gathering, he stressed that China is the “defining issue” for the transatlantic relationship. Stoltenberg and a group tasked with charting the alliance’s long-term course — the NATO 2030 working group — have recommended deepening and broadening relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific region. By necessity, refocusing on China would involve curtailing NATO’s other sprawling activities — beneficial in itself. Beyond ending the training and advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, pausing NATO expansion would make sense, since it would be inadvisable to add new members — such as Ukraine and Georgia, thereby provoking Russia — as it works out its identity crisis. Russia is already pretty much contained; admitting Ukraine and Georgia, a move for which many Europeans have little appetite anyway, would doom arms-control and other negotiations with Moscow. Regrettably, as with Russia, Europe is divided over how to deal with China. Many European allies are wary of picking sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and its Asian rival. Some, like Germany, even appear outright resentful at the suggestion that they must choose. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed last year to conclude the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment — even though the incoming U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had strongly signaled that Europe should wait till Biden’s inauguration. China’s rise is indisputably the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. It would be strange for an alliance as potent as NATO to ignore the challenge. A Europe that continues to downplay the danger posed by China’s growing influence in the North Atlantic area could lead Xi to succeed where Trump and Putin failed: He could splinter the alliance. International organizations like NATO move slowly, and it will take time to lay the groundwork for tackling the security implications of China’s ascendance. By beginning that shift now, the alliance may avoid a greater challenge later.

#### NATO 2030 agenda and recent commitments to combatting China’s rise are effective and have broad support – solves China deterrence.

Brauss ’21 -- Senior Associate Fellow At The German Council On Foreign Relations (Dgap) and Former Nato Assistant Secretary General For Defense Policy And Planning (Heinrich Brauss, 6-17-2021, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Ready for China?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/84798, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

At their recent meeting in Brussels, NATO leaders agreed an ambitious transatlantic agenda for the future: NATO 2030. The alliance is determined to address global developments relevant to its security by strengthening and broadening political consultations; further enhancing resilience; fostering technological innovation; tackling the implications of climate change as a threat multiplier; and increasing cooperation with partners, including in the Asia-Pacific. The vigorous implementation of these commitments will help NATO to deal with the strategic implications of China’s rise to world power status. For the first time, NATO acknowledges that China’s ambitions, strategy, and behaviour present systemic challenges to alliance security. It is determined to “engage China with a view to defending the security interest of the Alliance.” At the same time, Russia’s aggressive actions continue to constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Its growing cooperation with China carries the risk of concurrent strategic challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. The United States considers China its primary strategic competitor and is shifting its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. NATO must therefore ensure Euro-Atlantic stability. Credible deterrence and defense against Russia remain its priority task. The new Strategic Concept must address all these challenges, ensure a shared strategic vision, and strengthen alliance cohesion. KATE HANSEN BUNDTSECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE NATO’s joint statement on China as a systemic challenge to the rules-based international order and the summit’s approval of the NATO 2030 reform package were necessary steps in NATO getting ready for China. But this was far from saying that China is a challenge that will trigger conventional military use or out-of-area operations for NATO. NATO needs to confront China in areas where it poses a challenge to the alliance. Facing cyber, technological, and other asymmetric threats, such as disinformation campaigns and attempts to influence political decisionmaking processes, calls for action. And clearly, out-of-area does not apply to these threats. China is becoming a global power in terms of high technology. Chinese companies are already center stage when it comes to surveillance technology. And in the race to control and influence the global digital infrastructure, China is playing an increasingly bigger role in the development of technological standards. It is also expanding its nuclear programs. Together this is challenging alliance security and democratic values. In addition, China has been growing as a global economic superpower through its direct investments in European infrastructure, which also calls for allied awareness. If NATO members are to protect their common values, it is vital that they stand up against authoritarian forces that want to undermine the allies. Following the summit this week, NATO member states have jointly agreed that this is a battle they want to take on together. RALUCA CSERNATONIVISITING SCHOLAR AT CARNEGIE EUROPE The rise of China and the evolving Sino-U.S. great power rivalry are the defining geopolitical features of our time. They will unquestionably have a defining impact on NATO’s 2030 agenda and its new Strategic Concept. China’s rise as a high-tech great power and systemic challenger should be seen as an opportunity to remember NATO’s very purpose as a high-level political and military organization. But NATO requires the United States and the EU to come together and improve joint strategic awareness, encourage a coherent Euro-Atlantic approach for the Indo-Pacific, and recommit to the defense of common democratic values and a rules-based international order. A first step in the right direction was NATO leaders taking a tougher line on China at the Brussels summit. Details about a specific NATO China policy in the communiqué were sparse. But an emphasis on China shows that the alliance’s traditional and still almost exclusive Russia focus is slightly shifting. China’s military reach is getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic area. It will likely challenge the alliance’s ability to build collective resilience, safeguard critical infrastructure, address emerging and disruptive technologies, and protect sensitive supply chains. Such wide-ranging challenges are complex. They will require a comprehensive EU-U.S. NATO approach and a shared vision as well as a constructive dialogue with China where possible. The alliance will also need to overcome substantial and potentially show-stopping intra-alliance political and military organizational hurdles. Closer cooperation with the EU, given its regulatory, economic, and technological innovation instruments, would also enable NATO to respond to the multifaceted risks and threats of this new era. MARTA DASSÙSENIOR DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AT THE ASPEN INSTITUTE If “ready” means that NATO is able and willing to consider China as a potential security challenge, NATO is ready. China will figure prominently in the new Strategic Concept, to be approved in 2022. For the first time in a NATO communiqué, China’s military buildup is considered to be a systemic challenge to alliance security. And NATO’s new global agenda entails commitments in critical fields, amplified by or related to China’s rise: from value chains’ vulnerabilities in strategic sectors to the need to preserve a technology edge in defense; from countering cyber attacks—mostly from Russia but also from China—to reinforcing resilience of democratic societies. If, however, “ready” means that NATO will engage military in the Asia-Pacific region, this is not the case: NATO is not turning into a Sino-centric alliance. And Washington is not asking NATO to support the United States militarily in Asia. Joe Biden is suggesting, instead, a new transatlantic bargain: NATO, with renewed American commitment, will focus mainly on Europe and collective defense—and here Russia remains the main military threat for the alliance. At the same time, European allies will support Washington in containing China, first of all in diplomatic and economic terms. Is Europe ready to sustain its part of the bargain? This is the key question, to which Europeans still reply with some ambiguity.

#### NATO is investing in Russia and China deterrence now – solves

Garamone ’22 -- (Jim Garamone, 6-17-2022, "Stoltenberg Details NATO Progress in Deterrence, Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3067076/stoltenberg-details-nato-progress-in-deterrence-defense/, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

Russia's invasion of Ukraine dominated the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels, but the ministers — including Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III — also considered a range of actions and programs in preparation for the Madrid Summit on June 29. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has there been as serious a threat as Russia's unprovoked invasion of neighboring Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said yesterday at a press conference. This drastically changed the security environment in Europe and the globe, he said. "We must set out NATO's response for the longer term," he said. "At the summit, we will take decisions to make NATO even stronger and more agile in a world that is more dangerous and more competitive. I am confident that the Madrid Summit will be a transformative summit." The secretary general said there are a number of areas where the heads of state and government will make decisions in Madrid. He expects the 30 NATO nations to significantly beef up deterrence and defense. "We will also decide on a new NATO strategic concept, setting out our position on Russia, on emerging challenges, and — for the first time — on China," he said. "And in this context, I welcome that the leaders of our Asia-Pacific partners will take part in our summit for the first time." The Indo-Pacific nations that will attend the summit are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific The leaders will also look at better burden-sharing and resourcing for the alliance. Finally, they'll discuss the historic applications for NATO membership by Finland and Sweden, he said. The defense ministers looked at all these areas and made progress, the secretary general said. The ministers met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and got an update on the situation in the embattled country. "We addressed the imperative need for our continued support, as Russia conducts a relentless war of attrition against Ukraine," Stoltenberg said. "NATO allies and partners have been providing Ukraine [with] unprecedented support, so that it can defend itself against Moscow's aggression." Many NATO countries — including the United States — have announced additional assistance, including much needed heavy weapons and long-range systems. But as Russian President Vladimir Putin's war continues, the ministers discussed plans to support Ukraine for the long haul. "We are putting together a NATO comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, helping Ukraine improve interoperability with NATO, transitioning from Soviet-era to modern NATO equipment, and further strengthening security institutions," Stoltenberg said. Spotlight: Support for Ukraine "Russia's aggression is a game-changer," he said. "So, NATO must maintain credible deterrence and strong defense." The defense ministers addressed the scale and design of our future posture — the so-called footprint of NATO forces in Europe. They also discussed how the alliance can work in all domains of warfare: land, sea, air, cyberspace and space. On land, the idea is "more NATO forward-deployed combat formations to strengthen our battlegroups in the eastern part of our alliance," Stoltenberg said. He said there will be more air, sea and cyber defenses, as well as pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles. The strategy calls for a new force model, "with more forces at higher readiness and specific forces pre-assigned to the defense of specific allies to enable much faster reinforcement," he said. "A number of allies have committed to contribute to our stronger presence in the eastern part of our alliance. But we still have some work to do as we look to the summit, where I expect further announcements."

#### Active denial solves China [short]

Heginbotham and Heim ’15 -- (Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, 06-03-2015, "Deterring Without Dominance," The Washington Quarterly, v.38, no. 1, Spring 2015, p.185-199, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external\_publications/EP50711.html, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

Even as events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine have captured the attention of U.S. foreign policy elites, the United States faces key questions about its military position in Asia. In the face of growing Chinese power, can the United States continue to provide a credible deterrent in Asia without either bankrupting itself or pursuing risky strategies that raise new questions about crisis stability? While other security issues remain important, none will have a more fundamental effect on the U.S. military budget or the way the United States does business overseas. Basic precepts of U.S. foreign and security policy are under debate. Notable commentators have recently argued that U.S. forward defenses in Asia are no longer viable and that the United States should transition to a less engaged strategy of “offshore balancing.” Others have countered that the right combination of new technologies and offensive systems might yet restore U.S. dominance. While we welcome the new debate, neither of the most prominent alternative approaches is advisable. The United States requires a new strategy, one that does more to assure U.S. partners than offshore balancing but that is also affordable and does not rely on a vulnerable hair-trigger offensive posture. Fortunately, the United States could realize such a strategy, though it would require significant diplomatic efforts as well as a variety of military adjustments. What we label an “active denial strategy” would maintain a forward presence but be oriented toward denying an opponent the benefits of military aggression, rather than trying to ensure a decisive defeat. The strategy would have three primary features: first, a resilient force posture and the exploitation of strategic depth; second, a focus on combat against offensive maneuver forces instead of strikes against home territories; and third, leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners. This active denial strategy aligns well with the status quo nature of U.S. interests and provides a cost-effective deterrent that would reduce rather than increase the incentives for pre-emption during crises. What follows is an outline of the challenges facing U.S. diplomats and commanders in Asia, the state of the debate on U.S. military strategy today, and an alternative to current options that offers a better combination of attributes.

#### Active denial strategy of deterrence effectively solves Chinese adventurism by flipping their cost-exchange ratio – prevents US-China war [long]

Heginbotham and Heim ’15 -- (Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, 06-03-2015, "Deterring Without Dominance," The Washington Quarterly, v.38, no. 1, Spring 2015, p.185-199, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external\_publications/EP50711.html, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

An active denial strategy seeks to deter Chinese adventurism by maintaining a capability to refuse China the benefits of military aggression. This is different than maintaining all-aspects dominance. Dominance is fast becoming prohibitively expensive and may well be inadvisable when confronting a nuclear-armed great power. Instead, active denial involves both defending the territory of U.S. allies and partners as well as making retaliatory strikes against Chinese combat forces involved in offensive operations. The active denial strategy differs from the offshore control strategy by meeting Chinese aggression directly, thereby making it more difficult for China to achieve a fait accompli. Unlike the alternative approaches outlined earlier, active denial offers a broad strategy that includes many branch options for a U.S. president. There are three mutually-reinforcing components of the active denial strategy. The first is resilient U.S. combat power, capable of surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike; this will require a portfolio of adjustments to survivability and deployment patterns. The second is capabilities optimized for attacking Chinese forces directly engaged in offensive operations such as amphibious ships, aircraft, and landed forces. And the third is bolstering and leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners. The United States should assist partners in improving their defensive capabilities (create mini-A2/AD bubbles) as well as fully using the geographic advantages offered by partner states. A Resilient Force Surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike requires that U.S. forces be resilient in the face of Chinese attacks. This includes a portfolio of measures including hardening airbase facilities; dispersing aircraft and other critical assets; prepositioning missile defenses; employing camouflage and concealment, electronic warfare, and rapid repair capabilities; as well as developing procedures and training for fighting under attack. Making aircraft carriers and air bases operationally resilient introduces risk into Chinese military options by denying the PLA confidence in its ability to suppress U.S. air power. Dispersal can take two forms. On-base dispersal spreads aircraft, maintenance equipment, and fuel supplies around a given base and minimizes the amount of damage that a single arriving weapon can do. Theater-level dispersal spreads aircraft across more locations in order to minimize the impact of losing any single location. U.S. Marine Corps concepts for distributed operations using the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B from improvised bases offer an extreme example of theater-level dispersal. The Marines have also demonstrated their capability to operate conventional fighters from expeditionary airfields, for example during the 2012 Geiger Fury exercise held on the island of Tinian in the Northern Marianas. In a similar vein, the U.S. Air Force has developed a “Rapid Raptor” concept for quickly deploying F-22 fighters to austere locations for short periods. Dispersal will stress combat support capacity, likely requiring Army support for key enablers such as logistics, security forces, and combat engineers. All of these dispersal concepts would complicate Chinese targeting and offer survivability benefits. In addition to dispersal, the operational resilience portfolio will need to include some hardening of key facilities (air bases, command-and-control centers, and ports). Hardening key nodes at those facilities (e.g., communications, fuel storage, and aircraft) can be a cost-effective way to mitigate vulnerabilities. This could involve reinforcing existing buildings with steel or concrete or constructing new bunkers and underground facilities (if local geography permits). However, attempting to make entire facilities invulnerable is prohibitively costly, and probably unrealistic. Therefore, hardening efforts must pursue cost-effective ways of protecting critical capabilities. U.S. forces would come under the most intense attacks at the start of a conflict. Consequently, a resilient force posture would seek to exploit U.S. strategic depth in Asia. At the outset, relatively more U.S. forces might be deployed at a distance from China, rather than being concentrated overwhelmingly in China’s immediate periphery as they are today. Long-range bombers flying from lower threat areas, in conjunction with submarines firing cruise missiles, could provide a great deal of U.S. combat power during the opening phase of a conflict. Resilient air bases and carriers near conflict areas will generate sorties to support these other assets, and will become a primary means of attack as adversary surveillance capabilities are diminished and missiles inventories exhausted. Missile defenses (such as Navy ships armed with SM-3 interceptors and the Army’s Patriot air defense system) can intercept some portion of incoming ballistic missiles. These capabilities are far from perfect but they can reduce the number of missiles that could reach defended aircraft carriers and bases, forcing an adversary to expend more missiles to achieve its goals and drawing down its finite quiver of ballistic missiles more quickly. In the future, directed energy systems might augment these layered defenses.14 Camouflage, concealment, and deception could complicate China’s ability to locate U.S. forces. A final component of the resilience portfolio lies in rapid repair capabilities. The U.S. Air Force recently demonstrated a rapid runway repair capability able to fill dozens of craters in an air base’s runways and taxiways in eight hours.15 In the event of a conflict, this resilience portfolio would multiply targets and confuse PLA planners, thereby minimizing the damage that a Chinese attack could do and enabling U.S. forces to rapidly rebound from what damage did occur. Although U.S. forces would initially be deployed in greater depth than they are today, resilience would not require ceding ground to China from the outset. Some U.S. forces would remain in areas close to China during peacetime and at the outset of a conflict. And as the war progressed, the resilient force posture would permit U.S. forces to shift their center of gravity back towards the Chinese mainland. Countering Attacking Forces A robust ability to counter Chinese power projection will require another portfolio of capabilities. The United States must be prepared to counter power projection in three domains: naval forces, air power, and landed forces. The strategy focuses on defeating PLA assets beyond China’s shores, rather than on striking mainland targets. In countering Chinese naval forces, U.S. submarines will continue to have a significant advantage over Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities. But U.S. submarines have capacity limitations both in how many torpedoes each carries and how many submarines can operate in a given area. In addition to submarines, the military will need an expanded inventory of joint long-range anti-ship missiles. Integrating such missiles on U.S. Air Force aircraft will expand anti-surface warfare capacity. Land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, either operated by the Army or by U.S. allies, could also play a role, as could modern anti-ship mines. Expanding the ability to air-deliver mines from stand-off ranges would give the U.S. military additional flexibility and free up other highdemand assets such as submarines. In countering Chinese air power, the first line of defense would be provided by U.S. aircraft from aircraft carriers and resilient ground bases working in conjunction with allied air forces. Air defenses, in the form of U.S. Navy air defense destroyers and cruisers or land-based air defenses such as the Patriot system, could provide a second line of defense. Allies and partners could contribute to this second line of defense with their own assets. These could be bolstered by foreign military sales facilitated by the United States and possibly by Japan, which has recently relaxed its ban on arms exports. To defeat landed forces, a combination of capabilities would again be required. Many of the same weapons needed to attack adversary surface warfare groups could be used to interdict amphibious forces before they reached land. A suite of weapons could be used against beachheads, including air-delivered weapons optimized to attack ground forces (such as cluster munitions and sensor-fused weapons), naval fires (land-attack missiles and, in the future, perhaps rail guns), and ground-based fires (including artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, and anti-tank guided missiles). The ultimate means of reducing Chinese ground forces is through land power, ideally that of a partner or ally but potentially with U.S. support. Leveraging Allied Strengths The third component of a denial strategy is buttressing allied strengths and capitalizing on partner geography. One possibility is to assist allies and partners in creating their own A2/AD zones equipped with air defenses, anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, and sensor networks. By focusing on defensive weapons, the effort would seek to make U.S. partners and allies dangerous porcupines whose capabilities would only be a threat to an aggressor seeking to change the status quo. A second important facet will be improving partners’ ability to operate with U.S. forces. Measures could include combined training exercises, data sharing procedures, military advisors, embedded liaisons, and prepositioned supplies to enable U.S. forces to rapidly deploy into the country. During peacetime, the sales of key defensive systems and combined training exercises will demonstrate the challenges China would face if it attempted to change the status quo through force. Increasing the scope and frequency of exercises would also improve familiarity between the United States and its partners, enabling them to operate together better should deterrence fail. The April 2014 agreement with the Philippines regarding an expanded U.S. rotational presence is an important step in deepening contact between the U.S. military and key allies and partners.16 Shifting the Cost-Exchange Ratio All three elements of the denial strategy are designed to turn the tyranny of distance on its head, or at least to neutralize the most significant disadvantages posed by geography. China can, and likely will, build power projection forces (i.e. longer-range missiles, aerial tankers, longer-range bombers, and improved satellitebased communications and surveillance) to challenge the United States farther from its coast. But these systems will begin to place China on the losing side of cost-exchange ratios. The two-stage missiles required to strike targets beyond roughly 1,000 kilometers are more expensive than singlestage systems, and all other things equal, doubling the range of a bomber roughly doubles its cost. In summary, the resiliency measures described above make U.S. forces less lucrative targets against which China would have to launch more expensive missiles and bombers. If executed correctly, this strategy would proliferate targets more quickly and more cheaply than China could add to its missile inventory. On the U.S. side, although many of the capabilities required for an active denial strategy would be provided by legacy systems (such as Virginia-class attack submarines and long-range cruise missiles carried by B-52 and B-1 bombers) some new or expanded capabilities would be required. Improving the resilience of air bases and the survivability of aircraft carriers would require new spending in areas such as electronic warfare, rapid repair capabilities, and hardening. The most expensive element would likely be missile defenses with, for example, a single SM-3 interceptor costing approximately $10 million.17 Although some new capabilities would be required under an active denial strategy, their total costs would be far less than those associated with a strategy aimed at restoring all-aspects dominance. Moreover, the strategy would probably not require an increase in the overall defense budget. Curtailing investment in conventional prompt global strike and reducing the F-35 buy, which would become less critical under a strategy that does not depend on penetrating Chinese mainland air defenses, are savings that could pay for the active denial strategy. As of 2013, the total acquisition cost of the F-35 program was estimated at over $320 billion (in 2012 dollars).18 The F-35 will still be a key U.S. Air Force capability, and one that is critical for air superiority, but fewer of these aircraft would be required under a strategy predicated on a dynamic defense-in-depth, or active denial strategy.

## Cohesion Impacts

### Impacts --- Cohesion Turns Aff

#### Internal tensions collapse NATO military effectiveness

Morcos ‘21

(Pierre Morcos Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, “‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion> //um-ef)

Finally, lack of respect for NATO principles has empowered member states to bring bilateral disputes into the alliance, as was the case in 2019, when Hungary accused NATO partner Ukraine of mistreating ethnic Hungarians living in western Ukraine based on Ukraine’s introduction of a restrictive language law. Rather than tackling the issue bilaterally, Hungary brought it into the alliance, blocking Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan and cancelling meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Internal tensions can also negatively affect NATO’s military tasks, as recently witnessed when Turkey blocked a defense plan for the Baltic States and Poland on the grounds that NATO did not recognize the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist organization.

### Impacts --- Cohesion

#### Solves war with Russia AND China!

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/micahw> [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole.

### Impacts --- Cohesion Good

#### NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/>]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

#### NATO cohesion solves a litany of existential threats.

Mike Gallagher & Colin Dueck 19. Represents Wisconsin’s eighth district in the U.S. House of Representatives. Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and a Kirkpatrick visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “The Conservative Case for NATO”. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/>.

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k NATO Cred

#### Lack of unity causes competitors to exploit NATO --- collapses NATO credibility and effectiveness

Morcos ‘21

(Pierre Morcos Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, “‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion> //um-ef)

Any of these points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors as venues to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. As highlighted by the 2020 NATO Experts Group report, “a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” Despite the importance of preserving NATO’s values base and, in turn, its political cohesion, allies have nonetheless lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. In contrast to the European Union, which is arguably in a better position to address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism, NATO has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally who violates the alliance’s founding principles. Also, the fact that NATO operates by consensus means that any punitive action against the offending ally risks incurring retaliatory action on other NATO business. Yet however difficult, NATO can no longer afford to turn a blind eye on these internal strains. From its founding, it has been more than just a military alliance. NATO has embraced a political role built on a shared democratic identity. As the alliance seeks to exercise more fully the power of this political dimension, shoring up its values is vital to realizing the full benefits of collective security. A lack of response from NATO on these issues would ultimately undermine its reputation and credibility, most notably toward accession candidates and partners.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Deter China

#### NATO cohesion and efficacy -- specifically strong US-Europe relations -- is key to effective response to the rising threat of China.

Hodges ’18 -- (Ben Hodges, 12-7-2018, "Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The U.S. Priority: China A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific. The U.S. Commitment to Europe Many European leaders have expressed uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to Europe, based on President Barack Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” and, more recently, President Donald Trump’s questioning of the relevance and value of NATO and the EU. The facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that the United States, including the current administration, is fully committed to its long-time allies and partners in Europe. Everything promised by the Obama administration at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw is being delivered by the Trump administration: a rotational armored brigade combat team, pre-positioned equipment for an army armored division, and the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland. The administration just announced an additional 1,500 soldiers in an artillery brigade and short-range air defense battalion that will be assigned to Europe. The operational contingency fund, known as the European Reassurance Initiative, which started during the Obama administration, has increased steadily over the last three years and is now known as the European Deterrence Initiative, reflecting U.S. backing for Europe and deterrence of Russia. Also telling was the Senate vote just prior to this year’s NATO’s summit in Brussels, which affirmed by a 98:2 margin U.S. support for Article 5. The United States’ commitment to European partners like Ukraine and Georgia also remains very strong, as evidenced by provision of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system, other equipment, and training, as well as continued support for these countries’ eventual membership in NATO and the return of their territories from Russia.

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>

#### Solves war with China

Ben Hodges 18, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO,” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato/micahw>

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior.

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The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Baltics/Arctic

#### Solves war in Baltic Seas, North Atlantic, and Arctic.

Anders Ljunggren & Michal Jarmoluk 21, Ljunggren is the Swedish Ambassador to Estonia and Iceland, Jarmoluk is a political photographer, “Cohesion in the EU and Nato will keep the peace in Baltic Sea,” Frivarld, https://frivarld.se/sakerhetsradet/cohesion-in-eu-and-nato-will-keep-the-peace-in-baltic-sea/micahw

I would argue that in the situation we now are in, in the Baltic Sea Region, cohesion in the EU and in NATO is the most important challenge. The stronger the confidence in the cohesion of the EU and NATO, the lower the likelihood of military use of force in the Baltic Sea region.

Each state is first and foremost dependent on its own will and ability to assert its security. But all states depend on cooperation with others, especially in the case of a potential conflict with a country like Russia. This also applies to the militarily non-aligned states Finland and Sweden.

Sweden and Finland are now preparing for being able to give and receive support in crises, from each other, ”beyond peace”. No other partnership than that of Finland or Sweden has closer cooperation with NATO. The two non-aligned states also have special cooperation agreements with the United States and are increasingly participating in increasingly large-scale exercises with the NATO states.

During President Trump’s four years, the transatlantic link has been weakened. We have had a situation where not only Russia and China but also the United States have sought to divide EU and NATO member states. There is good hope that the link will be strengthened again under President Biden.

The transatlantic link is important. Security in the Baltic Sea region and the situation in the North Atlantic and the Arctic are closely linked. And vice versa. One challenge is to build transatlantic cooperation strong regardless of whoever is president of the United States. This means that European states need to take greater responsibility for the strength of the transatlantic link. The US, independently of the president, is said to have increased its focus on the Pacific. But the US will still be important for security in the Baltic Sea Region.

Unfortunately, the cohesion of the EU and NATO is not as strong as it should be in order to take greater responsibility for the transatlantic link. The situation is perhaps most difficult in the eastern Mediterranean. It is actually in the neighborhood of the Baltic Sea region. Already the Crimean War in the 1850s showed this.

In the EU, the challenge is to defend the Union as a community of values ​​and at the same time develop a real capacity to act as a foreign and security policy actor – especially in the geographical proximity of the Union.

The situation is not at all hopeless – but it is demanding. EU and NATO members, as well as NATO partners, in the Baltic Sea Region have every reason to contribute to a strong transatlantic link and to strong cohesion between member states in Europe.

Inevitably, the security situation in the Baltic Sea Region and in its immediate neighborhood is most important, especially with regard to defense policy. The lack of cohesion in a larger context only underlines this relationship.

**Thompson 16** [Loren B. Thompson is Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, “Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin”, July 20th, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044>]

While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.

First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance.

Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Deterrence

#### Strict capabilities aren’t enough for COMPLETE Russian deterrence --- Russia can collapse deterrence by creating openings in NATO disagreements --- Cohesion is the only way to ensure Deterrence

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Chart removed for brevity The direct comparison between the military capabilities of Russia and NATO indicates that there is no real threat in terms of quantitative or qualitative advantage in Russia’s favour. On the contrary, NATO is in the lead, with a huge advantage of both equipment and personnel as well as technology, quality and quantity. However, there are areas in favour of Russia. These include WRE (radio-electronic warfare), aviation and air defence capabilities, radar systems as well as nuclear carriers and weapons. Needless to mention other types of mass destruction weapons which, according to the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL), ought to cease to exist, whereas Russia is highly likely to possess them (chemical weapons were used in counter-terrorism operations and special combat operations). Over the past two decades, the Russian defence industry has developed, researched and introduced dozens of radio-electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting and completely immobilizing most of the forces in the areas of land, air and water. Russian technologies are effective at fighting aircrafts, cruise missiles, radars, conventional missiles and unmanned aircrafts. The latest implemented system is the Palantin system, which has been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea. This system is able to disrupt the operation of AWACS at a distance of 250 km. Probably, it is also able to disrupt all radio, GPS and mobile systems as well as create the so-called apparent targets that mask the correct flight paths of projectiles fired from the Iskander launcher. Thus, combating and destroying Iskander missiles have become even more difficult. Moreover, the system also functions as a reconnaissance platform (Cranny-Evans 2019; Hodges et al. 2019). The deployment of Iskander and Krasucha (Gawęda 2015), as well as Palantin and aeronautical defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea, including the S-300 and S-400, create strong Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) nodes with the simultaneous capability to strike by means of airborne and land forces within the depth of their practical impact range (A2/AD nodes). Another threat worth noting, particularly important for NATO Eastern Wall states, is Russia’s conduct of operations which cannot be immediately repelled by the Alliance due to their little scale. They take place in the form of quick, limited or offensive operations giving Russia the advantage of “facts made” and allowing it to join into the peace talks from that position. Figure 4 presents the summary of the estimated military capabilities, presented earlier in individual innovation trends, of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces in Europe at the end of 2019. It illustrates the deployment of the Strategic Connected Commands, the army and corpses as well as “inaccessible areas” and potential targets to be attacked in the event of a conflict (air bases, airports and radar systems). It is worth noting that almost the entire area of Poland is an anti-access zone (A2/AD) (Gawęda 2018), which means that any allied defence support from the air, at least in the first phase of a conflict, will be very difficult. Operations of the Polish aviation and capability to command them also seem highly problematic. Unfortunately, that confirms the likelihood of limited offensive capabilities as described above. \*\*Chart removed\*\* Russia’s significant asset is also the fact that it constitutes a single entity in contrast to NATO whose forces, which guarantee the security of Central and Eastern European states, are distributed throughout the world (including the US and Canada). Thus, the distance gives Russia a big advantage. The USA, being the major pillar of NATO, have several sensitive security spots and, therefore, have to operate on many levels, not just watching over their own national and NATO’s interests, but also, in particular, European states neighbouring with Russia. Moreover, the distance and response time create problems, while Russia has the freedom to choose the time and space to provoke and attack. However, it is not the military threat that is the most dangerous for NATO. The main threat are the attempts made by Russia to bring individual member states into conflict with each other in order to break down NATO’s cohesion. Success of such attempts could create a space for Russia to undertake possible military actions. The tools provided by the supplemented Gerasimov doctrine entitle Russia to use all methods and measures of combat such as: pre-emptive attacks, impacts on civilians and administration centres (psychological and information operations), as well as the use of nuclear weapons. In other terms, it entitles Russia to wage a total war at a convenient time and place.

### Impacts --- Deterrence/Cohesion up&effective

#### NATO cohesion and deterrence is up --- new command structure and troop adjustments

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Summing up the provisions of the consecutive NATO Summits and the declarations in Brussels of 2018, it can be concluded that they were crucial to the strategy pursued by NATO nowadays. The Alliance’s new command structure has become more suited for undertaking effective joint defence operations. Definitely, assessing the consecutive provisions, it can be stated that by introducing the standby initiative, NATO has become capable of putting into operation a greater number of troops almost instantaneously. The Alliance’s forward-looking presence in Central and Eastern Europe has also been modified, which should translate into a major increase in the Alliance’s defence capabilities in the event of potential enemy aggression (Graf 2018). The most recent NATO Summit in London of December 2019 reaffirmed the Alliance’s unity and commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stating that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on all. “In difficult times, we are stronger as an Alliance, and our citizens are safer. Our bond and mutual commitment guarantee our freedoms, our values and our security for 70 years to come. We are working to ensure that NATO guarantees these freedoms, values and security for future generations”.—The Alliance’s declaration proclaims.Footnote17 The leaders reaffirmed that NATO guarantees security and fundamental human rights as well as the rule of law on the territory of the Member States for the people living there. “Solidarity, unity and cohesion are the fundamental principles of our Alliance. As we are working together to prevent conflicts and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and the basic forum for consultation and security decisions among the allies. We reaffirm the lasting transatlantic relationship between Europe and North America, the observance of the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and our solemn commitment as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on all of us”—they reaffirmed in the declaration. Most importantly for Poland and the Baltic states, NATO leaders agreed on the updated defence plans for Poland and the Member States. They also expressed their criticism of Russia’s aggressive actions (Gotkowska and Szymański 2017).Footnote18

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Taiwan War

#### NATO cohesion spurred by Ukraine and Russia prevents Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Feng 3/9/22

(John, “China Is Learning Lessons From West's United Response to Russia,” pg online @ <https://www.newsweek.com/china-learning-lessons-wests-united-response-russia-ukraine-invasion-1686259> //um-ef)

China is watching the West's collective response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is learning lessons that may change its own calculations as it seeks to annex Taiwan, according to senior officials in Washington and London. When the threat of economic sanctions failed to deter Vladimir Putin and the first of Russia's 150,000 troops began pouring into Ukrainian territory on February 24, Taiwan became a trending topic as observers feared China's President Xi Jinping would be emboldened to make good on his vow to capture the democratic island of 23.5 million people. However, as Putin's forces failed to achieve their blitzkrieg goals and the war entered its second week, the thinking changed. Ukraine's leaders remained in Kyiv; its armed forces fought back and ordinary civilians joined the resistance. A galvanized NATO and the early effects of the West's unprecedented punishment on Russia's economy began to give China watchers pause. Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called the Ukrainian resistance an inspiration for the Taiwanese people. Taipei joined several Asian governments in imposing export controls on Russia and landed on Moscow's list of "unfriendly" countries this week. Russia's forces continue their march toward Ukraine's capital and may eventually achieve their military objectives even as political goals—regime change and the submission of its public—remain out of reach. But the events of the past days have already made China more reluctant to invade Taiwan than just several months ago, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. "The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they've seen between Europe and the United States, particularly in enacting sanctions," she said. "Not just that unity, but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for us to see how they learn those lessons." In her opening remarks, Haines said China—"an unparalleled priority"—would prefer "coerced unification that avoids armed conflict." The Chinese government has been working to isolate Taiwan and undermine its elected leaders for years, she said. "At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary." In answer to a similar question, CIA Director William Burns said he "would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan." However, Burns said Beijing has been "surprised and unsettled" by the difficulties the Russians have encountered in Ukraine. "Everything from the strength of the Western reaction, to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted," he said. "I think there's an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan." Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, who heads the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers at the Russia-focused hearing that Taiwan and Ukraine were "two different things completely." He then hinted at the considerable U.S. military presence in Asia. "I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this," said Berrier. "We do know that [China] is watching very, very carefully what happens and how this plays out." At a similar briefing of the U.K.'s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said Beijing "does not want to associate too closely" with Russia's new status as a "global pariah." She left little doubt that NATO was setting a precedent with its united response and sending a message to China in the process. "There's also the issue of the importance of showing strength as NATO," Truss said, "because the rest of the world will be watching, including China, on how the West continues to respond." "Of course, if we see a weak NATO, that is likely to embolden China. So I see a tough policy on Russia and a tough policy on China as being complementary," she said.

#### US-China nuclear war over Taiwan likely and causes extinction – deterrence and no first use don’t apply

Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

## Euro War Impacts

### Impacts --- Euro/Russia War Escalates

#### WWIII

Adrian Bonenberger 17, Vocativ Staff, Where Could The European Cold War Go Hot Again? Think a war in Europe won't happen? Here's a look at the issues most likely to spur a military confrontation, 1-27-17, <http://www.vocativ.com/397190/europe-cold-war-military-conflict/>

Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia. It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it. The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power, gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit), France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda, because it erodes federalism—the idea that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This makes it easier for Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia. This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy. Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly, Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy. The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is always one of degree and intensity. So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated by nuclear weapons.

### Impacts --- Goes Nuclear

#### Extinction

Jeffrey M. Elliot 7, North Carolina Central University and Robert Reginald, California State University, San Bernandino, The Arms Control, Disarmament, and Military Security Dictionary, p. 19-20

Escalation of War (15)

Increasing, enlarging, or intensifying the nature, magnitude, or parameters of a war. Escalation may entail an increase in troops, additional third party involvement, the use of deadlier weapons, or a change in political or military objectives. Escalation may be likened to a ladder, in that the level of coercion and force tends to increase as the war becomes more costly and uncertain. In a limited war, states can employ sundry military measures to challenge one another’s resolve and capabilities. in such conflicts, the goal of escalation may be to defeat or force the surrender of an adversary, or to mete out increased punishment to pressure a foe to negotiate or terminate the action that originally precipitated the conflict. In a limited war, military objectives tend to escalate rapidly. In a nuclear confrontation, however, the stakes are far greater—rapid escalation must be avoided, as it could spell instant disaster or extinction. In a nuclear age, most experts believe there is no such thing as a “limited” nuclear war. For example, if one side initiated a war in Europe, even with conventional weapons, it is highly likely that it would escalate inevitably to a global strategic nuclear war, since neither side would be willing to accept defeat in such a critical arena. See also BALANCE OF POWER, 4; CONFLICT, 10; ESCALATION, 71; LIMITED WAR, 20; TOTAL. WAR. 32.

## Impacts --- NATO Good

### Impacts --- NATO k Hard Power

**An integrated NATO is key to numerous existential threats**

Goldgeier 10 – James M. Goldgeier, James Goldgeier is a Professor of International Relations and Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2017-19 and in 2018-19, he held the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-Russia Relations at the John W. Kluge Center. Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., Government, Harvard University, Febuary 2010,“The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, <https://www.cfr.org/report/future-nato>

If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today, the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world of transnational threats, the **debate** would be **over whether to follow liberal and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies** without regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by the realists to uphold the current order. The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and **NATO should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be frayed**, **they are stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. Common history and values matter**, as do the resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The **NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy**, **including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies**, the member states are **threatened by forces such as Islamic extremism and** the **rise of authoritarian states**. For the United States, **the alliance is a source of legitimacy for** actions in places like Afghanistan. For Europe, **NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power**. While **NATO** alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing the member states, it **can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries** necessary to provide for the common defense. For all its faults, **NATO enables the United States to partner with close democratic allies** in ways that would be **difficult without a formal institution** that provides a headquarters and ready venue for decision-making, as well as **legitimacy and support for action that ad hoc U.S.-led coalitions do not.** As has been true since the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago, the United States (and Europe) should want **NATO** to succeed. After the Cold War, the alliance dramatically redefined itself. In the 1990s, it **fostered stability across Europe** by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans. In the 2000s, **it broadened its scope through** the mission in Afghanistan as well as a **counterterrorist operation** in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (in addition to continuing the enlargement process). But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention away from Europe. These members seek to return NATO to a more traditional understanding of its role defending against threats on the continent, particularly as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the Soviet collapse. In November 2010, NATO will release a new “strategic concept” to guide the alliance going forward. That document must state clearly that providing for collective defense in the twenty-first century goes well beyond defending against the “armed attack” of Article V. To remain relevant, **NATO** must expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to **confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare.** By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to **counter these modern threats**, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. **If NATO fails** to accept a growing global role, **then the United States will lose interest in investing** in the alliance’s future. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more **robust NATO offers** it **the chance to counter them.** Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the AsiaPacific region.

## Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves

### Impacts --- DIANA Solves Case

#### DIANA increases innovation now

Maria Vitoria Santana, 3/8/21,”Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA),” *European Army Interoperability Centre,* https://finabel.org/defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana/

When the Covid-19 crisis led to a lockdown of all activities, the lack of digital literacy from governmental bodies and defence personal exposed both a new threat and an opportunity. Bearing this situation in mind, NATO members (NM) have agreed at the 31st annual summit, held in June 2020 in Brussels, to initiate the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) that aims to reach full operability capacities by 2023. DIANA is NATO’s version of the U.S Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It will reinforce transatlantic cooperation regarding critical technologies to assure the security and defence digital literacy of NM.

This initiative is a joint effort between private-sector entities, non-governmental entities, and academia. NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General David van Weel explains that although financial support from companies and start-ups are crucial for funding the research projects, intellectual property will not be requested (Vivienne Machi, 2021). This is where academia joins the operation, providing the necessary technical knowledge for the development and creation of technologies to improve Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs): Artificial intelligence (AI), quantum-enable technologies, and big-data processing. This takes place on top of supporting the remaining EDTs: Data and Computing, Autonomy, Biotechnology and Human enhancements, Hypersonic technologies, and Space (Tania Latici, 2021).

Assistant Secretary-General van Weel also pointed out that the defence community has a wide range of technological needs that go way beyond the expected ones. Interested start-ups and Small to Medium-sized Enterprises (SME’s) are welcome to get to know the project. Thus, they can enter a trusted capital marketplace that connects qualified investors pre-selected NATO with start-ups, generating a strong network crucial for the development of DIANA. Assistant Secretary-General van Weel further explained that SME’s and start-ups would not solely provide funds, as NM have exceptionally agreed on building a venture capital fund for providing economic support to companies that develop dual-use and key technologies that could be of use for NATO. The NATO Innovation Fund is a bold optional investment on a 15-year time plan with an expected budget of €70 million annually (Vivienne Machi, 2021). Nonetheless, as van Weel stated, “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank — we are not, but it will be a country that will fund and give a general direction.” This fund was inspired by the US Department of Defense project “Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)” established in 2019 that has proven to be an efficient financial mechanism (Fuentitech, 2021) and aims to provide extra financial aid to DIANA.

By investing in disruptive technologies, NATO expects to be ready for the emerging security challenges facing the NM in this new era of warfare. By joining forces, efforts, and funds with SME’s, investors, and start-ups, NATO focuses on enhancing technological and digital defence mechanisms. These can create more independence and self-sufficiency, allowing NM to achieve the competitive military technological level of the United States and China. The Assistant Secretary-General argued that defence innovation has come a long way since the 1970s. The lack of proper investment in the field has put NM in a dependent relationship with the current world leaders in the area, namely the United States and China. In this sense, the DIANA initiative is presented as an alternative solution that will boost economic, military, and technological development for NM (Maija Palmer, 2021).

DIANA also aims to decrease the gap between SME’s and investors, positively affecting an economic exchange that will impact future disruptive technologies investment as a whole, benefiting all seven areas: artificial intelligence; quantum-enabled technologies; big data processing; hypersonics; biotechnology; space and autonomy not only the military and defence inclined ones (Jane Edwards, 2021). DIANA combines a multitude of strategic needs: the start-up function for trustworthy stakeholders while developing new technologies, the academic content producing function that provides the intellectual and technical support to the creation and analysis of imminent technologies, and the funding function from government and stakeholders that hold the capital power but lack the creational capabilities.

After reaching its full capacities, DIANA is scheduled to become the focal point for NM to cooperate and coordinate the development of new military technologies through the offices and tests centres that will be placed in the Alliance countries (Antonela Ionita, 2021). DIANA will have two headquarters, in North America and Europe, that will work closely together with their subordinated centres. Alongside this, the maintenance of the network line that will connect start-ups, academia, and stakeholders will be thoroughly coordinated by DIANA. Contrary to some doubts raised, DIANA does not present a threat to the NATO Industry Forum (NIF), but is instead a completely different community aiming to adapt NM’s military strategies to the challenges imposed by the new era of warfare (Fuentitech, 2021).

NIF and DIANA will operate independently and will both abide by the Secretary-General (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and NATO. It is key to allow both projects the freedom to create and innovate that comes with the risks of not always achieving a successful outcome. The world’s most impactful defence organisations and leading start-ups have embedded risk-taking in their culture, as it is the only way to assure innovation, even if it is not necessarily the safest. This is why the funding for this project is a collaboration between government and non-government actors, to allow the enhancement of military technology and disruptive technological advances of NATO Allies (Nicholas Nelson, 2021).

#### NATO is already involved in setting Allied targets for emerging technology and building industry partnerships – solves the aff better while avoiding direct engagement.

Shea ‘16

(Jamie Shea, 3-30-2016, "Resilience: a core element of collective defence," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

In a globalised but also more confrontational and complex world, resilience will remain an ongoing concern for Allies, requiring constant adaptation as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge. Virtual vulnerabilities Cyber space is perhaps the most extreme form of this vulnerability as it interconnects the entire planet in real time, making it possible for anybody to attack any electronically operated target from anywhere at any moment. This vastly complicates the task of defenders, who can rarely know in advance that an attack is being launched, where it will strike or where it will originate. So the defender has to try to protect every important part of the national economic or military infrastructure all the time, while the attacker can choose the individual segment or vulnerable fault line that he wishes to disrupt. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. As we move from the internet of things to the internet of everything, more and more of the infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is being automated or controlled from remoter distances or integrated into ever more complex networks. The SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are but one example. So are cross-border grids which means an energy blackout in Italy can immediately turn off the power in parts of Switzerland, or an overload at one transmission plant in India can plunge 400 million people into temporary darkness, to cite just two recent examples. The globalisation of networks and the increasing integration of physical infrastructure into the virtual world, for instance the storage of data not in machines but in ‘clouds’, has certainly brought about efficiencies and savings. But it has also greatly magnified the consequences of a disruption and the number of key nodal points and attack surfaces that malevolent actors can exploit. Civil preparedness A second tendency increasing the sense of societal vulnerability is the state of civil preparedness within the Alliance. The delivery of forces and military capabilities that NATO needs to uphold collective defence or to project forces beyond its territory relies on civilian resources. During the Cold War, many of these, such as railways, ports, airfields, grids or airspace were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation. Today, by contrast, 90 per cent of NATO’s supplies and logistics are moved by private companies and 75 per cent of the host nation support for NATO forces forward deployed on the territory of the eastern Allies comes from private sector contracts. Similarly, when facing distributed denial of service cyber-attacks against its outward-facing networks, NATO has relied on cooperation from the telecoms sector and the internet security companies to filter and capture data, identify malware and provide extra bandwidth. Without doubt the transfer of ownership and responsibility to the private sector has brought cost-efficiencies; but the quest to reduce costs and overheads to increase profitability has also led to less redundancy and less resilience. In addition, as hybrid threats below the threshold of NATO’s collective defence clause (Article 5 of its founding treaty) blur the traditional distinction between peace and war, government special powers based on wartime emergency legislation have become less practical to implement or even obsolete. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. As a result, NATO faces two distinct but inter-related resilience challenges: first, to ensure that it can speedily move all the forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure it needs for this purpose; and second, to be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s social, political and military cohesion. Civil preparedness is, above all, a national responsibility, in the same way that Allies must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical information technology networks, especially the ones that NATO depends on for its own operations. This said, Allies’ security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible, so that it can assess potential vulnerabilities or gaps and accurately measure progress. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capacity to analyse, decide and respond swiftly has to be the goal. Consequently, the theme of ‘resilience’ – how to define it, assess it and enhance it across the Alliance – has become a leading topic for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in July. Resilience is increasingly seen as the corollary of deterrence and reassurance measures in the classical military sphere as part of a comprehensive security strategy for the Alliance. The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are: 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems. These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners. So how can NATO make its contribution to improving resilience within its 28 Allied nations? Five specific areas come to mind: Cyber defence The first is cyber defence. NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its networks every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity is also what Allies are experiencing as the ‘new normal’ in the cyber domain. NATO’s first task has been to upgrade the protection of its own networks by giving the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) additional capabilities for earlier detection and more rapid response to cyberattacks. Two Rapid Response teams have also been created to assist Allies, as well as to manage incidents affecting NATO itself. NATO has now moved on to help Allies improve their cyber resilience by introducing capability targets into the NATO defence planning process and devising a new memorandum of understanding between NATO and individual Allies to establish secure connectivity and arrangements for information-sharing and crisis management. A number of Allies have come together to develop specific capabilities in fields such as a malware information-sharing platform, training and education, and systems configuration for effective decision-making. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia has helped NATO to organize state-of-the art annual exercises to improve the skills of cyber operators using a cyber range that Estonia has transferred to NATO. Finally, and given the importance of industry that owns 90 per cent of the networks NATO and the Allies depend on, the Alliance is developing a NATO-industry cyber partnership to encourage information-sharing and best practices. This will give NATO a better grasp of the rapid pace of innovation in the sphere of information technology and how it can better integrate emerging technologies and new concepts into its cyber defence. The proposal to create an ‘innovation hub’ at the NATO Communications and Information Agency should facilitate this dialogue and mutual understanding between NATO and the small-and-medium-size technology providers that are often the most innovative in this area. As the Alliance looks towards the Warsaw Summit, some further measures are on the table. One is a ‘cyber defence pledge’ or commitment to speed up national implementation of the NATO capability targets, which requires sustained national focus and adequate resources. A second idea is to look into the political, legal and operational consequences of declaring cyber as a domain, as many Allies have done already in terms of their national cyber strategies. This reflects the increasing awareness that most conflicts and crises these days have a cyber dimension and that – as NATO increases the momentum of its military activities for collective defence – NATO commanders need the requisite tools and authorities to defend against advanced cyberattacks and to operate across the cyber spectrum. Hybrid threats A second area of resilience is a strategy to respond to hybrid warfare which NATO foreign ministers approved last December. NATO is improving its intelligence-sharing and early warning processes in order to better anticipate and map hybrid warfare activities. It is developing in this respect a set of early warning indicators that can trigger a number of crisis-response options. This is because rapid identification of a hybrid attack (as opposed to an isolated or random incident) and speedy decision-making are essential to nip these attacks in the bud and block escalation. NATO ambassadors and defence ministers have held simulation and scenario-based exercises to fine-tune their situational awareness and responsiveness vis-à-vis threats, which are specifically designed to be ambiguous and difficult to attribute. Effective strategic communications to dispel false information, propaganda, lies and myths is also an essential part of coping with hybrid attacks that seek to confuse public opinion, aggravate social tensions and undermine trust in governments. All this does not mean that Allies are as vulnerable to a hybrid attack as Ukraine proved to be during Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. However, Allies are now encouraged to map potential vulnerabilities that can arise from Russia’s involvement in business, financial, media or energy concerns, for example, and to share the lessons learned from resilience stress testing more broadly within NATO. Civil-military readiness A third area under discussion concerns NATO’s ability to fully implement its Readiness Action Plan for the reinforcement and defence of Allies, whether to the east or to the south. NATO members have to adjust their territorial defence mechanisms and infrastructure to the new security environment and revive the planning fora that existed during the Cold War. In particular, NATO planners require cross-border transit arrangements for the rapid deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Response Force. As new Graduated Response Plans for detailed collective defence arrangements are adopted, the Allies must ensure that elements such as transport, flight corridors, civil-military airspace coordination, fuel stocks, pre-positioned equipment, port access and legal agreements are fully integrated into military planning. Crisis-response measures to activate civil emergency measures will need to be updated and civil defence requirements will need to be given more attention, based on the military requirements for the Readiness Action Plan and associated capability packages for its deployment. A more sustained dialogue between military commanders and national civil emergency authorities is now being established. Stepping up cooperation with the EU A fourth area is the relationship between NATO and the European Union (EU). The two organisations occupy different parts of the resilience spectrum but there is also considerable overlap in the middle. A joined-up approach based on a shared situational awareness and coordination of responses is key to a successful response. Currently NATO is talking with the EU on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning; cyber defence; information-sharing; and analysis and coordinated strategic communication to spot disinformation and communicate a credible narrative. One early deliverable is a technical arrangement between the NATO NCIRC and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT) for the exchange of information, which was concluded in early February. Up to the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU are continuing their discussions at the staff level, as the EU finalises its own strategy to respond to hybrid threats. The aim is to harmonise procedures and to support each other’s efforts in responding comprehensively. The ambition is to identify pragmatic, flexible approaches which could be reflected in a joint declaration by NATO and the EU at the Warsaw Summit. NATO and the EU are also developing compatible ‘playbooks’ to ensure more participation in each other’s activities, such as exercises and training. It is also important that NATO and the EU work together to tackle other resilience challenges that do not result from deliberate attacks. The most urgent of these is the migration crisis. NATO has recently deployed a maritime task force in the Aegean to work with Greece and Turkey and the EU border agency, Frontex, to monitor the flow of refugees and migrants and in this way help to curb the illegal activities of smugglers and traffickers. Working with partner countries Finally, NATO’s partners can also help to improve the Alliance’s overall resilience. Not only Ukraine but many other partners have been the victim of hybrid operations. Their experiences and lessons learned can help NATO to better understand the type and impact of hybrid tactics. More information-sharing and early warning can help NATO decision-makers to identify incipient attacks that could start in a partner country but rapidly spread to NATO territory. Conversely, NATO’s experience and expertise can help partners improve their own capacity for resilience. Unsurprisingly resilience areas like cyber defence and civil emergency planning are increasingly featuring in defence capacity building packages for partners such as Georgia, Moldova, Jordan and Iraq. In the Baltic region, Sweden and Finland – two of NATO’s most active partners, which have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation – have also faced hybrid pressures from Russia. These Nordic partners have drawn closer to NATO through consultations, training and exercises, including the conclusion of host nation support arrangements for crisis assistance. In conclusion, Allies need to adapt constantly as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge from non-state actors such as so-called Islamic State, as much as from state actors like Russia. Resilience is here to stay as a core element of collective defence. That is why NATO will stay focused on reducing its exposure to threats to its cohesion, independence and security.2

### Impacts --- DIANA solves Case (biotech/ai)

#### Specifically solves AI and Biotech---it’s a new shift on innovation.

Goda Naujokaitytė & Fintan Burke 22, Senior Journalists for Science|Business, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies/micahw

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.

The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.

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Until this point, the alliance has only supported applied research through the Collaboration Support Office in Paris, leaving a gap in support for translating technologies to the market.

The bid to spruce up its innovation capabilities predates the Russian invasion and was agreed on at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels. The fleshed out plans for DIANA were published last week, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is not the only military research announcement to pop up in the past weeks, with the US, Australia and UK setting out the AUKUS Quantum arrangement which eyes expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research.

### Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)

#### DIANA solves the aff but is SEPARATE from NATO command --- driven by private companies to advance EDT for NATO use --- STRICTLY for defense purposes

Machi ‘21

(Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, “NATO hopes to launch new defense tech accelerator by 2023,” pg online @ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/06/22/nato-hopes-to-launch-new-defense-tech-accelerator-by-2023/ //um-ef)

STUTTGART, Germany — In less than two years, NATO hopes to have its own, modified version of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) up and running. Alliance members agreed at the 31st annual summit, held June 14 in Brussels, to launch a new initiative dubbed the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic, or DIANA, meant to speed up trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies, and help NATO work more closely with private-sector entities, academia and other non-governmental entities. The goal is to have DIANA reach initial operating capability (IOC) by 2023, David van Weel, assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a Tuesday virtual roundtable with reporters. By next year, the hope is to have “the initial parts … starting to come up into fruition,” he added. In the long term, DIANA will have headquarters both in North America and in Europe, and link to existing test centers throughout NATO member countries that will be used for “validating, testing, and co-designing applications in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies,” van Weel said. DIANA will also be responsible for building and managing a network meant to help relevant startups grow and support NATO’s technology needs via grant programs. The focus will be on national security and defense purposes, and DIANA will not ask for or solicit companies’ intellectual property, van Weel noted. While he singled out artificial intelligence, big-data processing, and quantum-enabled technologies, DIANA is meant to support all seven of the key emerging and disruptive technologies — or EDTs — that NATO has identified as critical for the future. The other four include: autonomy, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. Sometimes a technology company may not realize that their product could be viable for the defense community, he added. One key component of DIANA will be a trusted capital marketplace, where smaller companies can connect with pre-qualified investors who are interested in supporting NATO’s technology efforts. Ensuring that investors are vetted ahead of time will allow NATO to ensure “that the technology will be protected from illicit transfers,” van Weel said. The fund is modeled after a The U.S. Defense Department set up its own trusted capital marketplace in 2019 as a tool that then-DoD acquisition czar Ellen Lord said could help encourage domestically based venture capitalists to fund national security and defense projects. That marketplace served as inspiration for the announced NATO trusted capital marketplace, per the alliance. Members also agreed for the first time to build up a venture capital fund to support companies developing dual-use and key technologies that could be useful to NATO, and which will be optional for member-nations to participate in. The NATO Innovation Fund, as it’s called, would have a running time of about 15 years to start, and would be underwritten by about 70 million euro (about $83 million) per year, per van Weel. The goal is not for NATO headquarters or for its member-nations to run the innovation fund, he noted. “The actual running of a venture capital fund, we believe, should be done by companies that have a broad range of experience in the field.” He cited the U.S.-based capital venture firm In-Q-Tel as an example of the type of partner NATO would seek to run the “day-to-day” business of the fund. “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank—we’re not,” van Weel said. “But it will be the nations providing the funds, and giving the general direction.” These two initiatives of a technology accelerator and innovation fund are “hopefully going to … bring the alliance forward into the 21st century,” van Weel said. NATO has previously invested in information technology (IT) and software through the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), but the difference with the innovation fund, and DIANA, is that the alliance wants to better connect with early-stage startups, rather than larger software companies or traditional defense firms, van Weel said. “DIANA is not about taking over innovation for the NATO enterprise,” he said. “It’s a different community, and requires different funding mechanisms and different types of engagement.” These two initiatives have been long awaited and demanded by NATO observers, and versions of both a “DARPA-like” technology accelerator and an alliance-wide investment bank were included in a 2020 list of recommendations by NATO’s advisory group on emerging and disruptive technologies. But it is still early days. While the IOC goal is 2023, “step one is we want to know from allies what they want to offer to DIANA,” van Weel said. Once the NATO Innovation Fund has its participating members, for example, a charter will be set up that will lay out the funding models, rapid contracting processes, and leadership guidelines. “We are trying to do this as fast as we can,” van Weel assured, but then noted, “we do want to get it right, because … with the startup community, you only get one chance.”

#### DIANA will solve the aff, but early stages now

[Goda Naujokaitytė](https://sciencebusiness.net/author/goda-naujokaityte) and [Fintan Burke](https://sciencebusiness.net/author/fintan-burke) 22, Goda holds a bachelor’s degree in communication from the University of Nottingham and a master’s degree in data journalism from Cardiff University, Fintan have a BSc in Biotechnology and an MSc in Science Communication, both from Dublin City University, 4/12/22, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” *Science Business*, <https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies>, JH

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Technology dominance

The nine technologies NATO wants to advance are AI; data and computing; autonomy; quantum-enabled technologies; biotechnology and human enhancements; hypersonic technologies; space; novel materials and manufacturing; and energy and propulsion.

These are all strategic for NATO if it is to maintain technological dominance. Losing grip was one of the drivers for DIANA, Jermalavičius says.

The bid for technology dominance over countries like China and Russia is also a driver for DIANA‘s goal of shortening the technology development cycle, especially when it comes to software, AI and quantum. “It’s a long horizon, but capabilities do not appear overnight,” said Jermalavičius.

The plan is for DIANA to launch challenge calls for non-dilutive financing that does not require start-ups to give up equity or ownership in their company. Mentoring, technology testing and potential contract opportunities will be available to go hand in hand with the financing.

This will be delivered through network of innovation hubs across the alliance. One such site is the Big Data for Smart Society Institute (GATE) based in Bulgaria. An official at GATE said that the institute’s work in DIANA will focus on digital health, intra governmental communications and using data in industry and city infrastructure. One focus will be on disinformation research.

However the official noted DIANA is still in its early stages. Talks are ongoing with NATO to flesh out exactly how cooperation will work between research centres, the national government, and the NATO secretariat.

The approved charter stipulates some details, though others are still to be discussed, for example the affiliated centres of the network and the points of contact between them. The official said that many of these are likely to be finalised at a meeting at the end of June.

#### Private investment solves in DIANA

By [Heiko Borchert](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/heiko-borchert/), [John Allen](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/john-allen/) and [Marcin Zaborowski](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/marcin-zaborowski/) 21, Borchet directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs, John Rutherford Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces, Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), 12/13/21, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/

To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment.

To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies.

The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel.

Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals.

Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies.

NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond.

First, NATO will embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations.

In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies.

Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element.

Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks.

The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies.

Therefore, the Alliance needs to step up activities with the European Commission, which works on a classification system to identify ESG-compliant activities, to make defence investments compatible.

Third, business is the first line of defence in a geoeconomic world, and NATO needs a platform to discuss geoeconomics with business.

Today, the NATO Industry Forum is the leading gathering to address defence industrial matters with defence companies. However, the emphasis on emerging technologies underlines the importance of non-defence companies.

Therefore, NATO should envisage a new special format of the North Atlantic Council to meet with the NATO Industry Forum members – and possibly also the European Commission – to allow state and corporate leaders to jointly engage on the proposed economic security agenda.

Fourth, strategic-level public-private dialogue also breathes new life into deepening cooperation with the private sector. NATO should become an early adopter of the solutions developed with allied money.

Making NATO the launch customer sends important market signals and provides companies with an initial track record confirming the relevance of their solutions. In addition, the Alliance should step up efforts to incorporate business into military operations. Logistics companies already play a crucial role, and traditional defence businesses provide frontline support.

The next stage comes with closely integrating digital companies to leverage their contribution. But for non-defence companies to provide frontline support, NATO not only needs the right mindset, but the Alliance also needs to think about incentives such as covering personnel risks on overseas deployments.

Finally, NATO’s ability to stimulate innovation and ensure economic security also depends on how it does business.

Critically, NATO needs to strive for a mission and capabilities-based innovation portfolio that maximises the value of allied money. NATO may take a page from the financial services industry and use a real options approach to manage technological risk and drive technology development. This approach prices technology building blocks like financial options, advances risk mitigation, speeds up technology adoption and gives force planners and developers more leeway to maximise input and output.

In addition, NATO should offer strategic hedging solutions for defence critical raw materials by combining corporate demand estimates with AI-based insights on financial and raw material markets. This will facilitate optimal, company-tailored hedging strategies to mitigate the corporate security of supply and price risks.

Overall, NATO’s relevance in the 21st century remains tackling defence challenges in a new strategic environment, increasingly defined by emerging and rapidly changing technologies and the profoundly important role of the private sector. To this purpose, NATO has embraced innovation and emerging technologies.

### Internals --- Must be OUTSIDE Mil-Mil

#### DIANA and Innovation fund part of Strategic Concept now --- funding and support must occur OUTSIDE institutional structures

Nelson ‘21

(Nicholas, Nicholas Nelson is a Senior Fellow for Emerging Tech and Policy with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Nicholas Nelson is an experienced leader in aerospace and defense (A&D), working at the nexus of innovation and national security. In addition to his work at CEPA, Mr. Nelson is Senior Technology Advisor at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), focused on emerging defense and dual-use technologies. He also advises a range of deep tech venture-backed startups. Previously, he was the Director of Strategic Development at a six billion dollar A&D and technology company, leading strategy, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate venture capital initiatives. Prior to this, Mr. Nelson worked in management consulting and technology scouting in Europe and North America, as well as civilian roles with the U.S. Department of Defense. His research and writing are focused on emerging defense technology, hypersonics, unmanned systems, and great power competition.“Getting NATO Innovation Right,” pg online @ <https://cepa.org/getting-nato-innovation-right/> //um-ef)

The Defense Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Fund announced at the NATO Summit are welcome developments, but they require new authorities and differentiated talent. Swift technological change has meant governments and the military created new organizations and approaches to innovation and rapid acquisition. Unfortunately, many do not have the necessary authority, budget, or workforce to succeed, meaning that meaningful change and impact have been sacrificed for theater. For the newly announced Defense Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA) – with planned locations in Toronto and Cambridge, UK – and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them. Authorities There are three key authorities that NATO must get right for DIANA and NIF: reporting lines, patience (or willingness to accept failure), and decision making. First, DIANA and NIF should operate independently with a direct line into the most senior decision-makers (the Secretary General, SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation — SACT, etc). Second, they need to be allowed to fail. The most impactful defense organizations (and indeed commercial organizations, particularly in the startup world) normalize taking big bets, with the knowledge that many will likely fail, and even the ones that succeed may take years to realize their full impact. Third and finally, these new NATO bodies need to invest in or provide support to initiatives and startups without requiring external permission or consensus. At the same time, they also need a clear transition partner for promising capabilities to be handed off to (e.g. DARPA transitioning tech to the U.S. Department of Defense), which can move from development to deployment. This will enable the Alliance to more readily identify, develop, and deploy emerging and disruptive technologies. Similar efforts including the U.S. Department of Defense’s DARPA and Defense Innovation Unit, CIA’s In-Q-Tel, and USAF’s Strategic Capabilities Office, are effective because they exist outside of traditional bureaucracies, leverage non-traditional talent strategies, and have consistent budgets. Budget Allocating funding seems obvious, but too often limited forethought is given to this issue. To ensure success, organizational funding must be significant, multi-year, and consistent or include inbuilt annual growth. A number of high-potential initiatives have either been announced with no dedicated funding or have had sizable funding gaps in subsequent years damaging their brand and relationships with defense companies and startups alike. The NIF in particular will likely rely on the willingness of Alliance members to make contributions beyond other NATO obligations. If so, multi-year commitments are crucial, as are success metrics, such as return on investment, which are rarely used within NATO or national government departments. Talent Finally, and most overlooked, is getting talent right. External talent is crucial. It is not enough to simply construct new organizations staffed in the traditional manner. To realize their full potential, NATO must attract talent with startup and/or venture capital (VC) experience, and pair them with top subject-matter experts from R&D communities, both government, and commercial. This cannot be done with NATO’s current Byzantine, long, drawn-out hiring process, which can last six months or even longer, and advantage insiders versus external candidates. As such the Alliance must engage and attract this talent. The good news is NATO has a number of potential examples to draw on for potential hiring pathways. In the U.S. the Defense Digital Service hires design and technical experts for one-to-two “tours of duty,” using their skillsets and operate outside the traditional civil service. In the UK, strategy and technology professionals are seconded into the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade, and intelligence organizations such as GCHQ, to provide experience or skills that may not exist within the current civil service workforce. But providing pathways alone is not enough: attracting this talent to apply and convincing them to join is just as important. This requires identifying areas where they might work, including industry, academia, and startups, and VC. At the same time, other steps are needed. Upskilling existing NATO civilians – among the international and international military staff (IS and IMS) — and Alliance service members are needed to address this skill and understanding gap. To do so, it is helpful to expose them to startup and VC environments. Programs like Shift’s Defense Ventures Program in the U.S. have succeeded in building understanding between the Department of Defense’s civilian and military workforce and startups and VCs. They’ve done so by bringing in high-performing defense personnel for eight-week immersions with growing venture-backed startups or VC firms. This cultivates the necessary connective tissue between startups, VCs, and the military. NATO could readily follow a similar process by providing its highest performers the opportunity to temporarily work alongside leading North American and European startups and investors. What’s Next? Accelerating the development, deployment, and integration of emerging and disruptive technologies into the strategic and tactical environments is at the core of future NATO operations. The Alliance’s move to build DIANA and NIF, along with incorporating the right language into strategic documents are significant first steps. But building these initiatives from scratch will require significant planning to establish the right authorities, budget, and talent environment to enable these organizations to thrive. In order to do so, they need to build outside of traditional NATO structures and models while creating a differentiated talent and organizational culture.

### Internals --- Unity over DIANA

#### DIANA is really good---every NATO member likes it.

Edward H. Christie 22, Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, lead author of NATO’s policy White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and lead consultant to NATO for the development of the Alliance’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” *European View*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 13–21, doi:10.1177/17816858221089372/micahw

Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into.

DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities.

### Impacts --- EU Solves

#### EU Compass already includes increased focus on emerging technologies – complementarity means NATO should stay out

EU Council ’22 -- (Council of the EU, 3-21-2022, "A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade," Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

Today the Council has formally approved the Strategic Compass, at a time when we witness the return of war in Europe. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. The more hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our defence capabilities. The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity and determination. The objective of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider. The EU needs to be able to protect its citizens and to contribute to international peace and security. This is all the more important at a time when war has returned to Europe, following the unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as of major geopolitical shifts. This Strategic Compass will enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests. A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. It will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when? Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The Strategic Compass provides a shared assessment of the strategic environment in which the EU is operating and of the threats and challenges the Union faces. The document makes concrete and actionable proposals, with a very precise timetable for implementation, in order to improve the EU's ability to act decisively in crises and to defend its security and its citizens. The Compass covers all the aspects of the security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: act, invest, partner and secure. Act In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary, the EU will: - establish a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises - be ready to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments - conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea - enhance military mobility - reinforce the EU's civilian and military CSDP (Common Defence and Security Policy) missions and operations by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process , acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity - make full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners Secure In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will: - boost its intelligence analysis capacities - develop Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats - further develop the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks - develop a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox - develop an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence - strengthen the EU’s role as a maritime security actor Invest Member states have committed to substantially enhance their defence expenditures to match our collective ambition to reduce critical military and civilian capability gaps and strengthen our European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The EU will: - exchange on national objectives on increased and improved defence spending to match our security needs - provide further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development and jointly invest in strategic enablers and next generation capabilities to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space - boost defence technological innovation to fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies Partner In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will: - strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN and regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN - develop more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others - develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building Background and next steps The first version of the Strategic Compass was tabled by the High Representative in November 2021, based on the first ever threat analysis to which the intelligence services of the 27 EU member states contributed and a structured dialogue phase amongst EU member states, EU institutions and experts. Successive versions were discussed in February and March 2022 to reflect the debate between member states and to take into account the Commission's package on defence and space of 15 February and the latest international developments, including in particular Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. It contributes directly to the implementation of the Versailles agenda. Once approved, the Strategic Compass is then expected to be endorsed by the European Council on 24-25 March 2022.

#### EU coalition building around AI regulation and digital autonomy is happening now – transatlantic cooperation interferes

Franke ’21 -- (Ulrike Esther Franke, 1-1-2021, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,” European Council on Foreign Relations, ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123>, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. Differing views on China As noted, only a few European states look at AI through a geopolitical lens, and EU efforts on this matter focus primarily on strengthening the EU as a global player. This means that the American interest in using transatlantic cooperation as a means to curb Chinese power is likely to have only limited traction in Europe. And US companies, rather than Chinese ones, currently remain the primary ‘other’ for Europe to measure itself against. European regulation efforts still concentrate on US companies rather than Chinese firms. In light of recent changes in language on China in both NATO and the EU, which describe the country as a “strategic competitor” and “systemic rival”, European and American views of China may converge eventually. But, at the moment, Europeans do not feel the same urgency as the US when it comes to pushing back against China. Unfortunately for those in the US who favour greater transatlantic cooperation, the European nation that most often thinks in geopolitical terms, France, is among those most sceptical of the US. Brexit Finally, the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU may further complicate transatlantic cooperation on AI. Even if the EU and the UK were to decide to work as closely as possible, the EU would no longer be able to speak as much of Europe as previously. Any transatlantic cooperation on AI will, therefore, require coordination between three, rather than two, actors. Given the UK’s strong technology and AI credentials (AI leader DeepMind is based in London, although it is now owned by Google’s parent company, Alphabet), the country is likely to want to play an important role in any future negotiations on AI standards and use.

# EU NB Cards

### Uniq --- Focus Key/EU Best Forum

#### Expanding to technology and hybrid war overstretches the alliance – the EU is a better forum.

Larsen 21 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “Henrik Larsen is a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). “Henrik Larsen is a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). “; Center for Security Studies; June 2021; https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP9-7\_2021-EN.pdf]//eleanor

NATO is not the organization that is best positioned to lead on global trade and technology-related issues. It can insist that US and European economic dealings avoid aiding China’s efforts in areas of advanced technology. It can also contrast its own policies with China’s authoritarian approach to autonomous systems and data storage. On the other hand, NATO is not the forum to solve EU-US regulatory issues or to devise industrial policy for its allies. If NATO wishes to stretch further into non-military aspects of security without harm to the integrity of its core business, it needs to enhance the use of its European partnerships. This concerns especially the EU due to the exclusive trade competencies that are needed for transatlantic harmonization (standard setting, investment screenings, export controls) as well as the significant civilian capacities it coordinates with relevance for gray-zone defense. NATO may perhaps see relevance in deepening its partnerships with Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden due to the high-tech industries they host (robotics, quantum computing, 5G). As NATO definitively winds down its operations in Afghanistan, it must restrain itself from renewed global engagements in view of China’s rise. Stoltenberg has emphasized the relevance of like-minded partner countries in the Asia-Pacific in preserving the rules-based international order. However, NATO’s cooperation with these partners should focus primarily on their utility for the alliance’s own efforts at supply-chain and technological decoupling from China. This could also lead to intelligence sharing and joint military exercises without necessarily giving NATO a global reach.

# Aff Answers

## Uniqueness Answers

### Non-UQ --- SC = EDTs

#### New concept will incorporate alternative visions of what deterrence entails --- incorporates EDTs

Tucker 6-17 -- (Patrick Tucker, 6-17-2022, "New NATO Strategic Concept Will Broaden Vision of Deterrence," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/06/new-nato-strategic-concept-will-broaden-vision-deterrence/368366/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

The new NATO Strategic Concept set to be unveiled later this month will press alliance members to envision deterrence as a matter not just of tanks and bombs but of supply chain security, cyberattacks, climate change, innovation, and more. “The strategic concept needs to be able to live for the next decade, so it looks far beyond the current crisis in Ukraine. It looks at the implications for our security of…climate change, innovation, the use of…hybrid warfare, cyber war and the role of cyber in our societies. But also resilience. How resilient are our Western societies to these kind of attacks and what do we need to do in order to tackle that?” David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said on Friday during the Defense One Tech Summit. Much has changed since NATO’s most recent strategic concept document came out in 2010, Van Weel said. Even before Russia launched a brutal war on the alliance’s doorstep, its members had growing concern about China’s rise, its influence over emerging technology, and its outsized share of the world’s electronics supply. The new concept will reflect the fact that future threats to alliance members won’t be purely military. “Supply chain was not an issue 10 years ago. We were still globalizing. We were working on the basis of just-in-time, just-enough logistic routes. And now we've seen with the pandemic, with the economic vision that China tends to use against countries or the fact that a simple container vessel can get stuck in the Suez Canal for two weeks, how fragile we are,” he said. “Safety and security is much more than building a border and having soldiers behind it. It's also about being able to…look after yourself and be independent.” While the strategic concept will bring new emphasis to non-military threats, it won’t short-change military deterrence, a need dramatically demonstrated by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. “I don't think it's either/or. We see now in Ukraine that what they need, mostly, now in order to stop the advancements of Russia in the Donbas is heavy artillery. And I think many people would have said two years ago that heavy artillery is probably not something we'll see in a conflict in the near future in Europe,” Van Weel said. “So we shouldn't be quickly drawing conclusions on what means are obsolete, or needed. But I think it is safe to say that in addition to that classical military deterrence and defense, there is an aspect to deterrence and defense that needs to take into account all these other [things] whether they are in energy supplies, supply chains, cyber, or in innovation and technology that can be used against us. “I'm pretty confident that all these aspects will feature prominently in the new strategic concept.”

#### Strategic Concept will already include a focus on emerging tech – link is non-unique

Harper 6-1 -- (Jon Harper, 6-1-2022, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept￼," FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%ef%bf%bc/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday. The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation. There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington. Smith did not elaborate on what the emerging technologies are, and FedScoop did not have the opportunity to ask her about them before the meeting with reporters ended. However, individual members of NATO have already their signaled interest and concerns about unmanned systems, AI, autonomy and hypersonics, among other emerging capabilities. For example, last week senior Pentagon officials and their U.K. counterparts signed an Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Statement of Intent, setting shared strategic objectives related to AI readiness. The agreement “will deepen AI cooperation between the two Allies, maintaining and increasing interoperability and promoting values-based global leadership for the responsible development, procurement, and use of AI in defense,” according to a DOD news release. Non-NATO members from the Asia-Pacific region will also be attending the summit for the first time, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The threat posed by Russia and China will be addressed during discussions and in the new Strategic Concept. At the meeting leaders will have an opportunity “to have a conversation about what we’re both seeing. It’s been interesting for me to watch, say, countries in the Asia-Pacific talk about hybrid threats on their side of the Pacific, how are they grappling with disinformation, cyberattacks, the aggressive tactics that they’re seeing, acts of intimidation from China. And then you pair that with an Estonian or a Lithuanian and they talk about some of the challenges that they’re seeing from Russia,” Smith said. “It’s about sharing lessons learned, sharing new policies that we’re developing. We’ve had a number of conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies [and] how are we grappling with that,” she added. Other topics expected to be discussed at the confab include NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe, and Sweden and Finland’s plans to join the alliance.

#### Emerging tech/AI focus within NATO is happening now – codifying and enhancing it through the Strategic Concept is necessary to combat rising hybrid threats and build multinational capacity for resilience.

Dolan 6-8 -- (Chris Dolan, 6-8-2022, "NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept Must Enhance Digital Access and Capacities," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

This month in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will update its Strategic Concept, the principal document that guides the alliance’s political-military strategy and collective defense operations. The war in Ukraine has put resilience in the face of Russian aggression front and center, especially in the cyber and information operation domains. Over the years, NATO has digitized and enhanced its security platforms, emphasizing interoperability of systems among its now 30 current member states. If NATO is to become more resilient against advanced persistent threats, hackers, and the maligned states that sponsor them, then the 2022 Strategic Concept must infuse multinational warfighting and deterrence against hybrid threats with methods that facilitate access to data and information sharing on its platforms and across multiple domains, namely in air, cyber, information, land, maritime, and space operations. The 2022 Strategic Concept The Strategic Concept is among NATO’s most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment. But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled “Active engagement, Modern Defense,” contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace,” even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China’s territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition. The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO’s Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO’s military and civilian personnel use them. ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing. ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces. Plug and Play The 2022 Strategic Concept encourages collaboration in the implementation of guidelines and procedures through a “plug-and-play” concept, in which platforms and systems are optimized for readiness and response at lightning speed. Plug-and-play is based on approaches used in commercial software that allow for innovation and easy access to networks and systems through secure platforms. The NATO School Oberammergau should offer platform training and education courses programs in mobile access for ACT and ACO personnel with appropriate security clearances. This would allow them to access the appropriate platform and utilize data and information necessary for their tasks and responsibilities. For example, NATO’s Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (MA) Information Sharing Platform contains rich and publicly available datasets on the roles played by the alliance in mitigating the illicit trade in small arms, tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels. It reports and updates NATO-funded projects to prevent adversaries from acquiring these weapons. However, the SALW-MA platform is outdated and not user friendly, impeding its functionality in practice. Put simply, NATO’s ACT and ACO should focus as much on easing access to information as it does on advanced technologies and conventional weaponry. This would provide NATO with useful tools to access data and intelligence on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and in land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains using devices and platforms that can seamlessly connect in different locations. But NATO Commands cannot simply expect its existing personnel to adapt. They must be trained and educated on a regular basis to use digital infrastructures in ways that make their jobs easier. On the strategic level, the 2022 Strategic Concept must provide NATO’s political and military leaders with flexibility and resources to discern the diversity of hybrid threats in the environment. NATO’s strategic planners, cyber operators, and warfighters should be trained and educated in relevant digital platforms, access, and sharing data and information in ways that improve collaborative decision-making and collective defense. On the operations level, personnel must be given enough space to share data and intelligence as well as to train tactical level personnel on software that enables them to collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information quickly and easily across multiple domains. Addressing these challenges is difficult for just one nation-state, let alone for all 30 NATO members. Therefore, the 2022 Strategic Concept should emphasize connectivity between member states in multi-domain operations and in collaboration with the private sector and academia. Accessibility to information and data sharing among NATO members should be securitized and harmonized. Essential Role of Artificial Intelligence The challenge for NATO is not necessarily adopting and investing in emerging and disrupting technologies for collective defense. Rather, the question is whether ACT and ACO can enhance accessibility to digital platforms and ease communications between platforms. Here, artificial intelligence (AI) can play a role in overcoming critical obstacles. AI is now occupying a greater space in NATO’s collective defense orientation. The challenge in the 2022 Strategic Concept will be delineating the degree to which AI will enhance the ability of the alliance to analyze information and assess data. Moreover, AI is only as good as the data it relies on. To maintain its technological edge, in 2021 NATO released an Artificial Intelligence Strategy, a good step toward maximizing interoperability of weapons systems, improving infrastructure, and building resilient hybrid defenses. While it emphasizes collaboration with the private sector and academia, the strategy needs further refinement as AI would help NATO’s military and civilian personnel interlink devices on different platforms, perform rigorous data analytics, and quicken response time in response to a conventional or hybrid attack. One innovation is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). DIANA leverages partnerships among academics, technology companies, start-up firms to address the full spectrum of threats in the security environment. Private sector firms utilizing DIANA can access innovation sites and test centers that focus on artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, autonomous machines, and biotechnology. In the past, alliance members supported the creation and development of a venture capital Innovation Fund for technology companies and start-ups. The Strategic Concept should support the initiative with sustained public funds in ways that allow for strategic-level planning at ACO and ATO to communicate more effectively at the operational and tactical levels. DIANA and the Innovation Fund are models for the alliance. An existing partnership that is proving effective is NATO’s collaboration with Klarrio, a firm that provides the alliance with innovative real-time data analytics and streaming services to combat disinformation and fake news. Klarrio has partnered with NATO’s Strategic Communications Center (StratCom) to assist the alliance in the information domain by streaming data analysis, processing, and applications analytics to identify and eradicate disinformation for NATO’s strategic-level planners. It supports and updates dashboard services to track suspicious activities in social media platforms, maintains an interactive user interface, generates analytical reports, and uses machine learning to analyze data and information.

### Non-UQ --- NATO Cohesion

#### NATO cohesion is non-unique.

Simon and Arteaga 22 [Luis Simón is Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels Office, in addition of being Research Professor of International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of London, and a MA in European Studies from the Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). Félix Arteaga is a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, UNED). He has a doctorate in International Relations and a BSc in Political Science from Madrid’s Universidad Complutense.; “NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept”; Real Instituto Elcano; January 17, 2022; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/]//eleanor

The restating of the bond is essential after a period of turbulence. The advent of Donald Trump as US President in January 2017, his unusually explicit criticisms of NATO and the European countries raised major doubts among the European allies regarding the US commitment to the defence of Europe and led them to push the ‘strategic autonomy’ agenda within the framework of the EU. The pivot to Asia and the importance placed on China by US Administrations completed a context of uncertainty in which the French President Emmanuel Macron went so far as to assert that NATO had become ‘brain dead’. Added to this was the questioning in some countries of the democratic values and the rule of law that have maintained internal cohesion and require an unequivocal reaffirmation.

### Non-UQ --- NATO Cohesion

#### NATO already has multiple structural problems – overstretch is the squo.

West 22 [West, 6-12-2022, Behind Nato’s defensive ‘shield’ lies weakness and division. Ukraine will pay the price, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/12/behind-natos-defensive-shield-lies-weakness-and-division-ukraine-will-pay-the-price] Eric

Why is Nato not doing more? Taken together, **all the rationales** **and excuses for passivity** **and inaction** **produce** a picture of **an** **alliance** [significantly less united, powerful and organised](https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-ukraine-russia-war-nato-fault/)**th**an **its admirers pretend.**

Initially backing Ukraine, albeit at arm’s length, gave Nato a boost. Its stock rose from the low-point of [last year’s Afghan withdrawal debacle](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/oct/26/nato-was-a-political-failure-in-afghanistan-says-defence-secretary).

But if, as expected, the war grinds on, if both sides grow desperate, if the diplomatic impasse deepens, and if the threat of wider conflict rises, Nato’s long unaddressed weaknesses and vulnerabilities will become both more obvious and more hazardous for those crouching behind its battlements. Its post-Soviet bluff may finally be called.

It would be unrealistic to expect seamless political unanimity in so large an organisation. But the fact that each member has an equal say when, **in terms of military capacity**, **they are** **absurdly** **unequal**, **hinders swift**, **bold decision-making.** **A**[Russian nuclear or chemical provocation](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/10/putin-nuclear-weapons-us-intelligence-avril-haines), for example, **would** be likely to **produce a paralysing cacophony of conflicting voices within Nato – and Putin surely knows it.**

At the same time, **there is huge** over-reliance on the US, a military superpower **without** **whose agreement nothing** **happens and behind whose might the laggards lurk**, refusing to pay their way.

Organisationally and militarily, too, [Nato is all over the place](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/). **It has three joint command** **headquarters** – **in Italy,** **the** **Netherlands and the US**. But **its top general is based** **in** **Belgium**. **Inter-operability** of different countries’ weapons systems is lacking, as are joint training exercises, arms procurement and intelligence-sharing.

**Nato** **is** also increasingly **overstretched**, caught between a Russian threat in the Euro-Atlantic area and [challenges in the Indo-Pacific from an aggressively expansionist China](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/29/china-says-nato-is-messing-up-europe-and-warns-over-role-in-asia-pacific).

Leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are expected in Madrid. Their shared nightmare: [a “no limits” totalitarian Sino-Russian global axis](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin-china-russia-tensions-grow-west) with echoes of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact.

**Nato** **is due to publish**[its 10-yearly “strategic concept”](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/) on how **to deal with all this**, **plus** trans-national **terrorism**, **destabilising** **climate change**, **cyber warfare** **and the rise of anti-democratic states**. It’s a tall order.

Overdue, too, is the Biden administration’s [new Asia-focused national security strategy](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-03/putin-s-war-forces-biden-to-rewrite-security-plan-nod-to-europe), which had to be hastily recalibrated following the Ukraine invasion.

Yet if it is to move forward effectively on these numerous fronts, Nato must also look back, admit past mistakes and accept some responsibility for the current crisis.

**By keeping Ukraine in membership** **limbo** **while failing to** **punish Putin for war crimes in Chechnya** **and Syria**, his 2008 attack on Georgia, **his annexation of Crimea** **and his post-2014 Donbas proxy war**, complacent western leaders unwittingly paved the way for today’s catastrophe.

#### Increasingly NATO cohesion is decreasing – there is less economic and political will

Ellehuus 21 [Rachel Ellehuus is the Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO, 7-21-2021, NATO Futures: Three Trajectories, No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories] Eric

**By 2024,** **only** **half of the allies** have **reached** **the NATO** **benchmarks** **of spending 2 percent** **of their** Gross Domestic Product (**GDP**) **on defense** **and 20 percent that on major** **equipment**. **The gap** between the most and least capable allies affects both interoperability and political will. **NATO** increasingly **relies on the same handful** **of countries** to generate forces for missions at home and abroad. **After failed** **efforts** **to increase its common funding**, the persistence of NATO’s “costs lie where they fall” system causes force-contributing **allies** to **become frustrated with “free riders**” in the alliance. While some countries invest in new and emerging technologies, only a few can muster the resources to field or procure these capabilities, and adversaries slowly gain a technological edge. The United States begins to rely on ad hoc coalitions of the most willing and capable allies, further eroding NATO’s role as the security partner of choice. **NATO’s** **nuclear deterrence** **posture comes into question following the** U**.S. Congress’s decision to fund modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad** only partially. **Other allies begin to waver on** **their roles** **in the extended deterrence mission** (including procurement of new dual-capable aircraft), forcing a rethink and reorganization of NATO’s nuclear posture.

#### NATO political infighting is the norm.

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. **Turkey** **under** President Recep Tayyip **Erdogan** is a semi-authoritarian state **that flirts** **with Russia** **and fumes** **at what it considers European meddling over human rights**. **Hungary** under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is **taking a different but downward path**, **fusing wealth and** **power** **into a new system** **of control at home** **and undermining** **U.S. and European attempts** **to put pressure on** **Russia** **and** **China**. **Macron’s relentless posturing** **and German Chancellor** Olaf **Scholz’s** **foot-dragging create** **constant obstacles** **and** **distractions**. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: [Scholzen](https://twitter.com/hashtag/Scholzen) is a German neologism for “dither,” while [makronic](https://polishnews.co.uk/the-word-makronic-in-ukrainian-a-reference-to-the-attitude-of-emmanuel-macron/) in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. **Any threat or provocation** **from Russia** **is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed**. **More likely it will** **be** **something deliberately ambiguous**, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. **Those actually facing the** **possibility of attack would be far more hawkish**, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

#### Disunity is at an all-time high---Greece, Turkey, France, and the US are all pissed at eachother.

Paul Antonopoulos 21, PhD Candidate at Vila Velha University, “2021: A year of NATO disunity like no other,” <https://infobrics.org/post/34879/pairie+micahw>

2021 is arguably the year when intra-NATO tensions and rivalry widened more so then ever since the alliance's inception in 1949. Although NATO most recently expanded its membership to include Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020, the rift caused by competing interests and the emboldening of revisionist ideologies (neo-Ottomanism and Anglo Chauvinism) among bloc members has only widened in recent years, but no other like 2021.

Intense NATO disunity first became prevalent during the Syrian War. Turkey continues to be enraged that the US, France and other member states train, fund and arm the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that Ankara recognizes as a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, Washington is furious that Turkey defied warnings to not purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system, and thus in December 2020 imposed sanctions on its fellow NATO member, an unprecedented action. With former US President Donald Trump unwilling to confront Turkey in a serious way in order to not jeopardize his personal business interests in the country, his successor Joe Biden has more willingly confronted his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

On Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day (April 24, 2021), Biden recognized the Turkish-perpetrated Armenian Genocide, something successive presidents refused to do out of fear of alienating a Turkey that was once seen as a bulwark against the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. Seeing as the previous non-recognition of the genocide was for political and geopolitical reasons, the recognition signifies a major change in Washington’s attitude towards Ankara.

Although Washington bemoans Ankara as being revisionist, its own contradictory revisionism actually caused a deeper disunity among NATO members in 2021 following the announcement of AUKUS, a trilateral Anglo security pact between Australia, the UK and the US. Under the pact, the US will share nuclear propulsion technology with Australia. This culminated in Canberra cancelling without notice the French–Australian submarine deal worth €56 billion, ending efforts for the two countries to develop a deeper strategic partnership.

The sudden cancellation of a lucrative contract and defense strategy with Australia was a humiliation for Paris as its ambitions for more global influence was dealt a blow. The French Ambassadors to Washington and Canberra were recalled to Paris, and Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said “With Britain, there is no need. We know their constant opportunism.”

Washington pleaded to Paris that it had no knowledge that Canberra was about to “backstab”, as Le Drian termed it, their planned strategic alliance. The UK’s post-Brexit Anglo Chauvinistic ideology, something that Canberra naturally aligns with, motivated the humiliating manner in which France was sidelined to make way for AUKUS. This total disregard for French industry and strategic interests made Paris lose trust in NATO.

This “backstab” spurred on Paris to seek greater strategic alliances at a bilateral level, leading to a mutual defense pact that supersedes NATO with Greece. Greece is also frustrated with NATO as daily Turkish violations against its airspace, Turkish threats of a casus belli if it expands its maritime zone in the Aegean Sea to 12 nautical miles from its six (as permitted by international law), and Turkish attempts to exploit energy deposits in Greece’s maritime space, is met with indifference. In this way, Athens lost trust in NATO as a peace guarantor, something that made its pact with France a security necessity.

The Biden administration praised what Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis termed as “strategic autonomy” from Washington, a minor concession likely to try and appease Paris as it lost its more lucrative agreement with Australia. However, Ankara continually berates the French-Greek pact, with Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar saying that Greece’s alliance with France will cause cracks in NATO. On another occasion he said “[Greece is] trying to overpower Turkey with armaments and challenges, in cooperation with some other countries,” an indirect reference to France. Akar added: “[Greece] has different ambitions that it seeks to achieve through other alliances.”

There is clearly a major breakdown in NATO unity as accusations are being made between member states on who is responsible for causing cracks. This comes as the US continues to expect all member states to be compliant, as the UK retracts to Anglo Chauvinism under the guise of “Global Britain”, as France attempts to have more international influence, and as Turkey more aggressively pursues a neo-Ottoman policy.

2021 saw Greece and France lose trust in NATO, Turkey accuse Greece of causing disunity, the US angered as Turkey announces it wants to purchase another S-400 unit from Russia, and the formation of an Anglo bloc that seemingly supersedes NATO and French interests. Throw into this quagmire the massive disparity of interest among NATO members to support Ukraine against Russia, and it appears that the bloc is disunited like never before.

These events suggests that 2021 is a year where NATO’s fragility and disunity was more apparent than any other year, especially in the post-Cold War period. With these tensions, particular as the Anglo bloc and Turkey pursue revisionist policies and ideologies, disunity within NATO will not only continue into 2022, but intensify.

### Non-UQ --- No Cohesion

#### NATOs strategic concept is failing now – cohesion is dead and its super overstretched.

Tisdall 6/12/22 [Simon Tisdall is a foreign affairs commentator. He has been a foreign leader writer, foreign editor and US editor for the Guardian; “Behind Nato’s defensive ‘shield’ lies weakness and division. Ukraine will pay the price”; June 12, 2022; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/12/behind-natos-defensive-shield-lies-weakness-and-division-ukraine-will-pay-the-price]//eleanor

While many allies have stepped up, important European Nato members cower behind an alliance they previously disparaged and neglected. They use it to avoid making costly national commitments to Kyiv that might anger Moscow. Daydreaming of EU strategic autonomy, France’s Emmanuel Macron prefers talk to action. Germany’s Olaf Scholz epitomises dither and delay. Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s sanctions-busting prime minister, often seems to bat for the other side. Cynically self-serving attempts by Turkey’s troublemaker president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to sabotage Finland and Sweden’s membership applications also undermine a united front. Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s inoffensive secretary general, will struggle to repair these fissures. Poland and other “frontline” states want a tougher approach, including permanent positioning of additional troops, heavy weapons and planes on Russia’s borders. In response, Nato officials promise “robust and historic” decisions. As for Ukraine, its leadership has all but abandoned hopes of membership, solemnly promised at Nato’s 2008 Bucharest summit, and has ceased calling for direct military intervention. “Of course, we will hear words of support… we are very grateful for that,” said its foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba. Having previously accused Nato of “doing nothing”, he does not expect concrete action in Madrid on accession or, for example, “Black Sea security”. That last remark referred to the unforgivable, ongoing US-European failure to challenge Moscow’s illegal blockade of Ukraine’s ports, which is creating global food shortages. Nato could and should be exerting greater pressure on Russian forces, so helping persuade Putin to end his genocidal war It’s one of many areas where Nato could and should be exerting greater pressure on Russian forces, so helping persuade Putin to end his genocidal war. Why is Nato not doing more? Taken together, all the rationales and excuses for passivity and inaction produce a picture of an alliance significantly less united, powerful and organised than its admirers pretend. Initially backing Ukraine, albeit at arm’s length, gave Nato a boost. Its stock rose from the low-point of last year’s Afghan withdrawal debacle. But if, as expected, the war grinds on, if both sides grow desperate, if the diplomatic impasse deepens, and if the threat of wider conflict rises, Nato’s long unaddressed weaknesses and vulnerabilities will become both more obvious and more hazardous for those crouching behind its battlements. Its post-Soviet bluff may finally be called. It would be unrealistic to expect seamless political unanimity in so large an organisation. But the fact that each member has an equal say when, in terms of military capacity, they are absurdly unequal, hinders swift, bold decision-making. A Russian nuclear or chemical provocation, for example, would be likely to produce a paralysing cacophony of conflicting voices within Nato – and Putin surely knows it. At the same time, there is huge over-reliance on the US, a military superpower without whose agreement nothing happens and behind whose might the laggards lurk, refusing to pay their way. Organisationally and militarily, too, Nato is all over the place. It has three joint command headquarters – in Italy, the Netherlands and the US. But its top general is based in Belgium. Inter-operability of different countries’ weapons systems is lacking, as are joint training exercises, arms procurement and intelligence-sharing. Nato is also increasingly overstretched, caught between a Russian threat in the Euro-Atlantic area and challenges in the Indo-Pacific from an aggressively expansionist China. Leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are expected in Madrid. Their shared nightmare: a “no limits” totalitarian Sino-Russian global axis with echoes of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact. Nato is due to publish its 10-yearly “strategic concept” on how to deal with all this, plus trans-national terrorism, destabilising climate change, cyber warfare and the rise of anti-democratic states. It’s a tall order.

### Non-UQ --- No Cohesion (Turkey)

#### Turkey does a little trolling.

Michael L. Crowley & Steven J. Erlanger 22, Crowley is a senior diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau, Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, “For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally,” https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html/micahw

WASHINGTON — When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked.

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member.

Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy.

“These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time.

#### Greece hates Turkey’s guts.

Anthee Carassava 22, Senior International Journalist at The Times, “Greek Forces on High Alert over Crisis with Turkey,” https://www.voanews.com/a/greek-forces-on-high-alert-over-crisis-with-turkey/6598746.html/micahw

Greece’s armed forces are on high alert in the Eastern Aegean Sea as tensions escalate with Turkey. Officials have been responding to what they say are mounting provocations by Turkey’s leadership.

Senior Greek Defense Ministry sources say the military intelligence they have gathered point to the prospect of so-called hybrid threats that Greece may face from its neighbor Turkey as the two NATO allies compete for oil and gas drilling rights in contested parts of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.

The points of friction between the two countries are many.

A crisis, the sources say, may also spring from a sudden surge in refugee flows from Turkey, or from unexpected wildfires in remote locations or islands in the Aegean Sea that Turkey wants to see demilitarized.

Some security analysts say that while Turkey’s recent actions – including the bellicose remarks of its leader – are serious, an armed conflict is unlikely. Retired General Leonidas Tzoumis said both countries stand to lose from a military confrontation, but he warned that Turkish actions may lead to a miscalculation. That prospect, he said, requires heightened vigilance by Greece's armed forces.

Tzoumis said Greece is facing what he calls a classic Turkish game of controlled escalation, one of repeated provocations that can trigger a serious enough incident that would eventually force Greece to negotiate matters like the Aegean Sea dispute and territorial rights that Greece has been refusing to discuss because – the analyst said - it does not want to cede an inch.

Greece and Turkey have been at odds for decades over rights to the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. They are also locked in a fierce arms race that has them spending among the highest amounts in defense compared to other NATO member states.

Turkey has the second largest army in the NATO alliance.

U.S. reluctance is blocking Ankara from obtaining a fresh batch of American-made F-16 fighter jets it needs to crush Kurdish separatists in its north. Some officials in the United States and western Europe have voiced concerns that a rearmed Turkey could pose a threat to Greece and others in the region.

Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he was cutting off all contact with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis because of an address the Greek leader made to the U.S. Congress, urging it to keep blocking the sale.

Mitsotakis also sealed a deal for F-35 fighter jets, dashing hopes of a détente in relations with Turkey, despite a March meeting with Erdogan in which the two men agreed to avoid “provocations” as the war in Ukraine rages.

Turkey has since carried out what Greek officials say is an unprecedented surge in violations of Greek airspace. Refugee flows are spiking again. Turkey has recently sent out an exploratory vessel to the Aegean. This week, Ankara openly contested Greek sovereignty over 23 islands, many of them populated and some of them tourist destinations favored by Americans and Europeans.

Mitsotakis warns that any serious threat from Turkey will not go unanswered. In a bid to rally European support, he has been meeting key European leaders, presenting them with the worrying intelligence report and a list of what Greece considers Turkish provocations.

In remarks Tuesday at a news conference, Mitsotakis said he was – in his words - not interested in psychoanalyzing Turkey’s behavior, nor would he engage in what he called ‘this play of bellicose remarks.’ But Mitsotakis told reporters provocations will not and should not be tolerated, especially from a country that says it wants to join the European Union.

Mitsotakis said he would push his EU counterparts to issue a strong protest against Turkey when they meet at a summit in late June.

Until then, military officials warn, Greece’s armed forces will continue to remain on alert.

#### They are throwing a hissy-fit over American F-16s---that’s straining their relationship.

W. Robert Pearson 22, Former Ambassador of the United States to Turkey and Director of Human Resources in the Foreign Service, “Turkey back at the barricades,” https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-back-barricades/micahw

Turkey is walking a narrow line. For now, NATO states are acting as if these difficulties will be settled. Turkey has a right to raise its concerns. Finland and Sweden have a right to explain their views. Delaying the membership process too long could escalate the level of NATO’s frustration with Turkey. Moreover, Turkey enjoys freedom from NATO sanctions on Russia. Turkey is benefiting from those exceptions financially and diplomatically by remaining officially neutral to Russia even as it supplies arms to Ukraine. Additionally, Turkey is no longer playing an active role as mediator. The real arrangement to settle the war will be up to Russia and Ukraine. Congress likely will hold up any approval of the F-16 deal until the obstacles to Swedish and Finnish memberships are removed.

Mr. Erdoğan has now added the United States to his list of countries to once again attack. The more the Turkish president feels empowered to criticize the United States and the administration that was willing to reach out to him, the less likely it is he will ever see the F-16s and the modernization kits. The longer he holds up approval of Finland’s and Sweden’s applications for membership, the more questions will arise about Turkey’s current role in the Russian war on Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has even said he is not opposed to these new memberships per se. If Turkey asks for too much, Ankara might lose much more than it bargained for.

#### Turkey will never say yes to Sweden/Finland.

Natasha Turak 22, Senior International Correspondent for CNBC, “'The stakes here are now massive': Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland,” https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/will-turkey-block-nato-membership-for-sweden-and-finland.html/micahw

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has doubled down on his opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the NATO alliance, a move that would be historic for the two Nordic countries in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

"We will not say 'yes' to those [countries] who apply sanctions to Turkey to join security organization NATO," Erdogan said at a news conference late Monday. He was referring to Sweden's suspension of weapons sales to Turkey in 2019 over its military activities in Syria.

Sweden's Foreign Ministry said Monday that it planned to send senior officials joining with officials from Finland to the Turkish capital of Ankara to address Erdogan's objections. But the Turkish leader essentially said they'd be wasting their time.

"Will they come to persuade us? Excuse us, but they shouldn't bother," Erdogan said. He added that the two countries joining would make NATO "a place where representatives of terrorist organizations are concentrated."

### Non-UQ --- Concept broad now

#### The strategic concept will cover a wide range of issues inevitably.

Webber 6/24/22 [Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics, University of Birmingham; “Ukraine war: Nato summit to meet in a world reordered by Russian aggression and Chinese ambition”; The Conversation; June 24, 2022; https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-nato-summit-to-meet-in-a-world-reordered-by-russian-aggression-and-chinese-ambition-184882]//eleanor

The most substantive item on the agenda is an updating of Nato’s key Strategic Concept – which sets the alliance’s values and strategic objectives for the next decade. The current version, adopted in 2010, has served Nato well – but it was based on premises that no longer apply. Then, the global war on terror and Nato’s role in expeditionary operations as far afield as Afghanistan were what determined its purpose. Now, according to deputy secretary general Mircea Geoană, speaking at a conference in Copenhagen on June 10, Nato is more preoccupied with a new era of what he referred to as great power competition – focusing on Russia and China. It seems certain that a new document will be adopted. Russian belligerence has helped forge agreement, as has a growing appreciation of the “systemic challenges” posed by China. The multiple challenges of Nato’s security environment mean the document will pay attention to many other issues. Some will be quite separate from Russia and China – climate change, global health and terrorism among them. But others – hybrid and asymmetric threats, the militarisation of space, cyber security and the geostrategic importance of the Arctic and the Asia-Pacific – will be intimately connected to calculations concerning Moscow and Beijing.

#### Non unique – its already expanding to cyberattacks, China, and adding new members.

Feldscher 22 [Jacqueline Feldscher is senior national security correspondent at Defense One.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept Will Add China’s Threats, US Ambassador Says”; Defense One; June 1, 2022; https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/06/natos-next-strategic-concept-will-add-chinas-threats-us-ambassador-says/367613/]//eleanor

Even as a war rages in its own backyard, NATO will use its highly anticipated summit later this month to look beyond the concerns of the moment and address the threat posed by China for the first time in a major document, a top American official told reporters on Wednesday. Much of the conversation at the upcoming summit in Madrid is still expected to focus on deterring Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine and considering the applications from Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. But the strategic concept to be unveiled at the summit must encompass the next decade, which will see threats from China and emerging technology such as cyber attacks, said Julianne Smith, the United States’ permanent representative to NATO. “We are largely in agreement that Russia is the preeminent challenge, the primary threat that the NATO alliance is facing in this moment, and because of that, you’ll see a heavy emphasis on Russia right out of the gates at the top,” Smith said at an event hosted by the Defense Writers Group. “There is also an appreciation across NATO that this document is not intended to last for a week. This document…is supposed to last for 10 years.” NATO’s current strategic concept was released in 2010, four years before Russia annexed Crimea and years before major cyber attacks were commonplace. The 36-page document does not mention China; it also says the alliance seeks “a true strategic partnership” and more cooperation with Russia. The new, not-yet-finalized document set to be released in Spain will include the first mention of China in a NATO strategic concept, Smith said—though a statement released in June 2021 after an alliance summit in Brussels said that China’s “growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.” NATO leaders are also expected to address cooperation between Russia and China and how it affects the alliance, Smith said. NATO members have been united in their condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The alliance itself has provided no military support to Ukraine, a non-member, but many member countries, including the United States, have shipped billions of dollars worth of arms to Kyiv in addition to money for humanitarian aid and economic recovery. Besides the long view of the strategic concept, Smith said, NATO leaders might also release a communique or political declaration about the current threat posed by Russia and the war in Ukraine. NATO, which includes countries in Europe plus the United States and Canada, is seeking to expand its relationships with governments outside the region, and has invited leaders from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea to attend the summit in Madrid, Smith said. Smith said there is no talk of an Indo-Pacific-focused council within NATO, but added that bringing in partners from the region can help share lessons about Chinese and Russian cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns. “It’s been interesting for me to watch countries in the Asia-Pacific talk about hybrid threats on their side of the Pacific…from China. Then you pair that with an Estonian or a Lithuanian, and they talk about some of the challenges that they’re seeing from Russia,” she said. One of the biggest questions to be addressed at the summit is how many troops or weapons NATO will position on its border with Russia in the medium and long term, Smith said. NATO ramped up its presence on its eastern front when the war in Ukraine began, but it’s not clear how long those troops will stay, or what the force posture will look like if the fighting ends. There’s also the question of whether Finland and Sweden, which applied to join NATO last month, will be welcomed into the alliance by the summit in late June amid Turkish opposition because of the Nordic countries’ views on terrorism. NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday that he will meet in “in the coming days” in Brussels with senior officials from Turkey, Finland, and Sweden to discuss Turkish concerns. “I’m confident that we will find a united way forward,” Stoltenberg said during a press conference at the State Department.

### Non-UQ --- No Coord Now

#### No coordination now --- U.S. too unpredictable

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

The concept is a guiding document, now under development, intended to revitalise NATO’s purpose and core tasks for the future. After former US President Donald Trump’s and French President Emmanuel Macron’s respective accusations of NATO being “obsolete” and “brain dead”, the alliance is in grave need of a new concept that brings the US and Europe together to tackle the security challenges of today and tomorrow. The problem, however, is that the two sides are not entirely coordinated on how to do that. Compared to the Trump era, divisions among the allies are not nearly as evident. But given Washington’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific over Europe and flawed coordination efforts thus far, its allies have some doubts about how America’s intentions regarding NATO will mesh with their own. Europe, for its part, is in some ways stronger than ever—thanks to four years of consolidating its own interests and capabilities in response to growing US unpredictability. Now, it finds itself sometimes at odds with Washington over key issues such as China, strategic autonomy and even technology. Simultaneously, it is more capable of defending its positions. Given the domestic political volatility in the US, its allies are skeptical about what US decisions will last through the next presidential elections. This means their own decisions matter even more. All of these dynamics complicate the crafting of NATO’s future common agenda.

### Non-UQ --- Cyber

#### The strategic concept will already discuss cyber.

Garamone 22 [Jim Garamone is a Reporter at U.S. Department of Defense; “Russia Forcing Changes to NATO Strategic Concepts”; US Department of Defense; June 1, 2022; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3049900/russia-forcing-changes-to-nato-strategic-concepts/]//eleanor

Even before the Russian invasion, the Madrid Summit was poised to be a game-changer for the alliance. The summit crown jewel was to be the agreement on a new strategic concept for the alliance. Much has changed since the last time NATO leaders approved a strategic concept in 2010. "Even before February 24, there was a deep appreciation across the alliance that the language on Russia from 2010 was sorely outdated and needed a significant upgrade and needed to reflect the current environment," Smith said. "There was also an appreciation that China, for the first time, needed to be part of the strategic concept." In addition, the concept must address new threats and challenges, including "a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, [and] more on climate change," she said. And then, Russia again invaded its neighbor, which added new demands and complexities to the summit. Now, there is a force-posture piece to discussions in Madrid. The allies — including the United States — have sent thousands of service members to the alliance's frontline states to deter Putin. The number of NATO battlegroups in those states increased from four to eight. Biden has pledged to defend every inch of NATO territory. The allies will discuss how the long-range footprint of NATO forces in Europe should look. "What over the medium- and long-term should the alliance be looking to do in that neighborhood to reinforce NATO's eastern flank?" Smith asked. Another response to the Russian invasion is applications by Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. The two nations, long NATO partners, have military capabilities that would fit seamlessly into the alliance, Smith said. "The hope is that those two countries will join us in Madrid as invitees," she said. China, too, is a concern. The foreign ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea will join NATO leaders in Madrid. Smith believes this will broaden "the conversation about our shared security, … talking to them about things like emerging and disruptive technologies and cyber," she said.

### Non UQ --- Emerging Tech

#### The strategic concept will expand NATO’s emerging tech cooperation inevitably.

Harper 6/1/22 [Jon Harper is the Managing Editor of DefenseScoop. He covers the Pentagon and military technology. ; “Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept”; Fed Scoop; June 1, 2022; https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%ef%bf%bc/]//eleanor

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday. The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation. There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington. Smith did not elaborate on what the emerging technologies are, and FedScoop did not have the opportunity to ask her about them before the meeting with reporters ended. However, individual members of NATO have already their signaled interest and concerns about unmanned systems, AI, autonomy and hypersonics, among other emerging capabilities. For example, last week senior Pentagon officials and their U.K. counterparts signed an Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Statement of Intent, setting shared strategic objectives related to AI readiness. The agreement “will deepen AI cooperation between the two Allies, maintaining and increasing interoperability and promoting values-based global leadership for the responsible development, procurement, and use of AI in defense,” according to a DOD news release. Non-NATO members from the Asia-Pacific region will also be attending the summit for the first time, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The threat posed by Russia and China will be addressed during discussions and in the new Strategic Concept. At the meeting leaders will have an opportunity “to have a conversation about what we’re both seeing. It’s been interesting for me to watch, say, countries in the Asia-Pacific talk about hybrid threats on their side of the Pacific, how are they grappling with disinformation, cyberattacks, the aggressive tactics that they’re seeing, acts of intimidation from China. And then you pair that with an Estonian or a Lithuanian and they talk about some of the challenges that they’re seeing from Russia,” Smith said. “It’s about sharing lessons learned, sharing new policies that we’re developing. We’ve had a number of conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies [and] how are we grappling with that,” she added.

### Non-UQ --- Concept = EDT Now

#### Strategic Concept will already include a focus on emerging tech – link is non-unique

Harper 6-1 -- (Jon Harper, 6-1-2022, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept￼," FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%ef%bf%bc/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

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#### Strategic Concept will include focus on emerging technology and hybrid/cyber threats regardless of the plan – direct statement from NATO general days ago – proves lack of link uniqueness.

Tucker 6-17 -- (Patrick Tucker, 6-17-2022, "New NATO Strategic Concept Will Broaden Vision of Deterrence," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/06/new-nato-strategic-concept-will-broaden-vision-deterrence/368366/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

The new NATO Strategic Concept set to be unveiled later this month will press alliance members to envision deterrence as a matter not just of tanks and bombs but of supply chain security, cyberattacks, climate change, innovation, and more. “The strategic concept needs to be able to live for the next decade, so it looks far beyond the current crisis in Ukraine. It looks at the implications for our security of…climate change, innovation, the use of…hybrid warfare, cyber war and the role of cyber in our societies. But also resilience. How resilient are our Western societies to these kind of attacks and what do we need to do in order to tackle that?” David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said on Friday during the Defense One Tech Summit. Much has changed since NATO’s most recent strategic concept document came out in 2010, Van Weel said. Even before Russia launched a brutal war on the alliance’s doorstep, its members had growing concern about China’s rise, its influence over emerging technology, and its outsized share of the world’s electronics supply. The new concept will reflect the fact that future threats to alliance members won’t be purely military. “Supply chain was not an issue 10 years ago. We were still globalizing. We were working on the basis of just-in-time, just-enough logistic routes. And now we've seen with the pandemic, with the economic vision that China tends to use against countries or the fact that a simple container vessel can get stuck in the Suez Canal for two weeks, how fragile we are,” he said. “Safety and security is much more than building a border and having soldiers behind it. It's also about being able to…look after yourself and be independent.” While the strategic concept will bring new emphasis to non-military threats, it won’t short-change military deterrence, a need dramatically demonstrated by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. “I don't think it's either/or. We see now in Ukraine that what they need, mostly, now in order to stop the advancements of Russia in the Donbas is heavy artillery. And I think many people would have said two years ago that heavy artillery is probably not something we'll see in a conflict in the near future in Europe,” Van Weel said. “So we shouldn't be quickly drawing conclusions on what means are obsolete, or needed. But I think it is safe to say that in addition to that classical military deterrence and defense, there is an aspect to deterrence and defense that needs to take into account all these other [things] whether they are in energy supplies, supply chains, cyber, or in innovation and technology that can be used against us. “I'm pretty confident that all these aspects will feature prominently in the new strategic concept.”

### Non-UQ --- NATO does EDT Now

#### NATO leading on EDT now --- disproves the link

Wodecki 5/4/22

(Ben, “NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China,” pg online @ <https://aibusiness.com/document.asp?doc_id=777260> //um-ef)

The pair cited AI projects being undertaken by adversaries, including China’s attempts to develop purported mind-controllable drones and AI assistants for fighter pilots. But NATO allies have their own capabilities – including U.S.-developed autonomous tanks and British-made systems that provide ground troops with information on the surrounding terrain. The think tank’s study suggests that at present, NATO is leading the AI race – but risks losing its competitive advantage to peer competitors “competitors if allies fail to leverage the private sector, coordinate implementation and engage with the public.” CEPA suggests that NATO allies should accelerate AI adoption and actively encourage private sector innovation. “Ultimately, we hope that these recommendations enable NATO allies to better innovate, scale, deploy, and integrate AI and autonomy-based technologies to form agile, system-wide solutions. NATO to test quantum and hypersonics NATO has found itself on the ropes of late – it’s had to contend with Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, increasing missile tests from a rambunctious North Korea and the ever-growing technological might of China. Last October, it signaled AI as a potentially game-changing addition to its arsenal, with its members formally adopting an AI strategy to try and maintain a technological edge against its adversaries. That strategy includes plans to spend $1 billion to “futureproof” the security pact. New test centers will open in both Europe and North America that will focus on several technologies, including AI, autonomy, quantum and hypersonics, among others. Separate from its strategy, NATO is also planning on setting up DIANA, or Defense Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic, which models itself as a transcontinental version of the U.S.’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DIANA will be tasked with managing the NATO Innovation Fund, which will receive $82.6 million a year for 15 years.

#### Emerging tech/AI focus within NATO is happening now – codifying and enhancing it through the Strategic Concept is necessary to combat rising hybrid threats and build multinational capacity for resilience.

Dolan 6-8 -- (Chris Dolan, 6-8-2022, "NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept Must Enhance Digital Access and Capacities," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki

This month in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will update its Strategic Concept, the principal document that guides the alliance’s political-military strategy and collective defense operations. The war in Ukraine has put resilience in the face of Russian aggression front and center, especially in the cyber and information operation domains. Over the years, NATO has digitized and enhanced its security platforms, emphasizing interoperability of systems among its now 30 current member states. If NATO is to become more resilient against advanced persistent threats, hackers, and the maligned states that sponsor them, then the 2022 Strategic Concept must infuse multinational warfighting and deterrence against hybrid threats with methods that facilitate access to data and information sharing on its platforms and across multiple domains, namely in air, cyber, information, land, maritime, and space operations. The 2022 Strategic Concept The Strategic Concept is among NATO’s most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment. But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled “Active engagement, Modern Defense,” contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace,” even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China’s territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition. The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO’s Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO’s military and civilian personnel use them. ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing. ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces. Plug and Play The 2022 Strategic Concept encourages collaboration in the implementation of guidelines and procedures through a “plug-and-play” concept, in which platforms and systems are optimized for readiness and response at lightning speed. Plug-and-play is based on approaches used in commercial software that allow for innovation and easy access to networks and systems through secure platforms. The NATO School Oberammergau should offer platform training and education courses programs in mobile access for ACT and ACO personnel with appropriate security clearances. This would allow them to access the appropriate platform and utilize data and information necessary for their tasks and responsibilities. For example, NATO’s Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (MA) Information Sharing Platform contains rich and publicly available datasets on the roles played by the alliance in mitigating the illicit trade in small arms, tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels. It reports and updates NATO-funded projects to prevent adversaries from acquiring these weapons. However, the SALW-MA platform is outdated and not user friendly, impeding its functionality in practice. Put simply, NATO’s ACT and ACO should focus as much on easing access to information as it does on advanced technologies and conventional weaponry. This would provide NATO with useful tools to access data and intelligence on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and in land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains using devices and platforms that can seamlessly connect in different locations. But NATO Commands cannot simply expect its existing personnel to adapt. They must be trained and educated on a regular basis to use digital infrastructures in ways that make their jobs easier. On the strategic level, the 2022 Strategic Concept must provide NATO’s political and military leaders with flexibility and resources to discern the diversity of hybrid threats in the environment. NATO’s strategic planners, cyber operators, and warfighters should be trained and educated in relevant digital platforms, access, and sharing data and information in ways that improve collaborative decision-making and collective defense. On the operations level, personnel must be given enough space to share data and intelligence as well as to train tactical level personnel on software that enables them to collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information quickly and easily across multiple domains. Addressing these challenges is difficult for just one nation-state, let alone for all 30 NATO members. Therefore, the 2022 Strategic Concept should emphasize connectivity between member states in multi-domain operations and in collaboration with the private sector and academia. Accessibility to information and data sharing among NATO members should be securitized and harmonized. Essential Role of Artificial Intelligence The challenge for NATO is not necessarily adopting and investing in emerging and disrupting technologies for collective defense. Rather, the question is whether ACT and ACO can enhance accessibility to digital platforms and ease communications between platforms. Here, artificial intelligence (AI) can play a role in overcoming critical obstacles. AI is now occupying a greater space in NATO’s collective defense orientation. The challenge in the 2022 Strategic Concept will be delineating the degree to which AI will enhance the ability of the alliance to analyze information and assess data. Moreover, AI is only as good as the data it relies on. To maintain its technological edge, in 2021 NATO released an Artificial Intelligence Strategy, a good step toward maximizing interoperability of weapons systems, improving infrastructure, and building resilient hybrid defenses. While it emphasizes collaboration with the private sector and academia, the strategy needs further refinement as AI would help NATO’s military and civilian personnel interlink devices on different platforms, perform rigorous data analytics, and quicken response time in response to a conventional or hybrid attack. One innovation is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). DIANA leverages partnerships among academics, technology companies, start-up firms to address the full spectrum of threats in the security environment. Private sector firms utilizing DIANA can access innovation sites and test centers that focus on artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, autonomous machines, and biotechnology. In the past, alliance members supported the creation and development of a venture capital Innovation Fund for technology companies and start-ups. The Strategic Concept should support the initiative with sustained public funds in ways that allow for strategic-level planning at ACO and ATO to communicate more effectively at the operational and tactical levels. DIANA and the Innovation Fund are models for the alliance. An existing partnership that is proving effective is NATO’s collaboration with Klarrio, a firm that provides the alliance with innovative real-time data analytics and streaming services to combat disinformation and fake news. Klarrio has partnered with NATO’s Strategic Communications Center (StratCom) to assist the alliance in the information domain by streaming data analysis, processing, and applications analytics to identify and eradicate disinformation for NATO’s strategic-level planners. It supports and updates dashboard services to track suspicious activities in social media platforms, maintains an interactive user interface, generates analytical reports, and uses machine learning to analyze data and information.

### 2AC --- Thumper – AI Regulation

#### NATO has been developing AI initiatives for years

Soare 21 [Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021, 6-11-2021, Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies, GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies] Eric

**Since 2018** **NATO** has launched several initiatives **to support** **allies** **in** **understanding the impact of EDTs on defense**. These include:

the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap, first developed by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and **officially endorsed by allies in 2019**, **which** **identified seven** **critical technologies**, **including AI and machine learning**, big data, autonomy, hypersonics, space technologies, quantum computing and biotechnologies;6

**the** NATO 2030 process, which **prepares the next stage** of **adaptation** **and explores avenues to “future proof**” the alliance in the era of great-power competition and technological competition;

theNATO InnovationBoard**, established** **in** **2020**, **and tasked** **with the implementation of** **the EDTs Roadmap** **and** **coordinating policy** and implementation of innovation efforts across the alliance; and

the Innovation Unit, within the Emerging Security Challenges division, **established in 2020**, **which works on developing** **innovation pipelines and ecosystems across the alliance.**

In addition, **allied-driven initiatives** **such as the U.S.-led AI** **Partnership** **for Defense and limited** **exchanges** **on EDTs in the** **NATO-EU framework**7 **have** also **contributed** **to allied efforts** **in** **this area.**

Since 2020, **the NATO Innovation** **Board** has **presented white** **papers** **on** **all tech**nology **priority areas**. This month, the alliance is expected to publish the Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies and the implementation strategies on AI and big data. **The strategies** **outline five-year goals** **for AI and big data development** **and** **deployment, new agile and dynamic business** **models for AI** **adoption**, and ways to operate AI systems responsibly and in line with democratic values.8

On June 1, **allies** **agreed to establish a new “defense** **innovation** **accelerator** – a new centre to foster greater cooperation among Allies on technology, underpinned with extra funding from nations that decide to participate.”9 **They will be able to** **opt to participate** **in and contribute financially** **to this** **instrument** **to pursue joint collaborative projects in the field of** **defense innovation and EDTs.**

### 2AC --- Thumper – Resilience

#### U.S. will push to expand the mandate to include EDT

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

Adapting to Emerging Threats and Building Resilience Despite its focus on the basics, the US believes NATO must also modernise for a new era of emerging threats. Future-proofing the alliance will mean adapting for cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and disruptive technologies—all of which are insufficiently covered in the last concept. In the new version, the US will advocate for its allies to build resilience to these threats. Washington could champion the establishment of stronger shared resilience requirements for allied nations and capability targets aimed to address these challenges. Some in the US have even advocated for resilience to become a new NATO core task. As part of building resilience, the US will support efforts to strengthen NATO’s cyber defences. The alliance should be a more formidable and proactive actor against persistent Chinese and Russian hacks, espionage, and infiltration of allied networks. Washington will also push allies to do more to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation, investment in sensitive critical infrastructure and other hybrid activities in allied nations, which have serious security implications. For some at NATO, resilience should also include stronger sustainability guidelines and natural disaster response capacities to mitigate shocks from climate change. But given NATO’s limited resources and competing priorities, some in Washington believe climate issues should be left to other international frameworks. While the US will likely support acknowledging climate security in the Strategic Concept, it may wish to accordingly scope NATO’s role in addressing it. In response to the rise of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT), the US supports the alliance’s efforts to maintain its technological edge over Russia and China, including through NATO’s new EDT strategy. However, Washington sees NATO not as a developer of technology, but as a customer. With hesitation among allies to share key data and intellectual property (IP) necessary for the successful co-development of tech, some in the US believe NATO’s added value lies in standardising, adopting and integrating emerging technologies across allied nations. In this spirit, the US will want to make sure the Strategic Concept empowers nascent allied innovation initiatives—including DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—to fulfil this function.

## Link Stuff

### No Link/Link Turn --- Incentives Solve B/L

#### Incentives solve the backlash and in-fighting links

Goodman ‘21

(Matthew P. Goodman is senior vice president for economics and holds the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brooke Roberts is a research associate with the Economics Program at CSIS, “Toward a T12: Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-t12-putting-allied-technology-cooperation-practice> //um-ef)

In addition to encouraging pre-standardization cooperation, Washington could do more to engender trust and cooperation with the private sector on standard setting and related policies. With its extensive firsthand experience, the private sector can help the government better understand the true dynamics of standard-setting rivalries in different standards bodies. Greater public-private exchange of perspectives on the commercial and national security dimensions of emerging technologies would also be valuable. Also, as mentioned above, small amounts of additional funding for government experts’ participation in—though not direction of—international standard-setting work could improve public-private coordination and support U.S.-preferred outcomes. While the focus here has mainly been on technical standards, it is also important for the U.S. government to work closely with allies on aligning regulatory approaches to technology. In addition to promoting positive U.S.-preferred norms such as environmental and social sustainability of technology, these efforts would help minimize the scope for misuse or ethical breaches of new technologies. The OECD Principles on AI, for example, are designed to ensure that development of AI technologies adheres to global democratic and human rights values. The International Bioethics Committee (IBC), housed under UNESCO, is another body working to develop normative requirements to safeguard human rights in the development and use of biotechnologies.

### Link Turn --- Aff key to SC

#### Turn --- including tech discussions key to effective concept and building deterrence

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Intensifying internal political–military dialogue It is clear that NATO’s broad engagement with a range of amorphous crises following the end of the Cold War eroded its own internal political–military dialogue. The art of managing such crises was new to the Alliance, and it relied more on diplomacy and a host of other non-military means to do so, rather than on defence plans and military deterrence. Thus, as NATO – with some difficulty – built experience in crisis management from Bosnia and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Libya, the close communication that had once existed between the North Atlantic Council and SACEUR withered, becoming more contingent in nature. The Strategic Concept should help to rebuild this relationship. By prioritising collective defence and building a narrative of values, the Strategic Concept would invite a dialogue on the compatibility of a broad set of values with a focused military strategy to keep Russia at bay in the Euro-Atlantic area. The challenge will be to sustain this dialogue. The Reflection Group appointed by Stoltenberg rightly emphasised the need to enhance NATO’s political consultations,but gave scant attention to political–military dialogue.48 NATO should consider putting military technology front and centre in this dialogue. Military technology has come a long way, offering vastly enhanced processing power rooted in artificial intelligence (AI), faster loops from decision to strike, and the high speeds of hypersonic weaponry. Of course, rapid change can cause problems that need political framing and guidance. New technology complicates not only inter-service or joint warfare but also multinational warfare and, not least, the civilian decision-making that is meant to lie at the heart of strategy.49 Thus, military technology can be found at the juncture between the NATO priorities of values (democratic control) and defence (at high speed). Technology has already captured high-level political attention in and around NATO. President Biden is set to focus on ‘technologies vital to longterm economic and military power’ in the United States’ competition with other powers, primarily China.50 Britain’s March 2021 Integrated Review aims to ‘grow the UK’s science and technology power in pursuit of strategic advantage’.51 France has been investing heavily in closing the AI gap with China and the United States, and recently undertook its first exercise in space warfare.52 Finally, Stoltenberg’s February 2021 ‘Food for Thought Paper’ identifies NATO’s ‘technological edge’ as a priority.53 NATO should seek to build a sustained political–military dialogue on the strategic implications of new technology in order to bolster its collective-defence posture and its dialogue with like-minded countries.

### Link Turn --- EDT k Effective Concept

#### Only incorporating emerging tech into its new concept makes NATO functional

Allen et al ‘21

(General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” pg online @ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/> //um-ef)

To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment. To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element.

### Link Turn --- Concept too Narrow

#### Concept too narrow --- focused on solidarity undermines deterrence and long-term planning --- including EDT is key

Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21

(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

As NATO prepares to update its Strategic Concept, some might be tempted to regard this moment as an opportunity to push NATO beyond Trump – that is, beyond political division and towards a new era of trans-atlantic solidarity. Such a push is certainly needed, and dovetails with the heightened awareness that in a new geopolitical age, and following the debacle in Afghanistan, democratic values may lack the power to bring allies together and to offer the kind of unified vision required for renewed geopolitical competition. The danger highlighted in this article is that political enthusiasm for renewal might well produce a myopic, inadequate Strategic Concept. NATO has been here before: in 2009–10, eager to move beyond the political divisions built into the war on terror, NATO embraced a Strategic Concept that was perfectly crafted to speak to the Alliance’s broad range of political interests and sensibilities. In an age of contingent crisis management, NATO could muddle through without a clear statement of political–military priorities and defence guidance. In an era of great-power competition, this kind of muddling through would be a calamity. NATO’s post-Crimea adaptation tells the story. NATO responded with political vigour, condemning Russia and placing the burden of change on Moscow while bolstering its own defence and deterrence posture. However, internal political limitations meant that NATO did not develop its thinking on the nature of the threat and the effects that would serve to deter it. By 2016, when Trump burst onto the scene, NATO’s capacity for such in-depth political thinking seemed non-existent. The military authorities seized the initiative, crafting a new military strategy centred on desired effects and deterrence. This first real strategy since the adoption in 1967 of NATO’s Flexible Response strategy was then met with political ambivalence. NATO needs to get its strategic house in order. The political–military divide outlined in this article is real but not yet alarming; a failure to tend to it in the new Strategic Concept would sound the alarm. Confronting Russia while competing with China, digesting the lessons of Afghanistan and developing a range of policy competences in cyber, resilience, outer space, capacity-building and more is indeed a tall political order. Strategy is about priorities, however, and NATO’s priorities must bridge the political– military divide. Thus, the new Strategic Concept could do worse than establish collective defence as an overriding priority; wrap it in a narrative of democratic values necessitating both a rebalanced NATO and collective defence; and invite continuous political–military dialogue on military technology and its strategic implications.

### Link turn --- bioweapons

#### Including bioweapons in the strategic concept improves deterrence.

Finch 22 [Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.; “How NATO can curb Russia’s chemical weapons threat”; Atlantic Council; April 8, 2022; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-nato-can-curb-russias-chemical-weapons-threat/]//eleanor

Amid growing speculation that Russia could employ chemical weapons in its war against Ukraine, NATO has collectively voiced its concern over such an escalation, saying it would “result in severe consequences.” The Alliance has also pledged to increase protective equipment for Ukraine while enhancing its readiness against any chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. But how serious are the chemical and biological threats, and what exactly should NATO do to prepare? The West is right to be concerned. Russia used nerve agents from the Novichok family of chemical weapons to target a former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter in the United Kingdom in 2018 and prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Siberia in 2020. These attacks—predictably denied by Moscow—contradicted Russia’s claims that it destroyed the remnants of its chemical weapons program in 2017. Russia has also propped up a Syrian regime that repeatedly used chemical weapons in its brutal civil war, as well as wielded its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto to shield Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and other responsible individuals in his government from justice. This impunity has set a dangerous precedent that could tempt Russia: If Damascus could get away with it, why can’t Moscow? Meanwhile, Russia has also circulated disinformation about a purported biological weapons program in Ukraine backed by the United States—and even brought these false claims to the UNSC in March (they were swiftly dismissed). Related conspiracy theories have taken off on platforms such as Twitter and Telegram, received air time on US television channels, and were parroted by China. These allegations could set the pretext for a false-flag attack involving chemical weapons that Russia could use to expand its invasion or justify additional military action against Ukraine. While sanctions have destabilized the Russian economy and shrunk the resources available for President Vladimir Putin’s war efforts, he likely already has what he needs to mount chemical attacks in Ukraine. Moves, not just messaging To preempt Russia’s use of chemical or biological weapons, the United States and its NATO allies must publicly demonstrate that the West takes this threat seriously and are prepared to respond. In the past few weeks, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Department of Defense spokesperson John Kirby have done just that, raising these issues on social media and during press conferences. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made clear that any use of chemical or biological weapons would violate international law, while citing worries that the effects of biological or chemical agents would be felt in Ukraine’s neighboring countries (several of which are NATO members). And just as it “pre-bunked” potential Russian false-flag operations before the invasion began, the United States should also aggressively and proactively debunk Russian misinformation about chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, NATO should update its strategy for countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats was last updated in 2009 and does not account for the numerous developments in the international security environment. For example, the document references cooperation with Russia as a key element to curbing WMD proliferation, which is clearly untenable today. Russia has also shown its willingness to flout international norms and use CBRN weapons—so NATO’s new policy must place a corresponding emphasis on the ability to defend against such weapons. The Alliance is set to release its next Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June; by referencing a more relevant CBRN policy in that document, NATO would send a clear message to Moscow that CBRN threats remain top of mind. Messaging, however, is not enough. Words must be backed up by tangible actions. NATO has sent forty thousand troops to allied nations close to Ukraine; they should be reinforced with CBRN defense capabilities. NATO’s top military commander, US Air Force General Tod Wolters, has already activated the Alliance’s Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force, putting it on alert in case it is required to deploy. It can respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack with reconnaissance, sampling, protection, and decontamination capabilities, among others. Deploying this task force to support other military reinforcements along its eastern flank would demonstrate NATO’s practical preparedness to respond to contingencies that could involve CBRN weapons used by Russia. Finally, the US Department of Defense should sustain its support of Ukraine via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was established after the fall of the Soviet Union to secure and destroy Soviet WMD materials. The CTR program has a long history of working with Ukrainian officials to reduce WMD threats by destroying nuclear delivery systems and improving biological safety and security. US efforts can benefit from CTR’s long-standing relationships with Ukrainian government partners to quickly deliver additional supplies and equipment, which could include supporting other US government efforts to provide Ukraine with protective gear in case of a chemical attack. Through coordinated efforts that incorporate public messaging and tangible action, NATO might have a chance to dissuade Russia from escalating the conflict in Ukraine to chemical warfare. But to do that, Moscow needs to know that the use of chemical weapons will not help its ill-fated invasion and will not be tolerated.

### Link turn --- cyber focus good

#### Not recognizing cyber is more confusing for allies – NATO has already made cyber a core part of its mission.

Veenendaal et al 16 [Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. He has been closely involved in the development of cyber defence policy of the ministry of Defence and the principle author of the first Defence Strategy for operating in cyberspace (2012). Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As a legal and policy analyst with over 15 years of experience, her current research focus is on national cyber security strategies and organisational models, in particular cyber aspects of crisis management. She has also consulted on developing cyber security policy and strategy. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army.; “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence; June 2016; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf]//eleanor

NATO has defined two distinct responsibilities concerning cyber defence: (a) collective defence and (b) the protection of NATO networks. In 2011, the NATO Cyber Defence Policy established that “[i]n order to perform the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and crisis management, the integrity and continuous functioning of its information systems must be guaranteed.”6 The Wales Summit Declaration of 2014 expanded on this when the Alliance affirmed that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence, yet the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence of 2014 failed to delineate roles and responsibilities.7 The task of defending the alliance against armed attacks through cyberspace with military means was thereby added on top of a policy for network defence. As long as the NATO Cyber Defence Policy merely recognises that the principle of collective defence is applicable in cyberspace, while limiting possible action to the protection of networks, it will continue to cause confusion among Allies. The principle of collective defence is NATO’s raison d’être and lies at the heart of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It commits the Alliance to protect and defend the Allies’ territory and populations against an armed attack.8 Consequently, the accepted core responsibility of the Alliance in cyberspace is to defend the Allies against armed attacks through cyberspace, when necessary through military means. However, the only means at its disposal is the protection of its own networks and systems. This means that while the Alliance recognises that cyberspace can be used by adversaries to launch an armed attack against it, it is impossible for the Alliance to counter such an attack in and through cyberspace. For NATO, this is rather a novel approach to its responsibilities. It would, for instance, be unimaginable that in response to an armed air attack, NATO would not allow for the use of air power, but would limit its response to the use of air defence systems. While the core tasks of collective defence and the protection of own networks are clearly connected and overlapping responsibilities, they are executed under different political, legal, and organisational frameworks. The responsibility for the protection of its own networks is, in principle, the same for NATO as it is for any other large public or corporate organisation working with sensitive information. It is essential to the security and continuity of these organisations, but it is a task mostly carried out in a peacetime context and day-to-day business setting. Outside of an armed conflict, cyber attacks against NATO as an organisation will be qualified as cyber espionage, cyber crime or, in some cases, information operations; but not as armed attacks. Thus, the organisation has the obligation to protect its networks, systems and data but there is a big difference between guarding duties and combat actions. Likewise, as the Alliance will not use military means to counter these types of cyber attacks, the guiding policy should not be defined in military terminology or integrated into a larger military framework. However, that does not mean that a guiding policy for the use of cyber operations is unnecessary and it certainly does not mean that a network defence policy can substitute a cyber operations policy.

#### NATO cyber defense makes it a more effect alliance.

Veenendaal et al 16 [Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. He has been closely involved in the development of cyber defence policy of the ministry of Defence and the principle author of the first Defence Strategy for operating in cyberspace (2012). Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As a legal and policy analyst with over 15 years of experience, her current research focus is on national cyber security strategies and organisational models, in particular cyber aspects of crisis management. She has also consulted on developing cyber security policy and strategy. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army.; “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence; June 2016; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf]//eleanor

Given modern armed forces’ dependency on digital technology, it is legitimate to expect that NATO would adapt to this new reality. Since 2002, NATO has invested significantly in improving the defence of its networks. However, NATO has shown little inclination to move away from its current purely defensive posture in cyber defence. At the political level, Allies remain reticent when it comes to discussing the options of using military (offensive) capabilities within a NATO setting. For most of them, cyber operations are generally still uncharted territory in which confusion abounds. Moreover, Allies that have invested heavily in cyber capabilities worry that others might benefit without making a similar investment themselves. Allies therefore remain reluctant to engage in any meaningful discussion on the position and role of cyber capabilities in military operations within the Alliance. In order to achieve a more mature and realistic cyber defence posture, the Alliance must address two important issues. Firstly, it must clearly recognise that network defence does not equal collective defence in cyberspace. Secondly, given that NATO accepts the applicability of collective defence in cyberspace, Allies should develop the full range of military capabilities to defend the Alliance and its interests.

### Link turn --- NATO AI and biotech focus good

#### NATO leadership in EDTs improves deterrence – includes biotechnology and AI.

Soare 21 [Dr Simona R. Soare is a Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis. Simona analyses trends in emerging and disruptive technologies and their impact on transatlantic and European security and defence.; “Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”; GMF; June 11, 2021; https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies]//eleanor

Five steps could transform NATO into an innovator in its strategic environment: establishing a civil-military technology assessment capability; prioritizing systemic innovation targets; setting ambitious benchmarks linking innovation to capability development, deterrence, defense, and resilience; doubling down on collaborative innovation so that no ally gets left behind in the innovation competition; and committing to more ambitious NATO-EU cooperation. Throughout NATO’s history, defense innovation has been critical to its technological edge and its deterrence and defense posture against multiple threats. The unprecedented progress in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) offers the prospect and challenge of transformative defense innovation for allied armed forces and societies at large. Technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, advanced robotics, biotechnologies and human enhancement, quantum technologies, big-data analytics, and fifth-generation telecommunication systems, as well as growing autonomy in the critical functions of military systems, promise to change how wars are fought, how fast, where, and by whom. These technologies enable new forms of military presence, coercive action, and power projection in and across old and new domains (for example, cyberspace and outer space) and below and above the conventional threshold of armed conflict. However, NATO and the transatlantic allies are neither the only nor the most agile actors investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. China and Russia already invest substantially in and have accelerated their adoption of these technologies in military applications. To maintain its strategic advantage against China and Russia, NATO needs to become an agent of innovation and be more agile and strategic in supporting allies to jointly exploit new technologies for deterrence, defense, and resilience purposes. NATO has prioritized EDTs and signaled it has joined “the technological adoption race” against China and Russia.1 Much work remains to be done. Allies remain divided on the ethical and legal specifics of the military use of EDTs and by their national-industrial preferences. Technological capacity across the alliance also varies significantly and, as always, funding is in short supply. Concrete decisions on how to consolidate innovation in EDTs, a critical task for NATO’s mission and future adaptation, are expected at this month’s Brussels summit. Specifically, allies will respond to calls for a “strategic surge” in EDTs2 innovation by establishing a Defense Innovation Accelerator, an opt-in instrument funded through dedicated national contributions, which NATO hopes will incentivize innovation and transatlantic cooperation on emerging technologies.3 As NATO prepares to embark on the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies, this brief takes stock of its ongoing efforts in this field. It examines what drives the alliance’s efforts to exploit EDTs for defense innovation and what it would take for NATO to become an innovator in an environment of unprecedented technological progress and great-power competition. NATO’s ongoing efforts in innovation and EDTs are a step in the right direction. However, to survive in a world of multipolar great-power competition and deliver security to its members, it needs to innovate, not just to adapt incrementally. NATO needs a new framework in which innovation drives adaptation, rather than the other way round as is currently the case. Investing now in the establishment of a resilient innovation capability for the whole of the alliance is a long-term investment in the future of NATO and a strategic necessity. In addition to ongoing efforts, NATO allies should consider five further steps: establishing a NATO civil-military technology assessment capability; prioritizing systemic innovation targets; setting ambitious benchmarks linking innovation to capability development, deterrence, defense, and resilience; doubling down on collaborative innovation so that no ally gets left behind in the innovation competition; and committing to more ambitious NATO-EU cooperation. NATO, Innovation, and Emerging Technologies In NATO and the armed forces of 30 allies, technology-driven defense innovation4 is an ongoing process that encompasses transformational or disruptive innovation—“revolutions in military affairs”—and evolutionary, incremental, or sustained innovation. The alliance has solid experience and practice in defense innovation and technology assessment, not least because defense innovation is seen as a crucial part of continuous adaptation to its strategic environment.5 However, the commercialization of digital emerging technologies critical to allied security and defense, the ongoing technological competition with great powers such as China and Russia, and its own inertial bureaucratic procedures challenge NATO’s capacity to innovate.

### No Link --- No Fracturing on cyber

#### No fracturing – NATO members already agree that cybersecurity needs to be a priority.

Csepregi et al. 21 [Zsolt Csepregi is the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest based foreign policy think tank. He is a security policy expert focusing on the Eastern-Mediterranean region, specialised in Israeli foreign and security policy. Zsolt obtained his MA degree in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest and also pursued studies at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Currently he is pursuing a PhD in War Studies at the National University of Public Service of Hungary.; Péter Dobrowiecki, Dominik Jankowski, Danielle Piatkiewicz, dr. Tomasz Smura, Matej Spišák; “The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass”; Casimir Pulaski Foundation; 2021; https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/the-v4-towards-a-new-nato-strategic-concept.pdf]//eleanor

This issue, over which there are no major disagreements among V4 states, comprises cybersecurity and the development of the alliance’s resilience in cyberspace. All member states agree that this new operational domain has become vital in all types of conflicts, and therefore must be a key area of cooperation amongst NATO members. Our experts also noted that cyber resilience is an area where cohesion can be achieved at the lowest cost. This does not diminish the importance of the topic at hand; rather, it shows us that there are still key challenges which have to be overcome in the near future. Despite the fact that it is not a physical area of operations, cyberspace cannot be separated from the aforementioned geopolitical tensions. It is also connected with the question of the alliance’s stance towards Russia and China; both of these countries have robust capabilities in cyberspace, which they are keen to utilise in the developing great power competition. This factor is also relevant on a lower level, connected to other disruptive and hostile powers such as Iran or North Korea, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations. The V4 countries naturally have lower levels of readiness in cyberspace than the great powers do; however, it is entirely possible for small and medium-sized powers to enhance their resilience against cyberattacks. For example, Estonia reacted (with the support of NATO) to Russian cyber aggression, and developed robust defensive infrastructure and practices, which should be emulated by other countries. Due to its limited size, resources, demography, and industrial capacity, Estonia could not aspire to such a power position in terms of conventional warfare. International cooperation in cyber resilience is also a force multiplier, and no country can or should rely solely on itself. Thus, it is in the interests of security and political stability to have more pronounced cooperation in this field. The V4 can be a champion in this area: Poland is a great example of the rapid development of the cyber industry, deeply anchored in the transatlantic alliance. The security environment in the 21st century is fundamentally different to any time in the past. The geopolitics of today is not about the possession of territory and material resources, but about the interdependence of economies and companies, as well as the incorporation of new technologies, such as 5G networks and AI, often developed either in the US or China. In such an environment, NATO should incorporate defence capabilities into the fields of cyberspace, countering fake news, human trafficking, and weaponising migration.

#### NATO cooperation over emerging technology is key to NATO superiority

Simon and Arteaga 22 [Luis Simón is Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels Office, in addition of being Research Professor of International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of London, and a MA in European Studies from the Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). Félix Arteaga is a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, UNED). He has a doctorate in International Relations and a BSc in Political Science from Madrid’s Universidad Complutense.; “NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept”; Real Instituto Elcano; January 17, 2022; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/]//eleanor

Industrial cooperation and technological innovation is a subject that has been gaining ground in NATO circles in recent years, particularly with regard to emerging and disruptive technologies. It is true that the economic interests of the companies based in the member countries differ, and that so far NATO has not managed to consolidate the channels of existing collaboration. Furthermore, the EU’s aspiration to attain strategic autonomy, and the particular attention it pays to the technological-industrial aspect of defence, heralded another episode of transatlantic discord, now on the way to being healed thanks to the concept of so-called ‘open’ strategic autonomy, which will enable non-EU-member allies to take part in its industrial and technological initiatives. Added to the discrepancies between allies there is now the need to address the challenge posed by emerging technologies and those threatening to disrupt the traditional military superiority of the Alliance. In this context, the NATO 2030 report emphasises the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological lead over possible rivals and warns of the progress made by China in terms of innovation. The adoption of NATO’s first Artificial Intelligence strategy in 2021, the setting up of the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the launch of the NATO Innovation Fund in October 2021[13] are tangible progress in the chapter of technological innovation and is destined to play a prominent role in the Madrid summit and Strategic Concept.

#### Tech interoperability improves NATO’s cohesion.

Kunertova 18 [Dominika Kunertova works as a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies think tank at ETH Zurich, where she reads, writes, and comments on the geopolitics of emerging and disruptive technologies, military robotics, and transatlantic security and defence cooperation.; “An Alliance Divided?”; Army University Press; January-Febuary 2018; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/]//eleanor

Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31 Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

#### No tradeoff – incorporating emerging tech cooperation into the strategic concept makes NATO deterrence more effective and modern

Thomson and Stacey 6/19/22 [Sir Adam Thomson, former United Kingdom ambassador to NATO, is now director of the European Leadership Network, a not-for-profit network of leaders working for a safer Europe. Sir Graham Stacey, former chief of staff of NATO Transformation, is senior consulting fellow at the European Leadership Network.; “NATO’s next Strategic Concept: Getting modern deterrence right”; The Hill; June 19, 2022; https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3529051-natos-next-strategic-concept-getting-modern-deterrence-right/]//eleanor

But while strong defense is necessary for deterrence, it does not guarantee it. For effective collective defense in unstable times, the 2022 Strategic Concept must deliver modern deterrence fit for the next decade. That means changes from the 2010 Concept, which was written for a less demanding era. The new wording should adapt existing text but give sharper focus and clearer intent. The 2022 Concept should move the Alliance beyond 2010’s purely military conception of deterrence to modern, full-spectrum deterrence in peace, crisis and war, using all the tools available to NATO and developing intellectual capital on deterrence across all levels of the Alliance. Agreed NATO language since 2010 already recognises the need for modern deterrence to be full spectrum. But the 2022 Concept should further guide Allies on how. Four quite simple adjustments would make NATO’s deterrence more effective at lower risk and lower cost. First, resilience. The first segment of the deterrence spectrum is to deny your enemy the ability to damage or coerce you. Allies are already sharply focused on things like diversifying energy supplies and defending against cyberattack. Last year, they agreed, painfully, on reviewing each other’s resilience, because to an important degree the Alliance is only as strong as its weakest link. But national resilience wasn’t explicitly part of 2010 deterrence. It needs to be made integral in 2022. Second, communication. Deterrence is all about what goes on in the mind of the adversary. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows just how spectacularly Moscow can miscalculate not only its next-door neighbour Ukraine but also the West as a whole. The Alliance needs not just the capability and credible will to defend itself but also the ability to communicate those facts accurately to its adversaries. Far more than in 2010, the new Concept must say how NATO will enhance its channels of diplomatic and military communication and use the full potential of its existing ones to plant deterrence, risk reduction and de-escalation with maximum effectiveness into Kremlin and other hostile minds. Third, shaping deterrence through diplomacy. NATO seeks international stability with undiminished security for all. It has always sought negotiated agreements to deliver this. Arms control is in NATO’s DNA, as is the diplomacy with which to deliver it, because arms control can facilitate better deterrence at lower risk and lower cost. The 2010 Concept doesn’t describe arms control and the diplomacy to deliver it as a part of deterrence. The new Concept should make arms control central to NATO’s modern deterrence toolkit, shaping the confrontation with Russia and putting Moscow on the diplomatic defensive. Fourth, updating for the coming decade. Emerging disruptive technologies are already accepted in the 2010 Concept as a part of deterrence. But less is said about their impact on strategic decision making (including nuclear): So many new technologies from hypersonic missiles through space weapons to artificial intelligence can distort or disrupt decisions. The complexity of the interaction of disruptive technologies is an issue in itself. Effective decision making is key to deterrence credibility. So, the 2022 Concept should include not just keeping the Alliance on the technological front edge, understanding the threats and exploiting the opportunities, but also confronting the challenges of technological complexity for NATO decision making. Thus ensuring that mitigation is a central part of Alliance capability and institutional development for the years to come. If the 2022 Concept sets the course, the detailed planning will follow — and NATO will be safer because its deterrence will be stronger.

## Impact Answers

### 2AC --- Thumper – Afghanistan

#### Afghanistan thumps alliance credibility.

Sly 21 [Liz Sly is a correspondent-at-large covering global affairs. She has spent more than 17 years covering the Middle East, including the first and second Iraq wars.; “Afghanistan’s collapse leaves allies questioning U.S. resolve on other fronts”; The Washington Post; August 15, 2021; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\_pacific/afghanistan-chaos-blame-us/2021/08/14/0d4e5ab2-fd3e-11eb-911c-524bc8b68f17\_story.html]//eleanor

LONDON — The Taliban's stunningly swift advances across Afghanistan have sparked global alarm, reviving doubts about the credibility of U.S. foreign policy promises and drawing harsh criticisms even from some of the United States' closest allies. As Taliban fighters entered Kabul and the United States scrambled to evacuate its citizens, concerns grew that the unfolding chaos could create a haven for terrorists, unleash a major humanitarian disaster and trigger a new refugee exodus. U.S. allies complain that they were not fully consulted on a policy decision that potentially puts their own national security interests at risk — in contravention of President Biden's promises to recommit to global engagement. And many around the world are wondering whether they could rely on the United States to fulfill long-standing security commitments stretching from Europe to East Asia. "Whatever happened to 'America is back'?" said Tobias Ellwood, who chairs the Defense Committee in the British Parliament, citing Biden's foreign policy promise to rebuild alliances and restore U.S. prestige damaged during the Trump administration. "People are bewildered that after two decades of this big, high-tech power intervening, they are withdrawing and effectively handing the country back to the people we went in to defeat," Ellwood said. "This is the irony. How can you say America is back when we're being defeated by an insurgency armed with no more than [rocket-propelled grenades], land mines and AK-47s?" As much as its military capabilities, the United States' decades-old role as a defender of democracies and freedoms is again in jeopardy, said Rory Stewart, who was Britain's minister for international development in the Conservative government of Theresa May. "The Western democracy that seemed to be the inspiration for the world, the beacon for the world, is turning its back," Stewart said. Britain has voiced some of the bluntest criticisms of the pullout, which is unusual for a country that regards itself as the United States' closest ally. Britain made the biggest contribution to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and suffered the highest number of casualties after the United States. In comments Friday, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace predicted civil war and the return of al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization whose attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, prompted the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. "I feel this was not the right time or decision to make," he told Sky News. "Of course al-Qaeda will probably come back, and certainly it would like that kind of breeding ground." "Strategically, it causes a lot of problems, and as an international community, it's very difficult . . . what we're seeing today," he added. Rivals of the United States also have expressed dismay. Among them is China, which fears that the ascent of an extremist Islamist government on its western border will foster unrest in the adjoining province of Xinjiang, where Beijing has waged sweeping crackdowns on the Uyghur population that have been denounced by the West. Washington "bears an unavoidable responsibility for the current situation in Afghanistan," Col. Wu Qian, a spokesman for China's Ministry of National Defense, said earlier this month. "It cannot leave and shed the burden on regional countries." Secretary of State Antony Blinken rejected criticisms that the withdrawal damages U.S. credibility. He said staying mired in a conflict that is not in the "national interest" would do far more damage. "Most of our strategic competitors around the world would like nothing better than for us to remain in Afghanistan for another year, five years, 10 years, and have those resources dedicated to being in the midst of a civil war," Blinken told CNN. "It's simply not in our interest." But the manner and implementation of the withdrawal has left allies feeling betrayed, said Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations. Germany’s government, which withdrew its troops in June and is evacuating its embassy, has refrained from overt criticism of the U.S. withdrawal. Nonetheless, some German officials and lawmakers are seething at Washington's failure to consult coalition partners such as Berlin, Clüver Ashbrook said. Germany is particularly concerned about the potential for an exodus of Afghan refugees similar to the influx of 2015, when more than 1 million migrants, spurred largely by the war in Syria, surged into Europe, with many headed for Germany. "The Biden administration came to office promising an open exchange, a transparent exchange with its allies. They said the transatlantic relationship would be pivotal," she said. "As it is, they're playing lip service to the transatlantic relationship and still believe European allies should fall into line with U.S. priorities." "We're back to the transatlantic relationship of old, where the Americans dictate everything. . . . 'Yes we want to partner with you, but in reality, we want to be able to tell you what to do and when,' " she added. The United States' Arab allies, which have long counted on the U.S. military to come to their aid in the event of an attack by Iran, also have faced questions over whether they will be able to rely on the United States. "What's happening in Afghanistan is raising alarm bells everywhere," said Riad Kahwaji, who heads the Inegma security consultancy in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts one of the biggest American military contingents in the Middle East. "The U.S.'s credibility as an ally has been in question for a while," he said. "We see Russia fighting all the way to protect the Assad regime [in Syria], and now the Americans are pulling out and leaving a big chaos in Afghanistan." Clüver Ashbrook said Biden's plan to build an alliance of democracies to counter the influence of China and Russia is also in doubt, now that the West will no longer maintain a significant presence in Central Asia. For China and Russia, there is opportunity as well as concern in the departure of U.S. troops. Both Moscow and Beijing have hosted Taliban delegations in recent weeks in an attempt to pave the way for a post-American future in the region. The humiliating conclusion of the two-decade U.S. venture into Afghanistan will aid their efforts to persuade many governments to seek out relationships elsewhere, analysts say. In a commentary directed at Hong Kong, China's state-run Global Times cited Afghanistan in a signal to democracy activists not to heed repeated American promises to "stand by" Hong Kong. "It has been proven repeatedly that whomever U.S. politicians claim to stand with will face bad luck, plunge into social unrest and suffer severe consequences," the commentary said.

### No Impact --- NATO Detterence

#### NATO and its allies have no deterrence capability – years of underfunding.

Kramer 22 [Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council. Mr. Kramer has served as a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, 6-13-2022, NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/nato-priorities-initial-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war/] Eric

As a starting point, **it is important** **to recognize** that **almost** **all** **NATO nations**, **other than the U**nited **S**tates, **have**—in the words of a recent European Union (EU) analysis—**had** “years of defence underspending, **which has led to an** accumulation **of gaps and shortfalls** in the collective military” capabilities.[1](javascript:void(0))

Most importantly in the context of the current environment, **the** “**capacity to operate full-spectrum** and at high intensity was neglected.”[2](javascript:void(0)) That neglect, and the concomitant need to focus on reestablishing the capacity for high-intensity battle, is well recognized by NATO military leaders. For example, France’s “Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff” specifically sets forth the requirement to be able to “respond…in a high-intensity conflict.”[3](javascript:void(0)) Yet, as a recent RAND report stated: **France’s capacity to sustain** **a high-end**, **conventional** **conflict** nonetheless is limited. The French military might be able to accomplish all its assigned missions at once, but it **lacks depth, meaning** **that such demanding** **operations** would quickly exhaust both its human and material resources.” What is true for France is similarly true for other European militaries, including—perhaps most importantly—**Germany**, which has suffered from years of underspending and strategic neglect. In addition, while operating at a different scale in terms of resources and reach, the US military itself is insufficiently prepared, in particular, in terms of its munitions and supply inventories for a sustained, high-intensity conflict. However, these deficiencies are entirely remediable if appropriate measures are taken.

#### NATO is a “tangled pile of spaghetti.”

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

**The political weaknesses** **are** **matched** **by military ones**. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. **The U.S. security guarantee** to Europe—**with its threat of** **devastating** **conventional** **and**, if necessary, **nuclear response** **to any attack**—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet **the result of this is a colossal dependence** **on** **U.S. capabilities**, **ranging** **from ammunition** **and spare** parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) **to** **military transports** **that move forces** **quickly** **and efficiently** **over long distances**. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, **they will not change** **the fact that only U.S.** **armed forces can move with the** **scale and speed necessary** **to** **defend** territory **from** a country like **Russia**.

Conversely, **the countries that most need defending**—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. **They need advanced weapons**, particularly for air and missile defense, **that they cannot afford themselves**. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet **NATO command structures** and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction **that the European allies** **are** more or less equal partners. **Even military lightweights** **need to** **have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the** **North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.**

**The resulting command structure** is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, **NATO** **has several multinational headquarters**, **one** divisional headquarters **split between Latvia and Denmark**, **another** divisional headquarters **in Poland**, **and a corps headquarters at** **a different location in Poland.** Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because **NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the** **alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members**, **let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible.** Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

#### NATO military exercises are dysfunctional.

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

A further problem is exercises: **NATO** **does not conduct fully** **realistic**, **large-scale rehearsals** of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that **these are costly** **and** **disruptive**. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also **lacking are detailed plans** **for fighting a war against Russia**, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, **countering a Russian attack**, **regaining any temporarily occupied territory**, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

#### NATO can’t work against modern warfare

Lucas 22 [Edward Lucas is a nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 6-7-2022, NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/] Eric

Worse, **NATO** **is unprepared for** **the changing nature of modern** **warfare**. **Russia’s** **old-style assault** on Ukraine is all too familiar. **But the artillery bombardments** **and missile strikes** **that are grinding down** **Ukraine’s defenses are** only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. **The most burning** current **example** **of nonmilitary warfare** **is Russia’s weaponizing** **of hunger**. **By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports**, **Russia has** raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet **NATO is ill-equipped** **to deal with this**. **It cannot mandate more economical use of** **grain**—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. **It cannot build** **new railways to ship** Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. **NATO has little in-house expertise** **in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence** **in African and other countries** **susceptible to Kremlin narratives** **blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.**

#### America dropped the ball by making it clear that they wouldn’t escalate in Ukraine---NATO can’t recover without risking war.

Dr. Nadia C. Schadlow 22, National Security Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, “Why Deterrence Failed Against Russia,” Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-u-s-deterrence-failed-ukraine-putin-military-defense-11647794454/micahw

A credible deterrent is designed to alter a potential aggressor's calculations of risk and reward. Vladimir Putin determined that the potential cost of invading Ukraine was relatively low, and on Feb. 24 he attacked. It will be the job of historians to try to understand why deterrence failed.

Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.

The U.S. spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the U.S. had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.

The White House has consistently broadcast what it won't do, removing a crucial component of deterrence: the ability to amplify risk through ambiguity. Mr. Putin now knows exactly how much to escalate the conflict because U.S. officials have told him exactly what the maximum U.S. response will be.

In early December, President Biden ruled out the possibility of using U.S. military power, stating that any consideration of American combat troops in Ukraine was "off the table." In January, even after trying to explain his comment that a "minor incursion" wouldn't warrant a forceful response, Mr. Biden repeated what he wouldn't do. There wouldn't be "any American forces moving into Ukraine," he said. In February he did it again, explaining that U.S. actions were "totally defensive" and that we "had no intention of fighting Russia."

What is particularly puzzling is that these messages were broadcast against a backdrop of increasing intelligence that Russia was preparing for war. While the White House apparently had a strategy to "aggressively release" intelligence, it concurrently made clear that it wouldn't act on this intelligence to deter Mr. Putin.

Most recently, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discounted the possibility of deploying North Atlantic Treaty Organization warplanes to support the Ukrainian resistance. He explained publicly that he was worried such an arrangement might drag the U.S. and NATO into open conflict with Russia. This view was repeated by top military leaders. The commanding general of the U.S. European Command announced that the American intelligence community had assessed that the "transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine may be mistaken as escalatory." In case this wasn't clear, the command further clarified that it had no plans to "facilitate an indirect, or third party transfer of Polish aircraft."

Such statements consistently play down the will of the U.S. The Biden administration's repeated statements that it is unwilling to escalate under any circumstances increases the risks of unintended escalation. Mr. Putin and his military are calculating American will based on what they see and hear. This is likely why they are acting as though there is little threat of resistance from any power more potent than the Ukrainian military.

This doesn't necessarily mean that the U.S. should deploy its troops to Ukraine or establish a no-fly zone by contesting Russian aircraft. The current bipartisan consensus is that such actions aren't in the American interest. But there is no reason to broadcast our reservations and reveal the weakness of our will.

Why share internal policy discussions and military deliberations with an adversary? A plausible explanation is that the White House has decided to give priority to the U.S. domestic audience, as opposed to signaling to Russia. But by openly taking options off the table, not only does the administration undercut its operational flexibility, it gives the enemy additional clarity. There is value in ambiguity—especially when Russia is a master at it.

The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of "escalate to de-escalate." That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Mr. Putin's ability or willingness to do so.

### No Impact --- Russia

#### Russia won’t escalate---there’s no military, allies, or political incentives for them.

Dr. Limor Simhony 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/micahw

The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale.

Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely.

The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have. Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the U.N. resolution demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia’s side.

These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war. This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West’s aversion to casualties.

The most widely discussed reason is the concern that Russia will use nuclear weapons if NATO intervenes militarily. Putin has reasserted Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, making this a legitimate concern. However, it is more likely that nuclear deterrence—albeit different to Cold War deterrence—will hold. Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons, either against Ukraine or against a NATO member state, could incur devastating consequences for Russia.

As then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said in 2018, dismissing the notion that tactical nuclear weapons are somehow a lesser threat, “Any nuclear weapon used … is a strategic game-changer.” Therefore, if NATO retaliates with a powerful response, either nuclear or conventional, it may target strategic Russian military positions and perhaps even sites of political power, aiming at wiping out Russian military capabilities and targeting those in positions of authority—a move that could threaten Putin’s leadership. A NATO retaliation should therefore be considered a major threat to Putin, especially because rivals include numerous nations with considerable nuclear capabilities, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

In addition, at the heart of this conflict stands national identity. Putin has little motivation to devastate a county that he wishes to annex and has not knowingly made any preparations for using nuclear weapons. Fear of the bomb accounts for one reason behind the West’s decision to leave Ukraine to fight on its own.

### No Impact --- MENA = NATO Fail

#### NATO overstretched its deterrent in MENA --- ensures no credible deterrent capabilities

Thierry Tardy 22, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College and Senior Analyst at the EUISS, “NATO’s Sub-strategic Role in the Middle East and North Africa,” https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-sub-strategic-role-middle-east-and-north-africa/micahw

NATO’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is politically and operationally complex. That a security and defense organization would play an important role in a contiguous region from which numerous security threats emanate makes intuitive sense. As NATO seeks to adapt to the evolving security environment while revisiting its Strategic Concept, its ambition and role in the MENA need to be factored in.

The security environment on NATO’s southern periphery is challenging. From Libya to the Near East and the Persian Gulf, the MENA concentrates a fair number of threats that range from regional conflicts to state fragility, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. These also pose direct and indirect risks to the security of NATO members and their societies, including those related to uncontrolled migration, human insecurity, and climate change. More recently, the reemergence of Russia and the emergence of China in the MENA have made a NATO role there even more pertinent. If Russia is in Libya and Syria, both countries that generate insecurity for the alliance, then there is an additional rationale for some sort of presence in the region.

The reality is, however, different as NATO has for long struggled to assert itself as a security provider on its southern periphery. Not that it has abstained from intervening. From Libya to the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aden it has been very present, but the coherence and impact of its interventions have been fragile.

Three factors can explain the difficulties that NATO is encountering in the MENA. First, the broad range and diffuse nature of the threats and risks in the region make it difficult to come up with a response that is coherent yet sufficiently targeted. Simply understanding what and where the problems are is daunting. Second, it follows from the nature of the threats that NATO might not be the best-suited institution to tackle them. Many of the risks relate to political or socioeconomic factors for which a military alliance brings little added value. Third, NATO’s role is hindered by the diverging agendas of its members. Not only do allies disagree about how central the region should be for NATO but some are also openly confronting one another in some of the sensitive southern theatres.

### No Impact --- Baltics

#### No Russian intent to infringe on the Baltics.

Person 15—(Associate Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy). Robert Person. “6 reasons not to worry about Russia invading the Baltics”. Washington Post. November 12, 2015.

So could the Baltics be next? I don’t think so, for six reasons. 1. Vladimir Putin can’t keep the Baltics out of NATO or the E.U. International relations scholar John Mearsheimer has made a provocative argument that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was provoked by NATO expansion in the 1990s and 2000s. Whether or not you agree, the Baltics made it into the club before Russia had the capacity to stop them. Some experts have argued that one of the main reasons Russia provoked conflict in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 was to effectively veto NATO membership for those countries — because NATO would be unlikely to let in new members with open territorial disputes. Invading your neighbors may be a good strategy for keeping them out of NATO or the E.U., but it’s not so useful once they’re already members, since it would guarantee a catastrophic war between Russia and NATO. 2. Russia will never have a seat at the table in Baltic politics In my previous post on the Monkey Cage, I argued that Putin’s key strategic objective in Ukraine was to install a government in Kiev that would give Moscow a say in making Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy. But that couldn’t happen in the Baltics. Ever. The historical antagonism is too strong. My previous research on national identity in the Baltics shows that the Soviet occupation of the Baltics during WWII remains central to national memory and identity. Russia is seen as the imperial “other” against which the Baltics define themselves, and would never be allowed to interfere in domestic politics. What’s more, Putin has so far failed to achieve his strategic objective of installing a pliant pro-Russian government in Kiev. Even if he imagined it possible, there’s little reason to believe he would be any more successful in the Baltics. 3. The Baltics don’t have the same symbolic meaning as Ukraine and Crimea Ukraine has deep symbolic meaning for Russia. Citizens of both countries consider the ancient empire of Kievan Rus (and its capital, Kiev) to be the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization. Kiev’s Prince Vladimir the Great brought Orthodox Christianity to his subjects in 988, during a golden age of Slavic civilization that was the foundation for later achievements by Muscovy and the Russian empire. In fact, they just installed the cornerstone for a massive new monument to Prince Vladimir near the Kremlin in Moscow. Parts of modern-day Ukraine had been part of the Russian empire since the 16th century; Crimea became part of Russia in 1783. This deep historical connection of civilizations has long made Ukrainian independence hard for Russia to swallow. Putin once famously remarked to George Bush: “You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a country.” And for most of Russia’s history, he’s right: Ukraine only became a country in 1991 after centuries as the borderland of the Russian and Soviet empires. That Ukraine took Crimea with it only made things worse, as the peninsula was only “gifted” to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954, a transfer that many Russians saw as illegitimate both before and after the Soviet collapse. Ukraine is special for Russia. The Baltics are a different story. My research has traced the territorial evolution of Russia in the Baltic region. While the Baltics became part of the Russian empire through the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, the Tsars were sufficiently “hands off” to allow strong national identities to flourish that opposed Russian domination. What’s more, the Baltics were independent between the world wars. When the Soviet Union forcibly annexed them again in 1940, Baltic citizens saw it as an illegitimate foreign occupation – and continued to resist for the next 51 years. Even as Gorbachev struggled in the dying days of the USSR to hold together some kind of union, he knew that it would not include the Baltic Republics, and left them out of his proposed treaty salvaging what was left of the Soviet Union. Russia and Russians have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically distinct from Russia, according to surveys and interviews I’ve conducted across Russia and Latvia. Whether the historical and cultural importance of Ukraine was a motivation or just a justification for Putin’s actions in Ukraine, comparable symbolism is absent in the Baltics, making them less likely targets for Russian interference. 4. Russian access to Kaliningrad is not threatened. For now. Throughout its post-Soviet history, Ukrainian leaders used the Russian naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, as a bargaining chip with Russia. After the Orange Revolution of 2004-5, pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would not renew Russia’s lease of the base after 2017. Though his successor, the ill-fated Viktor Yanukovych, reversed that decision, many have argued that permanently securing access to the base was a key strategic objective of Russia’s invasion of Crimea. Annexing the peninsula solved the strategic problem of where to locate the Black Sea Fleet once and for all. By contrast, no Baltic or Western government has ever made serious attempts to block Russian access to the exclave of Kaliningrad, though Lithuanian officials have recognized their theoretical ability to do so. But actually following through on the threat to cut railways, roadways and utilities to Kaliningrad would almost certainly provoke a Russian military response and guarantee a dangerous escalation with potentially nuclear implications. So no country even tries. Yes, Kaliningrad could conceivably emerge as a flashpoint, especially if Russia uses it for an aggressive anti-access/area denial strategy. Russian missiles based in Kaliningrad could keep NATO naval and ground forces from reaching the Baltics in the event of a Russian attack, isolating the three countries from the rest of the alliance at a critical moment. But as long as Lithuania allows Russians access to the region, war over Kaliningrad is unlikely. 5. Baltic Russians are not Crimean, Donbas or Russian Russians Much of the talk of a Russian invasion of the Baltics has centered around the ethnic Russians living there. As one reporter in Riga put it, “If Putin felt justified in his actions against Ukraine, where 17 percent of the population is ethnic Russian and 24 percent Russian-speaking, Latvia’s allegedly endangered minority would seem to provide him with a convenient pretext for action.” One social activist in Latvia warned about what many observers fear: “Military aggression in the old style — tanks crossing the border — is not likely here. … But what they call a hybrid offensive — provocations, a media war — that is very possible and hard to defend against.” Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional modes of warfare, bringing the battle to new battlegrounds. As retired Col. John McCuen writes, “the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population and the international community population.” Thus, many have speculated that the Russian minorities of the Baltics could offer Russia a sympathetic target population to use as its launching pad for a hybrid invasion, just as it used the native separatist movements in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as cover for hybrid warfare. I don’t think that’s likely. I recently wrote in the Moscow Times that the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism. More and more ethnic Russians have gained citizenship in the Baltic States and increasingly seem to hold the view of Nils Ušakovs, the ethnically Russian mayor of Latvia’s capital city, Riga: “I was born here. … I’m a Latvian national; a Russian-speaking Latvian who is a patriot of my country.” This attitude is especially prevalent among the younger generation of Baltic Russians, who increasingly see themselves as European and enjoy the benefits of living in the European Union. Even the older generations who still feel a stronger connection to Russia can see the contrast in living standards between Russia and the Baltics. Katri Raik is the director of Narva College in Estonia, which caters to Estonia’s Russian population, and compares Narva with the Russian city Ivangorod that sits just across the river: What would happen if Narva were to hold a referendum? Would its residents want to live in Estonia or in Putin’s Russia? Anyone with any common sense … would want to live in Estonia. Because life here is better, more stable, the pensions are higher, we have social welfare. People in Narva know what they would choose because they often travel to Ivangorod. Research by Ammon Cheskin confirms this point. While Baltic Russians maintain a close cultural affinity with Russia, Russia’s political and economic attraction is much lower.

### No Impact --- AT Cohesion

#### Nato cohesion impacts are empirically disproven.

Mishra 6/6/22 [Pankaj Mishra is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is author, most recently, of “Run and Hide.”; “Western ‘Unity’ Is Making the Ukraine War Worse”; The Washington Post; June 6, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/western-unityis-making-the-ukraine-war-worse/2022/06/05/9d5b85fe-e4a5-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html]//eleanor

A few months ago, acute divisions plagued the United States, the European Union and ties between them. Germany, Europe’s leading nation, had developed a mutually profitable relationship with Russia. Poland, a frontline state now aligned against Russia, was descending deeper into autocracy, inviting punitive measures from its EU partners. A mendacious Tory prime minister led the United Kingdom. The US, damaged by Trumpism, a mismanaged pandemic and a military debacle in Afghanistan, was debating the likelihood of civil war. French President Emmanuel Macron had declared NATO was experiencing “brain death.”

#### Too many alt causes they don’t solve for.

Dr. Aaron Bazin & Dr. Dominika Kunertova 18, Bazin is the Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group at the U.S. Special Operations Command, Kunertova is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich, “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO,” *Military Review*, Vol. Jan–Feb 2018, No. 9, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Bazin-an-alliance-divided.pdf/micahw

External risks. The participants found it questionable whether allies will be able to find a common conventional threat that would be perceived as strong enough to “transcend the domestic pressures and the concept of sovereignty.” Although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie in multiplication of external threats and a lack of common perception of those threats.

This underdeveloped common understanding of external threats, accompanied by differential threat assessments, could weaken NATO’s cohesion. To illustrate this point, although the survey participants listed the failure to activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, further discussions showed that non-Article 5 missions could constitute the real test for NATO’s cohesion. In words of the one of participants, “if there is an operation and only two nations show up, this is not cohesion.”

For some nations, this threat multiplication and dissimilar threat perceptions can lead to an operational overstretch or to an eventual “mission creep.” In contrast, other nations might develop an excessive sense of security that would lead them to reduce their attention and willingness to participate in NATO activities. For this reason, terrorism, for instance, cannot constitute NATO’s defining threat. Additionally, the changing nature of threats to allies’ security will require domestic, nonmilitary means to address them, rather than alliance-wide military measures. In other words, “nations will be looking inside to maintain order.”

Political and economic factors. The group of political and economic factors points to the risks of severe disagreements among the allies, which could lead to the weakening of the transatlantic bond, disintegration tendencies within the European Union, or even withdrawal of a NATO nation from the Alliance.

At the level of political elites, the participants identified the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations among the most probable causes of weakening alliance cohesion in the future. Particularly, populist leaders who prefer narrow, short-term political gains at home and who are prepared to “undermine an international institution to gain consensus internally” represent a serious threat to multilateralism, on which the Alliance has depended. Oftentimes, national leaders “use NATO as a scapegoat for their domestic political games,” while “NATO does not [and cannot] fight its own nations.”

At the level of domestic population, the support for the Alliance in member states can decline due to NATO’s unclear purpose. This could become an acute problem, especially if national leaders continue to frame security problems exclusively in domestic terms instead of treating them as NATO-wide. Particularly, concerns over sovereignty could override the relative value of the Alliance’s collective good and make governments pull limited funds away from NATO.

In a similar vein, demographic shifts changing the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of nations, such as an aging population and migration, will drive differences in fiscal priorities, which could result in decreasing national defense spending. Furthermore, if the free-riding behavior reaches critical proportions within NATO burden sharing, it can create, out of those who bear their fair share, a group of allies disinterested in defending free-riding nations, as they could cease to see “return on their investment.”

Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align.

Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up.

Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand.

Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations.

Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31

Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

Core values. The participants acknowledged that shared values and identity mean that allies do not represent a threat to each other. NATO’s core liberal-democratic values, defined in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, further frame the nonadversarial culture of the Alliance’s internal relational dynamics.32 Yet, although core values scored high in the survey, the discussions revealed the disagreement about whether they are more crucial for cohesion than national interests are.

The findings indicated that the general problem with core values relates to the intangibility of the common good that NATO produces. If the Alliance is successful, “nothing happens,” which leads nations to take peace, security, and stability for granted. This can affect the overall understanding of NATO’s purpose among domestic populations. Due to an unknown or unclear purpose of NATO, this “we-feeling” can disappear.

Moreover, the rise of populism and radical nationalism with authoritarian inclinations, further fueled by hybrid, cyber, or information warfare coming from Russia, appears threatening to NATO’s core values and will create frictions within NATO. Arguably, the Islamic State also uses a “strategy of chaos” intended to divide the NATO nations and to destroy the cohesion within and among their societies. Further regarding authoritarian regimes, the participants mentioned that the Alliance should think twice before establishing a partnership with yet another country.

Additionally, some participants believed that the continuing migration to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa region would change the fabric of the European societies. European societies might drift apart due to the different paces of change in their identities and values.

To conclude, although there was no consensus among the participants on the degree to which common values play a role in NATO and its cohesion, sufficiently aligned interests of NATO nations, together with a shared purpose of NATO, constitute a definite precondition for a cohesive Alliance.

### Impact Turn --- Cohesion = Russia War

#### NATO cohesion is worse – causes the alliance to pursue more punitive measures which provokes Russian backlash.

Mishra 6/6/22 [Pankaj Mishra is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is author, most recently, of “Run and Hide.”; “Western ‘Unity’ Is Making the Ukraine War Worse”; The Washington Post; June 6, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/western-unityis-making-the-ukraine-war-worse/2022/06/05/9d5b85fe-e4a5-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html]//eleanor

Of course, unfocused actions bred largely of self-regard were always doomed to fail. Take, for instance, sanctions, widely hailed as projecting Western resolve against Putinism. Ineffective against even toothless regimes such as Cuba, sanctions have predictably failed to deter the Russian leader while exposing billions across the world to steep inflation and hunger. Additional punitive measures have been very selectively imposed, with more focus on maintaining unity than on the political, economic and social repercussions for a world that has barely recovered from two radically destructive years of the pandemic. It should not be surprising that most nations, including close Western allies such as India and Turkey, continue to do business with Russia, or that Putin has retaliated by blockading ports that supply the world with wheat and fertilizers. Now convinced of their own rhetoric about the strength of the Western coalition, US politicians and commentators have clamored to change the regime in Moscow and fatally weaken Russia, with no reference to how such fantasies of supreme power worked out in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Meanwhile, three months into the war, these same figures seem no closer to defining realistic Western objectives in Ukraine. In fact, the options before the US and Europe have always been blindingly clear. They could throw their full support behind Ukraine’s resistance to Russia, make sanctions watertight and cut off all financial support for Putin’s war machine. Or they could bring forward the unavoidable obligation to talk to their enemies and offer incentives for both Ukraine and Russia to reach a negotiated solution. The first option is scarcely ideal. Nations that depend on Russia for its energy and food needs won’t end their relationship with the country overnight — not even Germany will do so. Also, increasingly direct military confrontation with a nuclear-armed state is unwise. Yet the second option is hardly being vigorously pursued right now. Thus, Ukraine receives from the West neither the weapons it seeks for a more fruitful war effort, nor sufficient motivation to pursue peace through diplomacy. What we do get, in copious measure, is a psychodrama — of a tiny but powerful minority of politicians and journalists who have been trying to resolve the identity crisis of the West by rhetorically exaggerating its will and resources against Putin. During his four years in power, US President Donald Trump wrecked the cold war idea of the West as free, democratic and rational. In Europe, hard-right movements and personalities that were openly admiring of Putin further blurred a Western self-image forged during the long confrontation with totalitarian Soviet communism. A brazenly imperialist Russia has now appeared to cleanse and vivify that identity just as the Soviet Union once did. Declarations that “the West must hold its nerve,” even as death and destruction stalk Ukraine, fuel the suspicion that achieving some kumbaya moment of synchronized purpose and identity has become more vital to the West than averting a global humanitarian catastrophe. Needless to say, old assumptions — of a singular West possessed of colossal power or prestige or nerve — cannot be sustained today by a profoundly fragile coalition of Western countries which are internally divided, with angry populations pursuing widely different socio-political destinies. It is true that many members of the West’s political and media elites, mostly middle-aged, white and male, fundamentally experienced the world as its hegemons. Too many disorientating things have happened since they were young — among them, the rise of China, a country nursing its sense of humiliation by Western powers, and the re-emergence of a defeated rival Russia as an energy superpower. Faced with such resentful and implacable challengers, they have naturally sought shelter in the easy certainties and slogans of their youth. But peace and stability in the world will depend on whether today’s fragmented West can find less treacherous ways of dealing with the rest.

### No Impact --- DIANA Fails

#### The private sector fails at defense innovation

Samuel J. Brannen 18, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Posture in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Bad Idea: Expecting the Private Sector to Drive Innovation in National Security,” https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-expecting-the-private-sector-to-drive-innovation-in-national-security/micahw

It’s bipartisan Washington gospel that America’s private sector (“industry”) will deliver the innovation the country needs from next-generation national security technologies to future manufacturing competitiveness. Such expectation, however, is increasingly a bad idea without a far more strategic, centralized, and White House-driven approach to the challenges ahead. We are at the front-end of an era of rapid, disruptive technological change in which global competition is heating up, and first-mover advantage could prove decisive in markets and geopolitics for decades to come. National government-backed industrial policies, not markets alone, will play a decisive role in determining outcomes. The United States needs proactive strategies and not the kind of defensive, on-the-fly responses we’ve seen on artificial intelligence and 5G telecommunications.

At some point in the 1970s, Republicans and eventually Democrats began to develop an allergy to anything that resembled government direction of industry, even if it was predicated on national security grounds. The central role that government played in industrial planning and policy in the Second World War and continued to play through the early Cold War was dismissed as an aberration. With supply-side economics ascendant since the Nixon presidency, the argument for a laissez-faire approach toward industry prospered. The less government direction, the better, and the economy will organically innovate, the thinking went (and goes).

Fast-forward to the present, and it’s a different world. U.S. competitors around the world are anything but laissez-faire with their national industrial policies. China has launched an ambitious industrial plan on key technologies and innovations through its “Made in China 2025” initiative. President Xi Jinping has been clear on the need to seize what “presents the Chinese people with an opportunity you rarely see in a thousand years.” Russia has maintained a heavy hand in protecting and promoting those industries key to its national security, even as it becomes a global innovation laggard. U.S. allies and partners from France to Germany, Japan to Israel, and South Korea to Singapore have also put into place strategies and policies to grow domestic industries around emerging technologies and to foster innovation in areas of national priority. They’ve looked intensely at everything from focused R&D to scaling up technologies and upskilling workforces for the changes underway.

None of this is your grandfather’s or grandmother’s industrial policy. It’s aimed at the cutting edge of tech, and it’s hardly a socialist approach. Instead, it’s an effort by national governments to concentrate existing resources and infuse capital smartly to address the most important elements of future science and technology and manufacturing competitiveness. To be sure, this is something the United States has also done over this time frame but in a largely balkanized way that depends on informal networks, one-off initiatives, and few economies of scale. The type of White House leadership on these issues seen during the Cold War has been missing. There has been plenty of talk of “moonshots” but little implementation of them.

As a result, America is achieving far less than its potential across a range of technologies in which its early lead is rapidly diminishing: artificial intelligence to additive manufacturing, electric vehicles to unmanned systems, etc. And at an economy-wide level, the United States is failing to take advantage of what the Fourth Industrial Revolution can offer for reshoring manufacturing and creating new, good-paying jobs as some of these technologies transform the overall economy and risk large-scale labor dislocation. An argument can also be made that the innovation economy is becoming dangerously concentrated, with big companies getting bigger and less room for the innovation that startup companies bring. Strategic investments by the government could change that.

America’s collective amnesia on the past success of government industrial policy intervention is puzzling. Nearly every major U.S. technological breakthrough of national security importance in the twentieth-century was the result of concerted national security policymaking from the Manhattan Project to ARPANET. Silicon Valley is Silicon Valley because of U.S. government investments made there over a span of decades. Defense and aerospace investments made by the U.S. government from the 1950s on led to the rise of the semiconductor industry and subsequently a clustering of engineering talent that laid the foundations for the rise of the tech industry. Yet in past decades, Silicon Valley companies and the Pentagon became so estranged from one another that the Department of Defense had to stand up a new and specialized office to renew its interactions with Silicon Valley (the Defense Innovation Unit) while also creating a Defense Innovation Board to try to infuse its own organization with the thinking and ethos of the tech industry. And meanwhile, tensions between government and major Silicon Valley innovators have risen, from the role of social media platforms as largely unrestricted gateways for foreign election interference, to the refusal of software engineers to work on Department of Defense-funded projects.

Is there hope that the U.S. government might yet remember how and why it once led the world in fostering innovation, updated for the technologically-driven opportunities and challenges of our time? In the 2017 National Security Strategy the Trump administration identified what it called the National Industrial Innovation Base and stated,

“To maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth and security, such as data science, encryption, autonomous technologies, gene editing, new materials, nanotechnology, advanced computing technologies, and artificial intelligence.”

But the follow-up to that worthy objective has been lacking. There is no federal government-wide strategy, let alone centralized implementation plan with resources. Despite broad lip service to that goal and important strides on export controls and intellectual property protection, no broad strategic actions have been taken. For example, the interagency task force report on “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States” is long on diagnoses of the challenges the country faces and short on prescriptions to address them. Protecting U.S. industry on these issues isn’t enough; industry must be grown. For a U.S. administration with demonstrated resolve to intervene in the market on national security grounds when it comes to steel and aluminum, it should be natural for President Trump to realize his strategic ends in fostering and protecting America’s next generation of crown jewels. Yet, the focus on future competitiveness is sorely lacking. The much vaunted Office of American Innovation—created to address just these challenges—is missing in action.

While it’s true that significantly more innovation is coming out of the private sector than ever before, it’s also true that the government can play a decisive role in what remains the world’s first or second largest market for just about everything. The U.S. government remains the single largest spender on R&D in the world, even as its share of total U.S. R&D spend has declined as U.S. private sector spending has risen (from a high of 53.9 percent in 1953 to 24.1 percent in 2016, according to the St. Louis Federal Reserve).

Put simply, it’s a bad idea for the United States to ignore the power of national industrial strategy and policy at this moment in history and expect the private sector alone to drive necessary innovation and future security and prosperity. The Trump administration should issue a National Innovation Strategy to clearly focus U.S. government resources and attention on priority areas, especially focusing on those technologies of national security and broader economic importance.

### No Impact --- AT: DIANA Solves

#### Ceding the innovation race to the commercial sector kills readiness and interoperability---only NATO’s military innovation solves case.

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Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31

#### NATO governance of emerging technologies is good – uniquely positioned to fulfill the three pillars of technological governance.

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki

NATO and Technological Change: Three Pillars of AI Governance This section considers three pillars where NATO has procedures and competency to operationalize AI governance through both mechanisms of policy alignment and standards, and enhance security in the international environment. The pillars reflect foundational issue areas constitutive of governance but are also issue areas where previous scholars have cautioned as particularly challenging in the AI governance space. The three pillars—(1) ethics and values, (2) legal norms, and (3) safety and security—are meant to illustrate three conditions for NATO to facilitate policy and standards harmonization. Importantly, these pillars are not exhaustive areas in which NATO will need to consider governance structures to responsibly implement AI technology, but rather highlight particular issues that researchers and analysts acknowledge as significant hurdles in navigating AI governance (see Table 69.2).54 Core, shared values at foundation of Alliance’s political cohesion that informs civilian oversight of operations and overall institutional effectiveness; included in principles Alignment between differing legal interpretations between Allies, particularly as affects the ability of forces to communicate and interoperate in dynamic contexts; constant calibration of policies based on legal interpretations Strategic planning for maintaining integrity of information in military operations and transparency measures that reinforce democratic accountability; setting priorities on defensive systems and countermeasures to protect from motivated attacks and intentional failure modes of AI-enabled weapon systems NATO Standardization and Certification Basis of standards reinforcing responsible state behavior (see legal norms) and responsible engineering practices (see safety and security); human-centric views of responsibility and accountability also embedded in technical adoption measures Precedents of legal standards dealing with international humanitarian law, including detention standards and training publications Certification frameworks and technical, human, and procedural standards to prevent emergent behavior and enhance robustness and resilience of systems to behave predictably in conflict environments The first pillar considers NATO’s role in the evolution of ethical and values-driven AI. One ongoing debate regarding AI as a military technology is the ethical implications and baseline values the Allies, and others, want infused in the development and adoption of AI. The Allies themselves lack uniform consensus on numerous, substantial ethical questions on the use of AI, as most clearly seen in the adjacent area of the ethics of autonomy in weapons systems including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In this discussion, we spotlight NATO’s role in facilitating and shaping ethical harmonization as an operational requirement to ensure successful future missions. The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation.

#### NATO key to the development of ethical AI

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki

Ethics and values One of the vital aspects of AI which has garnered significant global attention is the ethical implications of artificial intelligence as a military technology—an issue that has divided much of the global community, including NATO member states. As a starting point, researchers and analysts have considered the implications of emerging military technology in terms of ethical responsibility and regulation, especially as states and organizations continue to release AI ethical principles, guidelines, and standards.55 We explore how NATO can operationalize the debate around ethics and values of military AI to garner coordination and continue progress of EDT harmonization among partners. Building on the theoretical discussion from STS and military innovation literature above, the adoption of technologies that reinforce values serves the strategic interest of NATO to shape technological innovation against current waves of illiberalism. Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59 The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment. Put simply, shared values are important to both political and operational coherence between Allies. In its 2018 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, the strategic command Allied Command Transformation urged discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of technological advancement to both know how it would impact NATO decision-making and how the Alliance would be prepared to address adversaries who do not share in that vision.62 As such, NATO is contending with the ways that ethical AI impacts its own cohesion internally and how differences between allies may project outward in the face of competitors whose ethical frameworks and commitment to the rule of law differ. Internally, there is a strong national government commitment to responsible AI. Recently, transatlantic cooperation has initiated partnerships of largely NATO states committed to advancing responsible AI with goals towards data sharing and future interoperability.63 AI defense partnerships are not restricted to military innovation but rather aim to facilitate civilian innovation cooperation for defense purposes. Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.”64 Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another.65 These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway.66 While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies.67 Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.68 NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation. Many remaining questions and uncertainty will be addressed in NATO’s forthcoming AI ethical principles guidelines. But the guidelines adopted in 2021 do not address every ethical dilemma. Regarding accountability, especially, likely major questions will continue to affect the Alliance. As Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel recently clarified, NATO will offer a framework of responsible use for the Allies—but the question of accountability for member states, as opposed to civilian technology manufacturers for example, is one principle that will not have an easy solution.71

#### NATO key to international norms setting and legal interoperability – other alliances don’t solve.

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki

International legal norms In certain respects, the legal debate mirrors much of the ethical debate surrounding AI as the two address many of the same issues. International law is a values-based system embedded in certain principles and practices agreed-upon within the international system. This section certainly identifies the complementarity of the ethical discussion surrounding AI, but it also illustrates where the legal debate can depart from the ethical considerations to address different sorts of legal challenges that face the Alliance. Lawyers, researchers, and civil society grapple with existing legal regimes relevant to military operations and the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding automated decision-making, particularly in lethal decision-making. Thus far, the legal dialogue has been heavily anchored in the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other relevant legal regimes, to lethal autonomous weapons systems.72 IHL, also known as the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, regulate the means and methods of warfare and, as such, is pivotal to the emergence of military technology and how existing legal structures are disrupted. The legal debate often revolves around the prospect of a “treaty ban” of LAWS.73 But the legal debate is much more nuanced than the likelihood of international treaties banning any particular weapon system. Especially because NATO is not a regulatory body, it cannot institute measures to regulate emerging technology for the Allies. Instead, NATO’s function in the legal domain may be more effective outside the traditional legal debates around emerging military technology and more embedded in fostering cooperation and coordination among military partners. Other avenues of legal regulation may fall short of an international convention or prohibition, but nevertheless factor significantly in regulating and/or delineating state policies. Additionally, non-lethal applications of AI, as well as applications of AI that do not figure into autonomous systems, also raise important legal questions under international law. Arguably, norms around non-lethal applications are more urgent as their development is more advanced, harder to define, and less controversial in integration.74 Ultimately, NATO’s facilitative power can help ensure that integration of EDTs like AI into military capabilities and into multinational coalition operations is consistent with member states’ legal obligations. One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations.

#### NATO key to military development and standardization

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Safety and security For humans to meet ethical and legal commitments when developing and deploying AI, the systems themselves must be safe, secure, and reliable. More simply put, if humans and institutions interacting with AI do not have confidence that the systems will perform as expected, then they cannot assure that its development and deployment are responsible. This makes safety and security a key pillar of responsible AI governance for any actor.82 As this section explores for NATO in particular, safety and security are indispensable to the Alliance’s stated goals to focus its approach to EDTs in the areas of “deterrence and defense, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control aspects.”83 Politically, democratic militaries using AI cannot be accountable to their citizenries nor their coalition partners if they lack mechanisms to trace and explain how their systems are reliable. Accidents and interference with AI systems could likewise create political risks for the Alliance. For example, if deepfakes and micro-targeted information attacks compromise confidence in the integrity of information used to build a common operating picture, then the operational difficulties could also erode political trust between Allies in a few key ways. In the North Atlantic Council, disagreement about the integrity of information could slow the decision-making body’s ability to react to fast-changing operational realities.84 Further, compromised AI systems may not only make it harder for forces to prevent harm to non-combatants, but also to prevent friendly fire. In this way, coalition forces arguably face even higher obligations to coordinate on the reliability of their systems, relative to adversaries and near-peer competitors that tend to operate alone. As such, responsible AI governance is not purely technical; policy alignment and strategic planning are likewise necessary to draw attention to risk management above the tactical level. Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In addition to governability, NATO and its Allies are assessing the risks that bias, attacks, and lack of interpretability can introduce in relation to the anticipated uses of a given AI system.89 In security and defense, new and heightened risks include poisoning of the information environment, deception systems and techniques, uncertainty about the performance of systems in new and unknown environments, and the possibility that tensions or accidents escalate at a faster tempo than humans and institutions can process, among others. These risks can manifest either in motivated attacks or unintentional failure modes.90 In both cases, assuring and certifying that military assets are safe and secure is important given the inherently high risk in operational environments. These operational environments include the presumption that an adversary is disrupting one’s own systems, be it by directly attacking the AI systems themselves, or disrupting the broader command, control, and communications systems under which the AI systems are operating.91 Mitigating these types of risks is typically done in testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) and in experimentation activities.92 Yet AI cannot be validated and verified the way traditional software systems are because there is no guarantee that an AI system will perform in the real world as it does in a testing environment, and because lifelong-learning systems will perform differently over their lifecycle. Having robust assurance and TEVV processes in place are also important for operators to build trust in the systems they are meant to use, as well as for citizenries and coalition partners at large to see that accountability procedures still apply. As such, building institutional procedures to govern AI safety and security is necessary to build trust in the use of the technology—as well as to develop countermeasures and defensive systems that protect against adversarial threats. NATO thus has an institutional responsibility to prevent and mitigate these intentional and unintentional failures if using AI in operations and mission support.93 As Table 69.1 shows, the Alliance also has a range of relevant entities to coordinate national approaches to AI safety and security, as well as facilitate safety measures as part of responsible use in the Alliance-wide ecosystem. NATO has an important role to play in military standardization and Allied policy planning for safe, secure, and interoperable AI. This includes the coordinating role of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Command, Control and Consultation Board to implement complementary acquisition processes that fuse AI adoption measures with safety responsibilities. Furthermore, entities including STO and NSO have a significant role setting the technical baseline and promulgating materiel standards that provide the technical framework for safety and security. Although their staffs are themselves small, they both convene hundreds, if not thousands, of subject matter experts in working groups. As such they both offer unique technical networks to help shape safety and security in a way that minimize risk in operations. NATO’s resources and leadership are vital to using standards and coalition policy to instill safe and secure technological development, a necessary condition to interoperable and successful future operations.

#### NATO governance good

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ’22 -- (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, 2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69, accessed 6-23-2022) -- nikki

Conclusion At the core, this chapter argues that NATO is well positioned to steward the development of military AI and institute governance mechanisms towards coalition inclusion of responsible AI while simultaneously maintaining incentives for comparative advantage. Using the three pillars—ethics and values, legal norms, and safety and security—as issue areas which present AI governance challenges, we show that NATO has space to emerge as a leader in AI governance and contribute to responsible adoption of EDTs in the international security environment. This builds on foundations that derive NATO’s responsibilities to govern AI according to its values, legal obligations, and institutional interests. These foundations from both STS and military innovation studies offer ways that the Alliance can activate its existing governance mechanisms to exert influence in new ways. Not only is this influence important for the Alliance to bolster its institutional relevance in an evolving international security architecture, but it also dovetails with its capacity to shore up military effectiveness and interoperability as Allies modernize their arsenals and associated concepts into the frontier of AI. Importantly, we do not argue NATO is the only—or even the most important—actor shaping AI governance in international security. Other contributors in this Handbook impressively detail efforts at both state and regional levels. Our aim has been to convince sceptics that NATO has a role that is not replicated by other stakeholders in the international security environment. NATO has particular influence, procedures, and the competency to institute certain governance mechanisms—namely standardization and policy planning—that it can build on without needing to expend time building new institutions from scratch. Beyond just a role, NATO is incentivized to emerge as a steward of AI governance and use these mechanisms for future operations, should the Alliance wish to maintain its unique position as a leader encouraging policy alignment, defense planning, and military standardization. More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research. On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment. In any discussion of AI as an emerging military technology, it is necessary to strike a balance between acknowledging the transformative potential of AI in the security environment, while simultaneously recognizing the “hype” that may, thus far, be unfounded. But some conclusions are clear. The risks and opportunities of military AI can pose significant challenges for future military operations, and this necessarily means there are many stakeholders with a vested interest in developing, promoting, and implementing responsible military AI. As multinational coalitions and military operations are a foundational security policy for much of the world, this means NATO is also a stakeholder with a vital interest in promoting safe and secure technology among its partners, both traditional and non-traditional. As the international security environment continues to shift, there is space for NATO to pursue its agenda to maintain technological superiority not just to protect and defend its way of life, but also to build on its pillars of AI governance to steward military innovation on a responsible trajectory.